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Aiming, in contrast to the traditional attitude, to arrive at general 
distinction of the role of the Sophists and the Sophistic Movement, this 
research concentrates on the individual Sophists rather than Socrates in 
five of Plato's dialogues: the Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Euthydemus 
and Republic  I. The thinking of six individual Sophists is examined in detail 
by contrasting the historical Sophists and the Sophists as portrayed by 
Plato in his dialogues. In addition to this the study considers whether or not 
Plato’s logical validity is consistent in developing an argument between 
Socrates and the individual Sophists.
Chapter I attempts to contrast the meaning of Callicles' physis with 
the Homeric hero's power and honour in unrivalled strength and prowess, 
closely interrelated with one's competitive excellence(dpeT'n). Chapter II 
investigates the thinking of the two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, 
finding it to be closely interrelated with the logic and ontology of the 
Eleatics in the respect of developing their systematic fallacies. Chapter 111 
shows that Hippias, as polymath, has derived his basic ideas from the
natural philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles, and shows how this helps
to explain his idea of physis and "the natural continuous bodies of being". 
Chapter IV discusses how Protagoras' claim to be a teacher of the art of 
politics and of making men good citizens can be coherently justifiable 
through his use of myth and argument. Chapter V clarifies how 
Thrasymachus' definition of justice as "justice and the just are the other 
fellow’s good" leads to his other proposition "justice is nothing other than 
the interest of the stronger" in the actual world, involving the courage to 
look the real facts in the face rather than hide behind the name of justice. In
particular Socrates' ineffectiveness is well displayed in dealing with the
powerful claim of the moral sceptic, for his counterattack falls short of 
refuting Thrasymachus' position in this dialogue.
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Introduction
I N T R O D U C T I O N
I. Interpreting the Role of the Sophists: A Methodological Problem
To study the thought of the philosophers of a specific period using the
writings of a particular philosopher who was especially antagonistic to 
them, and take his representation of them as a matter of fact, is a 
procedure liable to lead to a mistaken and distorted idea of their thought. 
With this in mind prior to attempting an understanding of. the Sophistic 
Movement in fifth century B.C. Athens through Plato's dialogues, one must 
realise that Plato, who is hostile to the Sophists, is "the producer, stage- 
manager and script writer for the whole performance"^ with all the force of 
literary genius, whereas the Sophists have to keep silent even though they 
may be unfairly manipulated and criticised in Plato's dialogues. So to
expound the thought of the Sophists through Plato's dialogues is to risk 
perverting and misrepresenting it. Plato was not an historian, but a great 
philosopher and writer who had sufficient ability to perform dramatic
manipulation to the detriment of his master's opponents. And if we read his 
dialogues, e.g. the Republic  and the Gorgias, we can find that Plato has 
contempt not only for all the Sophists and all the rhetoricians, but for all 
musicians, poets and politicians, and even for the great politician, Pericles. 
There are more than eighty references to the Sophists in Plato's dialogues. 
Most of them are purely negative; as the ruiners or corruptors of young 
men{Meno  91c), peddlers of knowledge(Profagforas 313a), the hired hunter of 
rich young men (ibid 313 c), the mercenary hunter after the young and 
r \c h (S o p h is t  231 d), a sort of wholesale merchant of learning for the 
soul(ibid), a sort of master, appropriating to himself the eristic technique, 
in the art of combat about words(ibid), the imitators of true being and 
astonishing money-makers(ibid 253 c). Especially, the terms Sophist and 
money maker belong almost inseparably together for Plato. Following his
1 The Sophistic Movement, G.B Kerferd, Cambridge University Press 1981 p. 119
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master's view, Aristotle in his Sophisiici ElenchI defines the sophistic art 
as wisdom that appears to be such, but is not real, and the Sophist as 
someone who makes money from such apparent but unreal wisdom(165 a). It 
has come to be the long-established tradition to interpret and determine the 
Sophists' ideas based on the viewpoint and the mouthpiece of the great 
moral philosopher, Socrates, through Plato's dialogues. Because of both the 
immortal teaching of "sacred" Socrates and the lasting influence of Plato 
and Aristotle who used the pejorative title "Sophists" of the professional 
teachers who were involved in the Sophistic Movement, the meaning of the 
Sophists has been traditionally recognised, according to H. Sidgwick,^ as 
follows: "they(the Sophists) were a set of charlatans who appeared in 
Greece in the fifth century, and earned an ample livelihood by imposing on 
public credulity: professing to teach virtue, they really taught the art of 
fallacious discourse, and meanwhile propagated immoral practical 
doctrines".
However, this view was contested by the radical historian George 
G rote who in chapter LXVII of his book the History of Greece held that the 
Sophists were teachers of Greek morality. Grote argues that the Sophists 
were not a school, sect, or partnership with mutual responsibility but a 
profession, and there are no grounds for attributing to them any common 
doctrine, for the word Sophist was applied in Plato's time in a more
extensive sense than that in which he himself uses it. Secondly as regards 
the teaching of immorality, even Plato does not furnish any proof of this 
charge against the principal Sophists, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus and 
Gorgias, for "it is a apriori improbable that any public teachers should
propound doctrines so offensive to the common sentiments of mankind".^ On
the other hand, Edward Zeller, who, influenced basically by Hegel's approach, 
regards the Sophists as subjectivists and stresses the philosophic validity 
of their subjectivism, argues in his Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer 
geschichtlichen Entwicklung against Grote and his followers that all of the 
Sophists had a common educational discipline despite individual 
differences, and tried to characterise the Sophistic movement as a whole : 
"instead of completing physics by a system of ethics, physics are now
entirely set aside; instead of seeking a new method, the possibility of 
knowledge is denied; instead of searching for the internal grounds of
2 The Sophists, Journal of Philology 4, 1872 p. 289
3 Ibid p. 290
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obligation in the nature of moral activities and relations men are satisfied 
with a negative result, the invalidity of existing laws".^ The defenders of 
the Sophists are commonly classified into two groups: the one, which 
labelled the Sophists "positivists of the Enlightenment", stemming from 
Grote, and the other the Hegelian i.e. Nestle and Zeller.5 However, in the 
present century scholars on the Sophistic movement tend to combine 
elements from each group, for they have realised that it is dangerous to put 
them and their movement into either of two groups.
In the human mind there is a tendency towards extremism in making an 
eminent figure more conspicuous by contrasting him with other minor 
figures and differentiating him from them, so to us the polarisation 
between the Sophists and Socrates may be considered as a familiar and 
fixed opposite pair in relation to the Sophistic Movement in the fifth 
century B.C.. It does not follow that because Socrates was a morally good 
man, the morality of the Sophists must necessarily be bad. In this case 
minor figures like the Sophists are usually destined to be sacrificed as a 
scapegoat for the great figure, irrespective of the actual facts. So if we 
want to understand the Sophists' ideas more objectively, we must 
investigate them individually and in detail founded on the verified evidence, 
rather than comprehensively as has been the traditional approach, for the 
traditional interpretation of the Sophists' ideas might be suggested to be a 
sum of the views of Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle. As Kerferd rightly 
indicates in his article. The Future Direction of Sophistic Studies, "too much 
attention has been given in the past to attempts to arrive at general 
characterisations of the Sophists and the sophistic movement".^ However, 
most of the evidence is scanty and second-hand, as in the case of the pre- 
Socratic philosophers. Our primary sources for historical lives and thoughts 
of the Sophists will be quoted and examined by means of H. Diels and W. 
Kranz's Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (DK) and K. Freeman's The Pre- 
Socratic Philosophers. K. Popper, arguing for a favorable view of the role of 
the Sophistic Movement, identifies the generation of the Sophists with "the 
Great Generation" in his The Open Society and its Enemies. Popper asserts 
that by the realisation of the distinction between man's natural environment
 ^ Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 9 
5 Ibid, p. 10
 ^ The Sophists and their Legacy, Hermes, Einzelschriften Heft 44, ed. G. B. Kerferd 
Wiesbaden 1981
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and his social environment in the spirit of scientific investigation this 
generation marked a turning point in the history of mankind, which 
consisted in the transition from the closed society(the magical or tribal or 
collective society) to the open society(the society in which individuals are 
confronted with personal decisions).^ And Untersteiner's The Sophists 
examines the Sophists' ideas in detail by looking at the persons of the 
individual Sophists, Untersteiner claims in defence of the Sophists that "The 
Sophists agree in an anti-idealistic concreteness which does not tread the 
ways of scepticism but rather those of a realism and a phenomenalism 
which do not confine reality within a dogmatic scheme but allow it to rage 
in all its contradictions, in all its tragic intensity, in all the impartiality 
imposed by an intelligibility which will revive the joy in truth".8 On the 
other hand Guthrie's A History of Greek Philosophy III is a well-written 
work conducting an investigation based on subjects as well as on the 
individual Sophists. And in this book he tries to reconstruct the Sophistic 
Movement around the viewpoint of historical investigation and interest 
through "the contrast between Platonic idealism and the empiricism and 
scepticism of the S op h i s t s ,u s in g  philosophical and anthropological ideas, 
emphasising "essential connexions between the pre-Socratic tradition and 
the new intellectual ferment generated by the Sophists",lo Kerferd's The  
Sophistic Movement discusses the controversial themes of the Sophistic 
Movement as If the movement had broken out in our modern world; he argues 
that "the Sophistic Movement opened the way for the first time to the 
possibility of a genuinely historical approach to the understanding of human 
culture, above all, through the conception of what has been called "Anti­
primitivism", namely the rejection of the view that things were much better 
in the distant past In favour of a belief in progress and the idea of an 
unfolding development in the history of human b e i n g s . A n d  Kerferd's book 
discusses mainly the interpretation of two dominant themes^^ ; "the need to 
accept relativism in values and elsewhere without reducing all to 
subjectivism, and the belief that there is no area of human life or of the
 ^ The Open Society and its Enemies I, K. R. Popper, Reprinted 1973 p.57, pp. 173, 175 and 
185
 ^ The Sophists, M. Untersteiner, trans. K. Freeman, Oxford 1954 p.xvi 
 ^ A History of Greek Philosophy I I I ,  W. K. C. Guthrie, Cambridge University Press 1969 p.
9
10 Ibid p. 4
11 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 2
12 Ibid p. 2
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world as a whole which should be immune from understanding achieved 
through reasoned argument".
It is true that to criticise the ideas of the Sophists as revealed in 
Plato's dialogues has been the general way of understanding and interpreting 
them, instead of endeavouring to understand those ideas in relation to the 
Sophistic Movement. To study philosophy means to consider a matter in all 
its aspects and not to learn answers but to pursue them. The method of this 
research, motivated by asking questions on the problem of the Sophists, will 
be to concentrate on examining the viewpoint of individual Sophists in five 
of Plato's dialoguesi3: Gorgias, Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Protagoras and 
R e p u b lic  I. In these five dialogues we will deal with the thinking of six 
Sophists: Callicles, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Hippias, Protagoras and 
Thrasymachus. Keeping in mind Plato's intention of revealing the Sophists' 
negative aspects, we will consider whether or not Plato's logical validity is 
consistent in developing an argument between Socrates and the individual 
Sophists, and investigate whether or not Plato's view is convincing from the 
viewpoint of real life. In Gorgias we meet the so-called immoralist 
Callicles, a term applied to him by Adkins in Merit and Responsibility and 
by Annas in her book An Introduction to Plato's Republic. However, Dodds 
argues that "immoralist" is a misleading word, for Callicles believes that to 
obey the law of nature is not only profitable but right.i4 He is not a Sophist 
in the strict sense even if he is "beyond argument a very important figure in 
the history of the sophistic movement" .Plato 's  intention may be to show 
that "Gorgias' teaching is the seed of which the Calliclean way of life is the 
poisonous fruit".16 in this respect Plato regards him as a member of the 
Sophistic Movement in the Gorgias ; mordern scholars(Untersteiner, Guthrie 
and Kerferd) also categorise him as a minor figure of the Sophistic 
Movement. That is the main reason why Callicles' ideas should be examined 
in our research. The opposition of nomos  and physis  is a starting point for 
understanding Callicles' ideas. Our viewpoint will concentrate on his view 
of freedom, hedonism and practical life. Through this research Callicles' 
ideal is revealed to be derived from the Homeric hero's ideal of power and 
honour. And we will examine to see whether Callicles' suggestion that his
13 Quotations are from Burnet's OCT(5vol.) 1900-07.
1  ^ Plato, Gorgias , E.R. Dodds, a Revised Texts with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 
1959 p. 266
15 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 52
16 Dodds 1951 p. 15
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Ideal man who is superior, wiser and more courageous should rule over other 
people can be justified. Euthydemus' and Dionysodorus' ideas will be 
investigated in comparison with those of the Eleatics i.e. Parmenides and 
Zeno. The relationship between the two is strongly argued for by R. K. 
Sprague in her Plato's Use of Fallacy, where it is strongly suggested that 
the two Sophists are neo-Eleatics.i? We will analyse how their application 
of fallacies is interrelated with the logic of the Eleatics. As for Hippias, 
although Untersteiner identifies him as an advocate of absolute "physis", he 
does not examine Hippias' ideas about "the natural continuous bodies of 
being". However, Kerferd suggests that Hippias' philosophical position 
"seems to have been based on a doctrine of classes of things dependent on a 
being that is continuous or carried right through physical bodies without 
interruption."18 We will examine this neglected aspect of Hippias’ ideas on 
the basis of Kerferd's suggestion, and will see that his thinking is basically 
influenced by the natural philosopher, Empedocles. In addition to this, 
Hippias' idea of physis will be discussed as being applicable to pan- 
Hellenism, rather than to cosmopolitanism as maintained by Tarrant(Ttie  
Hippias Major attributed to Plato) and Untersteiner(T/?e Sophists). J. S. 
Morrison argues that Protagoras' argument is "based entirely on the 
ambiguity of the phrase dyaeoi TToXiTai".i9 Adkins also points out in his article 
'Ap€Ti), T€xv7], Democracy and Sophists (JHS 1973) that Protagoras is 
confusing co-operative excellences(al6ws Kal 8ikt )^ with administrative and 
political skills(TTo\iTiKfi tgxvti), and that Protagoras' use of terminology in the 
Protagoras is vague. Our study will attempt to make clear whether or not 
Protagoras is consistent as a teacher of dperii through his use of myth and 
argument, and to demonstrate that the confusion of terminology comes from 
Socrates, not Protagoras. To discover what Thrasymachus really means in 
Plato's Republic  I is our main task in the study of Thrasymachus* ideas. We 
will argue against the regular prejudice against Thrasymachus which is to 
be found in Annas' An Introduction to Plato's Republic and Cross and 
Woozley's Plato's Republic, and try to investigate his consistent position in 
the dialogue. We will treat various aspects of the Sophists' views and lives; 
on one side their positive views, and on the other side their negative views, 
both of which aspects we can find in any movement at any period in the
12 Plato’s Use of Fallacy, R. K. Sprague, Routiedge and Kegan Paul 1962 p. xiii
18 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 47
19 The Place of Protagoras in Athenian Public Life, J. S. Morrison Classical Quarterly
1941, 1-16, p.8
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history of human ideas. However, the result of this study cannot be to 
uncover the actual thought of the historical Sophists. Rather, by focusing 
our viewpoint on the Sophists instead of Socrates in Plato's dialogues we 
may achieve a clearer picture of their ideas than the traditional emphasis of 
Plato permits.
IB. The Genesis of the Sophistic Movement.
It is said that the philosophy of a certain era is the idea grasped by 
the people in that time. This means that philosophical ideas are mainly 
derived from the interpretation of the external world, which consists of 
social and philosophical circumstances, in which one lives by one's own 
subjective ideas. So by examining the history of ideas we can find that a 
new philosophical idea is the sum of a reaction against the traditional 
views.
What characterised the fifth century B.C. in Athens was a reaction in 
favour of humanism and against dogmatism, through an effort to apply the 
methods of natural philosophy to a new subject: m a n .20 Xenophanes  
emphasised the progress of human achievement, based on a belief in the 
self-awakening of human beings and their own efforts: the gods did not 
reveal to men all things from the beginning, but men through their own 
search find in time that which is better (outoi à-n' dpxns mvTa 0€ol 0vT|Toîa’ 
uTTeSei^ av, àXXà xpoi^ 4 ^îito<îvt€s è({)€\jpioKouoiv a]Ji€ivov DK 21B18).21 To have 
control over the natural environment results necessarily from philosophical 
and political achievements. The natural philosophers from Anaximander 
onwards had tried to give a natural explanation of the world favorable to a 
humanistic view, and rejected divine intervention in the account of the 
origin of the cosmos, which was also the root of the Enlightenment; lives 
are the product of nature, and social and political obligations are instituted 
by purely human agreement and are alterable by human consent. Also the 
philosophers of a later period believed in the relativity of religious ideas; 
Hecataeus was the first Greek to find Greek mythology a b s u rd 2 2 ; and 
Xenophanes, who had an interest in the red-haired gods of the Thracians and
20 The Sophistic Movement and the Failure of Greek Liberalism, from The Ancient 
Concept of Progress, E. R. Dodds , Oxford 1973
21 See Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound 442-506 even though Prometheus credits the 
achievement not to man but himself, and Sophocles' Antigone 332-75 .
22 Dodds 1973 p. 180
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the snub-nosed gods of the Ethiopians(DK 21B16), castigated the Homeric 
and Hesiodic gods from the viewpoint of relative religious ideas(DK. 21B11): 
if oxen (horses) and lions had hands or could draw with their hands and 
execute the works of art that man can, then horses would draw the forms of 
the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make their 
bodies such as they each had themselves(àxv d  cxov pdcs<riT 'no i>  t ’
XeovTes, f| ypai|)ai x^fp^ooi Kai epya TcXdv airep avSpes, ittttoi pev 9’ iTnroia i |3dcs Sé t € 
pouoiv ô |ioias Kai < k€>  0ewv lôéas eypacjjov Kai o w p a f èiroiouv Toia00’ o ldv irep K adroi
Séixas dxov <€KaaToi>. DK 21B15). Heraclitus ridiculed ritual catharsis, 
mentioning that men purify themselves by staining themselves with blood, 
as if one who had stepped into mud were to wash with mud(Ka0dpirovTai 6’ 
dXXws a îp a  a ip a r i  p ia ivd jievo i otov ei t is  els irnXov èp|3às itt|X(3 àirovi^oiTO DK 22B5). 
Anaxagoras said that the sun is stone, the moon earth(Apo/opy 26 d). He also 
maintained as follows; whereas animals have the advantage over man in 
strength and speed, man is their superior in experience, memory, wisdom 
and skill(DK 59B21). And medical science played an important part in 
understanding human nature as a part of the whole universe. The writer of 
On Ancient Medicine attributes "the rise of his own art not to Asclepius or 
any other god, but to 'n ecess ity '" .23  The extension of perspective-increasing 
contacts with foreign countries through wars, trades and travel played an 
important role in introducing humanism. Through these contacts the Greek 
people realised that their culture and customs were not absolute and 
universal throughout the world, but relative and partial.
The fifth century B. C. in Athens was a period of political and social 
changes in which traditional ways of life and thinking were seriously 
criticised in favour of a more free and democratic life. From the 
constitutional reforms of Solon, continued by Cleisthenes, the Athenian 
democracy had gradually developed. Especially in the period of Pericles 
Athens had reached the peak of democracy which was based on two 
principles: "(1) power should be with the people as a whole and not with a 
small section of the citizen body, and (2) high offices carrying the right to 
advise and act for the people should be entrusted to those best fitted and 
most able to carry out these functions."24 On the other hand, at this time 
Athens was engaged in a period of imperialism which promoted "the right of
23 In the Beginning ; some Greek View on the origins of life and the early state of man, 
London p. 1957 p. 96
24 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 16
Introduction 9
the stronger," as we can see from the decision over Mytilene made by the 
Athenian democracy as reported in Thucydides' writings(Thuc. iii 37-44). 
The aristocratic class of supposed divine descent was replaced by free-born 
citizens in executing the power of the poiitical community. The citizens of 
Athens had looked to the new education to mould their sons into the ideal 
citizens for the new democracy. So in Athens the intellectual and political 
ability of man came to be regarded as the most important point, which the 
new teachers were needed to develop. To meet the demand of the rising 
generation in the area of the new education, the individual Sophists came as 
itinerant teachers from all over the Greek world to Athens, which was in a 
state of forceful competition. As a result, an entire new and fundamentally 
individualistic culture came into Athenian society, in which Athenian 
citizens might live freely in the development of humanism. This new
education was usually carried into effect by seeking a career in public and
political life; one of its major goals was the art of persuasion in the matter
of politics and public administration. Its aim was to go beyond the 
privileged education for the noble class, which had been allowed only to 
those of noble blood. At any rate it is true that the Sophists were teachers 
to train the Athenian young men for their duties, the pursuits and the 
successes of their city. The reason for their advent in Athens was to meet 
the increasing demand among the Athenian youth. The fact that they received 
considerable pay is indicative of the distinctive recognition they won from 
the Athenian people for their own teaching and activity. In this respect the 
Sophists were the product of the age in which they lived, as Socrates was 
too. The basic position shared by the Sophists was trying to expiain the 
phenomenal world in itself instead of resorting to the so-called real world 
behind phenomena, for to the Sophists the practical and ernpirical way of 
thinking was more reliable than the extreme rationalism of Eleatics
rejecting the evidence of human senses and experience. This reactionai 
speculation moving from natural philosophy to human matters was based on 
two points: one was the new tendency to believe what is reasonable based 
on human empiricism, and the other, scepticism about the validity of social 
and political Inheritance, rejecting divine causation or supernatural agency 
and abandoning the idea of eternal reality behind the phenomenal world in 
favour of chance and natural necessity.
ill. The Art of Speech.
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The Sophists' concern with the problems of language represents their 
reaction in favour of humanism and against dogmatism. The Sophists' 
interest in language indicates that, both by raising various questions on 
language and by explaining its use and origin, they made an effort to unveil 
the fabrication and falsehood of uncritically inherited and accepted ideas. 
Through the examination of the relationships between words, objects and 
thoughts, they threw doubts upon the possibility of epistemology and any 
natural validity of words concerning what they represent, and thus tried to 
find a way to develop and clarify the function of language. So problems of 
the correctness of names or words{dp0o€TT€ia) were investigated by the major 
Sophists(Protagoras, Antiphon, Hippias and Prodicus) for the purpose of 
winning over their audience by using the right words at the right moment. On 
the other hand the art of speech was a good weapon for educating young men 
for social success; a means to power, wealth and influence. The rhetorical 
teaching of the Sophists was to promote in Athenian young men the power of 
making speeches, debating social and political matters and maintaining 
their right and claim if they were called before the Athenian court or the 
assembly. The aim of linguistic proficiency was also connected with 
matters of private business and commercial affairs. This kind of art could 
flourish in the development of democracy, but not in a state of tyranny.
The Sophists themselves practised the art of speaking, and taught it 
to their pupils. Protagoras claimed that he could make the weaker argument 
appear the stronger(rov ffTTw xdyov KpeiTTw TToieXv Aristotle Rhet. 1402 a) and 
maintained that there are two opposite arguments on every subject(DK 
80A21). Besides these, Protagoras was the first to distinguish the tenses of 
the verb(Diogenes Laertius IX 50) and the three genders of nouns, as 
masculine, feminine and inanimate things(DK 80A27). Gorgias as a teacher 
of rhetoric laid stress on the most inspiring, effective and persuasive 
methods of presenting a speech by appealing to intellect and emotion, as in 
the cases of the Encomium of Helen and the Palamedes. However, Prodicus 
concerned himself especially with linguistic problems and semantics 
(Euthydem us  277 e and Cratylus  384 b), having recourse to etymological 
explanations, and claimed to teach correct Xerm'mo\oQy(Protagoras 334 c, 
Xenophon's Memorabilia  II, i, 21). Antiphon is said to have taught how new 
words should be made in correlation with the concepts which they were 
intended to express.25 Hippias taught phonetics and metre(H/pp/as Major 285
25 Guthrie I I I  p. 204
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d). The Sophists wrote a lot of books concerning both rhetorical 
argument(Protagoras, Gorgias and Thrasymachus) and the correct use of 
language(Prodicus and Hippias). An absolutist and a man of dialectic, Plato 
condemns the practice of rhetoric which is interrelated with relativism, by 
contrasting reality(the object of knowledge) with appearance(the object of 
persuasion). Plato believes that rhetoric makes "probability" deserve more 
respect than "truth" (Phaedrus  267 a), and the rhetor can make trifles seem 
important and important points trifles by the force of their language(ibid 
267 b). On the other hand, in his treatise, The Cyprians 6, the orator 
Isocrates, a distinguished pupil of Gorgias, says that logos or speech, by 
enabling us to persuade each other rather than to live like animals, brought 
about civilisation. He also was "a successful educator who applied rhetoric 
and literature to the development of intellectual and moral qualities in his 
pupils".26 He especially criticises the Platonists who spent their time in 
disputing over the unity or plurality of virtue(/7e/e/? 2), Isocrates insists 
upon the the necessity of teaching with a view to an honorable life of 
citizenship.
IV. Nomos and Physis
According to Guthrie,2? in earlier writers the two terms nom os  and 
physis did not necessarily appear as antithetical, but after the advent of the 
Sophistic Movement they came to be regarded as opposed and mutually 
exclusive, especially in the field of moral and political matters. The term 
p h ys is ,  which involves the concept of "the way things are,"28 means 
primarily truth and reality as against falsehood and appearances. On the 
other hand nomos, which involves the concept of prescriptive custom or 
law, is "a kind of direction or command affecting the behaviour and 
activities of persons and things".29 The realm of nature is assumed to be 
superior to the realm of law in that what is developed by nature "is 
antecedent in time" to what is agreed by human beings; it is more original 
and everlasting.30
26 Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, H. D. Rankin, Banes and Noble Booksl983, p. 37
27 Guthrie I I I  p. 55
28 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. I l l
29 Ibid p. 112
30 Rankin 1983 p.82-83
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The observation of various customs and religious beliefs through the 
contacts of wars, trade and travelling induced the Greek people to realise 
the differences of nomos. And the growth of atheism and agnosticism at this 
period was also connected with the ideas opposed to nom os.  So it was 
inevitable that man should have a new conception of human nature and 
contrast nomos  as being changeable and alterable with physis as constant 
and everlasting. Heraclitus maintained that "ail human laws are nourished by 
the one divine law"(DK 22B114) on the basis of different human customs 
which are arbitrary and artificial. Democritus maintained that perceptible 
qualities exist only in nomos (DK 68A44), but in reality there are only atoms 
and void (DK 68B9). Hippias, appealing to the physis  of things, states that 
like is by nature akin to like, but convention, a tyrant over mankind, ordains 
many things by force contrary to naXure{Protagoras 337 c). Antiphon also, as 
an upholder of physis, contrasts nomos  with physis in the following terms: 
laws are artificial compacts, they lack the inevitability of natural growth; 
justice in the legal sense is for the most part at odds with nature(DK 
87A44). Antiphon's statement in favour of physis can be found in another of 
his surviving fragments(DK 87B44): in fact by nature we have the same 
nature in all particulars, barbarians and Greeks; we have only to think about 
the things which are natural and necessary to all mankind; ... in all these 
there is no distinction of barbarian or Greek; for we all breathe out into the 
air by the mouth and the nose. What is prescribed by nomos  is opposed to 
what is prescribed by physis, as Callicles argues in the Gorgias. Callicles 
also declares that the absence of any coercion on his natural desires is 
freedom which lies in the state of nature. Thucydides and Thrasymachus 
both express their concerns about the real world. Thucydides says that: the 
customary values of words were changed as men claimed the right to use 
them as they pleased to justify their actions; an unreasoning daring was 
called courage and loyalty to party, a prudent delay specious cowardice; 
moderation and self-control came to be reckoned but the c l o a k , of 
timidity(Thu. iii 82). And Thrasymachus sardonically declares in the 
R epub lic  I that justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger, 
and later replies to Socrates that injustice is good prudence, and justice a 
noble simplicity. On the other hand Protagoras is depicted as a supporter of 
nomos in Plato's Protagoras, arguing for the conclusion that nomos is a 
necessary condition for the survival of society. And the Anonymous writer 
quoted by lamblichus says: the observance of law would be best for the 
state and for the individual man; under the observance of law, men are freed
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from the most unpleasant concerns, but they enjoy the most pleasant(DK 89. 
7), An Important difference between the Sophists and Plato is "on the
question of what law(nomos) actually is"; the Sophists regarded it as mere
agreement amongst people, whereas Plato believed that nomos should be 
based on the true nature of reality.^:
V. The term "Sophist" and Sophistic Education
The word 0o4>iaTTfs was applied to various classes of people who had
lived before the advent of the Sophists in the fifth century B.C.. The word 
oo(j)ioTii8 is a noun of agent derived from the verb aoc|)i^eaeai which means "to 
practice ooc|)ia". Liddell and Scott distinguish the application of its meaning 
in three ways: (a) master of one's craft, adept, expert, of diviners 
(Herodotus); of poets (Pindar); of musicians (Aristophanes and Euripides) (b) 
wise, prudent, or statesmanlike, in which sense the seven Sages are called 
ao^iordi (Herodotus and Aristophanes); of Pythagoras (Herodotus); of natural 
philosophers (Hippocrates) (c) one who gave lessons in grammar, rhetoric, 
politics, mathematics, for money. Also lsocrates(XV. 313) says that Solon 
was the first Athenian to whom the name Sophist was applied. Kerferd 
argues as follows^^ : "Whereas ao^ds and ao<|)ia can be used of all sorts of 
skills, the term ao(|)ioTTis is confined to those who in one way or another 
function as the Sages, the exponents of knowledge in early communities". On 
the other hand Guthrie says33 that the aocj i^arifs was assumed to be a teacher, 
for the name was often applied to poets whose main function was in Greek 
eyes to give practical instruction and moral advice, and he also guesses that 
the term oo4)iottis was beginning to be used of prose-writers in contrast to 
poets, as the didactic function came to be more and more fulfilled through 
this medium.34 A ooc^ iaT-ns was a teacher and a writer who had a special skill 
to impart to his pupil. Socrates was denominated a Sophist not only by 
Aristophanes, but by the fourth century B.C. orator, Aeschines.35 As we can 
see, the term oo(j)ioTTfs was applied in a general sense as well as in a special 
sense. So the term oo<|)iaTTfs could have a positive or negative meaning 
according to the prejudice and social status of the speaker. However, from 
early on in the fifth century it had lost its prestige, as we can see in
31 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 80
32 The first Greek Sophists, Classical Review 64(1950), 8-10, p.8
33 Guthrie I I I  p. 29
34 Ibid p. 30
35 Ibid p. 34
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A ris to p ha n es ' C louds,  for the term Sophist came to be attached to the 
professionalism of the Sophists who professed to teach virtue or the art of 
acquiring power in a democratic society.
The common advocacy of the Sophists -with the exception of Gorgias- 
that virtue(dp€Tif) can be taught had a revolutionary effect upon Athenian 
s o c i e t y . 36 in this respect the Sophists were the heirs of the old 
poets(Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, Theognis and Pindar) who discussed by 
means of their poems how virtue(dpeTTf) could be acquired.37 This idea is 
directly interrelated with the negation of the traditional viewpoint, since 
anyone can possess the aptitude of exercising political power if he receives 
the required instruction, regardless of his inherited privilege or birth. 
However, we must note that the Sophists' claim to teach virtue(dpeTirf) really 
applies only to political virtue(dpeTTf), for their emphasis was laid on the 
intellectual and rhetorical aspect rather than the ethical one. The Sophists 
were optimists concerning human natural endowment: they held that it could 
be developed and cultivated by human knowledge arm ed with 
reason(education) by laying the foundations for a study of language and 
rhetoric and refining the analysis of political and social phenomena. 
Socrates or Plato, however, applies the term dperil to special excellence in 
relation to any function i.e. there is a proper dperif belonging to whatever 
has a particular function to perform(RepuMc 353 b). And Plato's viewpoint 
is usually concentrated on a moral quality,38 as as we see when Plato 
through the mouthpiece of Meno enquires as to the teachability of dperif: Can 
you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught? Or does it come by 
practice? Or is it neither teaching nor practice that gives it to a man but 
natural aptitude or something else? ( ’Tx^is |xoi duetv, (5 SwKares, Spa SiSaicrov f| 
dperif; if où SiSaxrov; if ovTre doKTjrov core pa6r|rdv, dXXd <|)Voei irapayiverai rots 
dvepwirois if dxxw rivi rpdirw; Meno 70 a) So we can easily guess that this period 
was one of class struggle between the aristocratic class and the newly 
risen class who came to have power under the democratic system of Athens. 
Especially to the aristocratic class the claim of teaching dperif was a
36 Plato's way of referring to the Sophists was as the paid teachers of virtue(dpeTTf) 
Gorgias 456 c-e, Meno 95c
37 According to Guthrie, '^Aperd when used without qualification denoted those qualities 
of human excellence which made a man a natural leader in his community, and 
hitherto it had been believed to depend on 'certain natural or even divine gifts which 
were the mark of good birth and breeding". Guthrie I I I  p. 25
38 Guthrie I I I  p. 25, 252 and 256
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revolting idea, for they were in danger of losing their own social status and 
privilege.
The Sophists' aim was to educate the young through various methods. 
Their methods of teaching were basically two39; (1 ) to impart to the human 
mind an encyclopaedic variety of facts, the material of knowledge; (2) to 
give the human mind formal training of various types aiming at cultivating 
all the power of the soul. According to Diogenes Laertius(Diogenes Laertius 
IX. 5 0  and DK 80A1) Protagoras made use of arguing by the method of 
questioning to show that on every issue there are two arguments opposed to 
each other. And Gorgias, as stated by Philostratus, had the boldness to say 
"suggest a subject" in the theatre of Athens, and showed that he knew 
everything and would trust to the moment to speak on any subject(DK 
82A1a). Hippias, according to Plato, gave an èTTi6€i^is(public demonstrative 
lecture) regularly at Olympia where he professed his willingness to speak 
on a subject he had prepared, and to answer any questions{H/pp, Min. 363 c- 
d). However, the main instruction, of which the usual method was the 
prepared lecture on a set theme, was given by the Sophists "neither in public 
lecture nor in public debates, but in small classes or seminars".4o
The Sophists' teaching was concerned with the humanistic view of 
man as well as the nature of the universe. Protagoras refuted the geometers 
on the basis of the theory reported to us by Aristotle(DK 80B7). Sextus 
(Outlines of Pyrrhonism I 216) states: what Protagoras says is that matter 
is in a state of flux, and that as it changes there is continuous replacement 
of the effluvia which it gives off; that, moreover, one's sensations undergo 
change and alteration in accordance with one's age and other aspect of one’s 
bodily condition (DK 80A14). Gorgias was interested also in the theory of 
Empedocles as stated by Plato: colour is an effluence of things 
commensurate with and perceptible by sight (M en o  76 a). According to 
Cicero (On the Orators III 32, 128) Prodicus of Ceos, Thrasymachus of 
Chalcedon, or Protagoras of Abdera, all in their time wrote and spoke on the 
subject of natural philosophy(DK 84B3).
39 Paideia I: the Ideals of Greek Culture, W. Jaeger, trans. G. Highet, Oxford 1939 pp. 289- 
290
40 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 30
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The common attribute of the Sophists(including Callicles) in Plato's 
dialogues has been suggested to be that, as rhetoricians, they are the 
experts at making a long speech, quite strangers to the method of Socratic 
dialectic; and they are the teachers of virtue. However, these views cannot 
be applied to the cases of all the Sophists, for Gorgias clearly denies any 
such profession(Meno 95c) and Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are caricatured 
as imitators of the Socratic elenchus in the Euthydemus even though we can 
find a difference between true dialectic and eristic whose effect is 
negative. In addition to this, the Sophists in the Sophist are much more 
similar to the pupils of Socrates than to those of Protagoras or Gorgias.
VI. Socrates
Paradoxically Socrates may be described as an Athenian Sophist, 
unlike the other Sophists who came from non-Athenian cities, in so far as 
his life was dedicated to the problematic question of whether dpeTif can be 
taught. Socrates can be characterised as a man trying to understand the 
phenomenal world - thus sharing the objective of the Sophists - while 
taking into consideration its contradictions, not positing the ideal world as 
Plato does. Socrates knew, as the Sophists did, that "different specific 
activities had their different ends or 'goods', calling for different means to 
acquire them ".4i However, his fundamental question no longer concerned the 
phenomenal world but rather the nature of moral entities, examined through 
debate ranging over the fields of both social and political matters, 
employing paradox and appealing to common sentiment. He wanted to find 
out man's place in this world. He brought philosophy down from the skies by 
shifting his interest from natural science to human affairs. In this respect 
Socrates was a member of the Sophistic movement, not an opponent of it. 
His life-work was concentrated on seeking after real wisdom and universal 
truth. The method by which Socrates contended and disputed with his 
interlocutors was to lead their conversations into a discussion of moral 
concepts to grasp a general characteristic of a whole class from the 
examination of particular cases, even though the definition of moral terms 
maintained by the interlocutor would usually be refuted by Socrates' 
destructive cross-examinatlon(elenchus), and found to be insufficient and 
objectionable. Aristotle testifies that Socrates was busying himself about 
ethical matters and neglecting the worlid of nature as a whole but seeking
41 Guthrie I I I  p. 460
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the universal in these ethical m atters, and fixed thought for the first tim e  
on definitions(2wKpaTovjs 6è ircpi pèv Tà fi0ifcà TTpa7 p.aT6uou€Vo\j irspi Sè Ti^s oX-qs 
(jîuaews où0€v, èv pévToi t o u t o i s  t ô  KaOdXov ^tjtoOv t o s  m i  irepi dpiopwv èm oTîiaavTos  
TTpwTou TT|V 6 id vo iav , èKeîvov àiroSeldpevos 8 ià  t ô  t o i o ù t o v  ÙTr€Xa|Î€V (ûs Trepi ércpiov 
TO0TO y iy v d p e v o v  icai où t w v  ala0T|T(3v 987  b); he aiso affirms that two things 
m ay fairly be ascribed to S ocrates - inductive argum ents and universal 
d efin itio n , both of w hich a re  co n cern ed  w ith the  starting  point of 
SCience(8uo ydp è o n v  a r is  av  diTo8oi'n SwKpciTei 8iKaitos, roùs f  èTraKTOKoijs Xdyous  
Kai TO ôpi^€o0ai Ka0dXou- TaÙTa yap èoTiv a|i())w irepi dpx^v èmoTuiATisl 0 7 8  b).42
Socrates identified the world of morality with the world of 
knowledge, and equated the good with what is beneficial or useful. The 
Socratic maxim that virtue(dpeTTf) is knowledge might be suggested as an 
outcome of the Sophistic Movement, for a part of this movement was 
characterised by the dispute over the way virtue could be acquired. 
Socrates' identification of virtue(dpeTif) with knowledge is based on the 
close connexion between what a thing is and what it is for. This can be 
reasoned as follows: if virtue can be taught, it must be a kind of knowledge. 
If virtue is a kind of knowledge, then the cause of wrongdoing and 
wickedness must be lack of knowledge i.e. they are due to ignorance. To 
know what is good for the agent is a necessary and sufficient condition of 
his achieving what is good for him. This means that no one who knows what 
is good for himself pursues what is bad for himself against his will. So 
from this follows Socrates' paradox that "no one does wrong willingly" as he 
strongly affirms in the P ro ta g o ra s  (345 d) and the Gorgias (509 d). He 
believed that an honest search after the truth about the principles of human 
behaviour was the way to find the right way to live.
Socrates as the seeker after the truth is contrasted with the Sophists 
in Plato's dialogues, who are characterised as men of insidious counterfeit 
and illusion, "concerned only with the appearance of truth rather than the 
reality".43 The difference between Socrates and the Sophists is defined as 
follows by R. Hackforth: "what in fact distinguishes Socrates from the 
Sophists is a sincerity which underlies all his banter, a passion for truth 
which inspires all his argument, a love of humanity which seeks to find 
expression in securing for men not outward success and reputation but
42 Aristotle's Metaphysics I. II. W.D. Ross, Oxford University. Press, Reprinted 1981
43 Kerferd 1981, Wiesbaden p.4
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Inward satisfaction and happiness".44 However, the Athenian public might 
have regarded Socrates as one of the Sophists; it was as such that 
Aristophanes introduced him, based on popular perception, in his comedy, 
the C/ouc/s.45 There Aristophanes makes fun of Socrates' philosophy and 
scientific notions as well as of the Sophistic Movement, using the method of 
"Right Argument" and "Wrong Argument" to parody the new sophistic 
education. The Clouds, which was later used to indict Socrates at his trial, 
was presented in 423 B.C. for the first time when Socrates was forty five 
and Plato was an infant. At that time it might be guessed that Socrates'
name and way of life must have been quite well known to the Athenian
audience, to be produced in a comedy. Dover rightly suggests that "although 
the difference between Socrates and the Sophists was known to 
Ar(istophanes), in the sense that the data which constituted that difference 
were available to his organs of perception, he simply did not see it, and if it 
had been pointed out to to him he would not have regarded it as important."46 
The differences between Socrates and such men as Protagoras would appear 
to the public less important than the resemblances, for "the charges brought 
against him by his accusers express just those general grounds of suspicion 
that would be felt against both alike".4? And, moreover, Socrates' method of 
argument(elenchus), dialectic, based on the destructive cross-examination 
which is very similar to the contentious eristic of the Sophists(e.g.
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus), in conservative eyes led his interlocutor to 
question and doubt the traditional moral and educational structures of 
Athens, even if Plato revealed the advantage of Socrates' sincere dialectic 
over the so-called sophistic eristic. Also his indifference to material
wealth and a successful life, and his freedom from sensual desire and 
political ambition, even though he had sufficient ability, were an acute 
criticism of Athenian society. We must further note that It was no strange 
coincidence that Socrates came to be one of the men charged on religious 
grounds, who directly or indirectly were involved in the Sophistic Movement 
as the leading progressive thinkers of Athens - Anaxagoras, Diagoras, 
Protagoras and possibly Euripides.
44 Socrates, R. Hackforth, Philosophy Vol. V III, No. 31 July 1933 p. 267
45 The Clouds  which we have was a partially revised one from the first version. For 
detailed explanation, see Introduction(IX) of Aristophanes Clouds, K. J. Dover Oxford 
1968
46 Ibid p.liii
47 Sidgwick 1872 p. 291 ^
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i. C A L L I C L E S
Life and Activity
Callicles, an ambitious and educated noble young citizen from the 
deme of Acharnae in Attica, Is portrayed in Plato's G org ias  as taking an 
energetic stand against Socrates' view that "to do wrong is more shameful 
than to suffer wrong"(TÔ àSiKcîv aioxiov e îva i t o û  dSiKâaSai 482 d), and as 
proposing a sort of natural justice based on the principle : "by physis  what 
is worse is more shameful, i.e. suffering wrong"(c|)\ja€i [icv -yap irav aioxiov 
èoTiv oTT€p Ktti KaKiov, TO à6iKcîo0ai 483 a), SO "it is right for the better to have 
the advantage over the less"(... ska ïov  èanv rov dneivw toO x^ipovos ttXcov cx^iv 
Kctl to v  6uvaTofT€pov TOO dSiJvaTWT€po<j 483 c-d). Callicles' personality is 
depicted as more impressive than the two Sophists, Gorgias and Polus. 
Callicles despises the Sophists as worthless people(oi3S€vos d fiw v  520 a), 
notwithstanding the fact that he plays the part of Gorgias' host in this 
dialogue. And Socrates describes him as a man of rhetor rather than a 
Sophist(520 a).
Unfortunately we do not have any independent evidence about Callicles 
of Acharnae, one of the very few characters in Plato's dialogues of whose 
historical existence nothing is known to us, who plays the role of the main 
interlocutor in this dialogue. Various older scholars suggested that he might 
be a mask for some real historical figure in the Athenian aristocracy. His 
real existence was doubted by G rote and other scholars, who have suggested 
other figures whom he might be meant to represent: Charicles (Bergk), or 
Critias (Cron, Menzel), or Alcibides with whom he is linked at 519 a (Apelt), 
or even(absurdly) the respectable and unadventurous Isocrates (Sudhaus); 
the majority of present-day scholars, however, have been prepared to
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accept him as an historical figure.i And there is sufficient reason to believe 
that he might be an historical person, for in this dialogue he is described as 
being in love with Demos, the son of Pyrilampes(481 b) who was Plato's 
stepfather and a friend of Pericles and is said to be a friend of Andron, who 
was one of the Four Hundred set up in the oligarchic revolution of 411 B.C.. 
Dodds suspects that the reason why such a vigorous and richly endowed 
personality left no mark on the history of his time is that the man who in 
the dialogue is just embarking on an active career (515 a) died too young to 
be remembered.2
Above all we must note Plato's hidden intention of showing the 
dangers inherent in the education of the Sophists like that of Gorgias, which 
"put a deadly instrument into unscrupulous hands for the corruption of 
simple people who are morally only children: Gorgias' teaching is the seed of 
which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruit".3 Through the 
mouthpiece of Socrates this dialogue especially criticises Athenian politics 
and politicians from the Persian Wars to the disaster of 404 B.C. and the 
execution of Socrates five years later. Plato shows us the reason why he 
has a feeling of disgust for Athenian political life - the overt and cruel 
desire for power of people like Critias or Alcibiades and their associates - 
by putting all the corrupt aspects of Athenian politicians into Callicles. 
Concerning this dialogue Friedlander points out that "Three separate issues 
converge upon a single focus-the struggle between immoralism and justice, 
the struggle between practical politics and philosophy, and the struggle 
between the Athenians and Socrates.Cal l ic les '  view seems very similar to 
that put forward by Thrasymachus in the Republic I. However, we must note 
that, as Burnet puts it, the difference between them lies in that Callicles 
holds, not like Thrasymachus that "right" is reducible to might, but that 
might really is right.s The difference between Callicles and Thrasymachus 
is their way of turning their views on laws. This dialogue is full of 
accusations between Callicles and Socrates.
1 Plato Gorgias, E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1959 p. 12 
 ^ Ibid. p. 13 
3 Ibid. p. 15
 ^ Plato II, P. Friedlander, trans. H. Meyerhoff, ' Pantheon 1964 p. 26
5 Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato, J. Burnet, The Macmillan Press, Reset and Reprinted 
1981. p. 98
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Callicles' Thought as Revealed in Plato's Dialogue Gorgias
Callicles, entirely dissatisfied with the way the argument between 
Socrates and Polus has developed, enters the discussion by introducing a 
new concept of justice which he calls justice according to physis, and 
criticises the concept of justice agreed on by both Socrates and Polus as the 
justice of n o m a s .  Callicles does not oppose Socrates with mere 
argumentation, as Gorgias and Polus did. He has his own theory according to 
which he criticises Socrates for illegitimately deriving the conclusion that 
"to do wrong is less advantageous" from Polus' admission that "to do wrong 
is more shameful than to suffer it (T o  a S ix e tv  a ï a x i o v  dvai  to O  à 6 iK € îo e a i  474 c)". 
Callicles maintains that Polus' admission "to do wrong is more shameful 
than to suffer it" is not the answer of physis, but that of no m a s ,  for the 
n o m a s  forces man to accept the idea that to get the better of others is
immoral. At any rate his intervention lifts the argument onto a higher
philosophical level in the procedure of this dialogue. Callicles is different 
from Thrasymachus in that from the start he delivers a long and expert 
speech through which his intended idea is to be clearly expressed. As W. 
Jaeger says,6 Callicles takes into consideration his opponent's personality: 
he sees that Socrates' strength lies in the firm and incontrovertible 
spiritual attitude which he embodies. But Callicles thinks this will really
prove to be a disadvantage as soon as his apparently consistent thinking is
brought up against experience and the reality Socrates has avoided all his 
l i fe.
Callicles manifests his ideas in a long speech from 482 c to 486 d. 
This first speech can be divided into two parts; one is from 482 c to 484 c, 
the other 484 c - 486 d.
I. In the former part of his first speech, against Socrates' view that 
"to do wrong is more shameful than to suffer wrong"(Tô àSiKeîv aioxiov clvai 
TGV àSiK€îo0ai 482 d) Callicles proposes a sort of natural justice based on the 
principle: "by p h y s is  what is worse is more shameful, i.e. suffering 
wrong"(<|)vo€i HCV yap irav aioxiov € o t i v  oircp Kai k o k io v ,  t o  a8iK€io0ai 483 a); "it iS 
right for the better to have the advantage over the less"{... s k a io v  è o T i v  t o v  
d|Jiav(o TO0 x^ipovos nXeov exeiv Kai t o v  SovaTWTepov to O  àSvvaTWTepoi) 483 C-d):
^Jaeger 1939 p. 136
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... But in my opinion those who lay down the nomoi (rows vbpous) are the 
weaker, the majority. And accordingly they lay down the nom oi  for 
themselves and their own advantage, and so too, with their approval 
and censure, and to prevent the stronger who are able to overreach 
them from gaining the advantage over them, they frighten the stronger 
by saying that to overreach others is shameful and evil, and injustice 
consists in seeking advantage over others. For they are satisfied, I 
suppose, if being inferior they enjoy equality of status. That is the 
reason why seeking an advantage over the many is by nomos said to be 
wrong and shameful, and they call it injustice. But in my view physis  
herself makes it plain that it is right for the better to have the 
advantage over the worse, the more able over the less (fi 8e ye ... envois
aoTTi diTO<j)aivei aÙTo, oTi Siicaiov èoTiv tov dpeivw ToO irXeov ex i^v Kai
TOV SuvaTWTepov toO a8ovaTWTepov). And both among animals and in entire 
states and races of mankind it is plain that this is the case - that 
right is recognised to be the sovereignty and advantage of the stronger 
over the weaker. For what justification had Xerxes in invading Greece
or his father Darius in invading Scythia? ......  But I imagine that these
men act according to the true physis  of right, yes and, by heaven, 
according to physis' own law (xaTà vojiov ye tov Tf\s cj^ ijoews), though not 
perhaps by the nomos we lay down. We mould the best and strongest 
among ourselves, catching them young like lion cubs, and by spells and 
incantations we make slaves of them, saying that they must be 
content with equality and that this is what is right and fair. But if a 
man arises endowed with a physis  sufficiently strong, he will shake 
off all these controls, burst his fetters, and break loose. And 
trampling upon our scraps of paper, our spells and incantations, and 
ail our unnatural conventions, he rises up and reveals himself master 
and there shines forth physis' true justice.
According to Callicles the weak majority created a large number of 
prescriptive things(nomo/) which might include laws, moral demands and 
social taboos.7 Nomoi, which can be legal decrees or moral precepts for the
7 On the other hand, we can find the other kinds of prescriptive things; languages,
music and signs. These are much less serious and urgent compared to laws, moral
demands and social taboos. K. Popper defines the difference between them exactly : "It 
is therefore most misleading to say that a mail decides for or against slavery as he may 
decide for or against certain works of music and literature, or that moral decisions are
purely matters of taste," for moral decisions involve the life and death of other men.-
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justification of the actions of the weaker, are laid down as directions or 
regulations for the behaviour of every member of society, which are 
imposed and enforced by no-one but the weak majority. It holds true that 
after these "rules" have been created, the behaviour and view of life of all 
the members of society are to be estimated, evaluated and judged according 
to these as if they were external criteria for their own life. Callicles 
contends that the weak majority lay down the normal law for their own 
interest, in fear of the stronger individual(483 b-c). As a result of the 
n o m o s  the weaker individuals, by organising the power of all the weak 
individuals, come to be the collectively stronger even if in fact they are 
weak individually. The organised collective power of the weaker can 
manipulate those who are individually stronger but are a minority compared 
to the collective weaker. This can be interpreted as meaning that the strong 
individual may come to be put in a dangerous predicament by the weak 
majority, if tackled as an individual. In this aspect we can find that 
Callicles criticises democracy on the grounds that the majority who are 
individually weaker legislate democratic laws to make themselves stronger 
and protect and extend their own advantage. So it follows that the strong 
individual is under the obligation which nomoi prescribe to the members of 
society regardless of their natural ability. If he does not behave in 
conformity with the n o m o i,  his failure to confirm will arouse social 
disapproval and condemnation, and in extreme cases earn him expulsion or 
the death penalty from his society. It is true that n o m o i  are the 
representation of human will, whereas physis is devoid of human will which 
is arbitrary. From this it can be derived that the unnatural nomos  should be 
altered and amended by man if he is naturally stronger. Against this 
unnatural nom os  Callicles proposes to set a revised principle based on 
physis' own law(KaTà vopov ye TOV TTÎS 4)oa€ws), which is made up of natural 
facts. He gives two demonstrations of these natural facts: the case among 
animals and the case in whole states and races of mankind(483 d). Wheri 
Callicles gives an example of the latter case: Darius and Xerxes, typical 
despots and tyrants, he maintains that they invaded Greece and Scythia 
according to physis' own law(xaTa vdpov ye tov T-ps <^vaœs) Also later on, by 
mentioning a famous passage of Pindar, Callicles extols the behaviour of the 
stronger Heracles who carried off the cattle of Geryon by force. Heracles' 
action is justified, for it is the stronger's right to do what he wants
The Open Society and Its Enemies I, K. Popper, Routledge and Kegan Paul Reprinted 1973 
p. 65
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regardless of accepted nomos. These three instances are based on the 
natural behaviour, that it is right for the stronger to have the advantage 
over the worse, the more able over the less.
Let us think about Callicles' idea of natural law. The man who supports 
natural law might derive his theory from the observation of the empirical 
facts which he has noticed and observed in the natural world which he must 
face every day. Callicles presupposes that physis herself makes it plain that 
it is right for the better to have the advantage over the worse, the more able 
over the less (fj 5e yc ... (|)IJ01S adrfi dTTo4)aiV6i aÙTo, oTi Sixaiov eoTiv tov dpeivw 
ToO x^ipovos TfXecv €xeiv Kai tov SuvaTWTgpov toO àôiivaTWTepoô 483 c). He thinks 
that ideal law, which is contrasted with normative law, should be grounded 
in some wider and more general law i.e. the law of physis. If we can define 
the meaning of physis, we can get the meaning of physis  own law. Physis, 
which can be applied in various ways, is in its widest sense the totality of 
things. The natural can be preferred to the artificial, as being more basic; on 
the other hand the natural can be criticised as being mere raw material, 
requiring artifice to add to it. From the viewpoint of Callicles' idea physis  
is contrasted with whatever is artificial or conventional. In its meaning 
physis also implies the laws of natural structure by which the behaviour of 
things can be understood. This means that the object or organism would 
behave according to the innate(natural) causality which is the distinguishing 
factor of any one thing. If we consider Callicles' phrase "by physis ' own 
law"(KaTd vdpov ye tov Tf|s c|)ijaews 483 e) we can find that it contains an 
ambiguous meaning, for he presupposes a kind of necessity to follow physis' 
own law, which governs the natural world and which might be interpreted 
as a kind of nomos for a criterion of our life. So we can argue that Callicles' 
antithesis between physis  and nomos  seems to be based not on physis  in 
general, but on the physis of man or human physis, for the demands of human 
physis  seem to give the applications of this antithesis a clear prescriptive 
fo rc e .8 The artificial and conventional are regarded by Callicles as 
interferences, forcing natural behaviour to be transformed by an unnatural 
aspect. Callicles might think that human physis should be free from any 
interferences, left to itself. Callicles seems to presuppose that human 
physis, which should follow p h y s is '  own law, is an ordered mode of 
attributes possessed in common by every human being and essential to his 
being. In consequence we can say that, Callicles' "physis' own law" is based
8 The Sophistic Movement, G. B. Kerferd, 1981 Cambridge University Press p. 114
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on the biological way of natural human desire which is the empirical fact 
observed from both animals and human beings. His interpretation of human 
desire is based on the concept "to get the better of(To irXeovcKTeîv)" others, 
for both the weaker majority and the stronger seek their own advantage. The 
weaker majority will get less compared to what would be the case if they 
observed natural law, whereas the stronger tries to break the nomos  to get 
the better of the weaker majority. We might guess that Callicles tries to
expose the hidden human wickedness of getting the better of others.
II. In the second part of his first speech Callicles holds a different 
viewpoint from Socrates about how we should live our lives. He argues for
his view of what a man should be, and what he should practise and to what
extent, both when old and when young. From 484 c to 486 d he advises
Socrates to follow his way of life by drawing a contrast between a life of
theoretical study and an active life in public affairs:
  This is the truth and you will realise it if you will now abandon
philosophy and rise to greater things. For philosophy, you know,
Socrates, is a delightful thing if you engage in it moderately at the
right time of life; but if you persist in it longer than you should, it is 
the ruin of any man. For if a man is exceptionally gifted and yet 
pursues philosophy far on in life, he is bound to end up inexperienced 
in all the accomplishments requisite for a gentleman and a man of 
distinction. ... It is a good thing to engage in philosophy just so far as 
it is an aid to education, and it is no disgrace for a youth to study
it(<})iXo0o4>ias pev o'aov iraiSeias xaXov p e jlx e iv , Kai oiiK a loxpov (xeipaKiü
ovTi (j)iXooo(|)€îv), but when a man who is now growing older still studies 
philosophy, the situation becomes ridiculous, Socrates, and I feel 
towards philosophers very much as I do towards those who lisp and 
play the child. ... When I see a youth engaged in it, I admire it and it 
seems to me natural and I consider such a man ingenious, and the man 
who does not pursue it I regard as illiberal and one who will never 
aspire to any fine or noble deed ( ...., to v  6e <{)iXoao<|)o<jvTa dveXeuSepov
KOI oitiSeTroTe ciJSevos d^iwoovTa éaoTov oifT€ KaXoO oifTC Yevvaiou irpdyjiaTos-),
but when I see an old man still studying philosophy and not deserting
it, that man, Socrates, is actually asking for a whipping  For now if
anyone should arrest you or an y , others like you and drag you off to 
prison, claiming you were guilty when you were doing nothing, you
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realise you would have no idea what to do with yourself, but you would 
reel to and fro and gape openmouthed, without a word to say, and when 
you come before the court, even with an utterly mean arid rascally 
accuser, you would be put to death, if he chose to demand the death 
penalty. And yet what wisdom is there in this, Socrates, in an art 
which finds a man well-gifted and leaves him worse - able neither to 
help himself nor to save from the extremes of danger either himself 
or anybody else, but fated to be robbed by his enemies of all his 
property and to live literally like one disenfranchised in his own city
(K ttiToi TTWs aocjîov TOVTO coTiv, w 2o)KpaT€s, f^Tis Xa^oOaa Texvn <|)fe)Ta
€0T|Kc x^fpov^*» a^Tov 5uvap,€V0V poTi0€iv lilts' èjcowoai ck tw v  jJieyioTwv
KivStJVWV |ATiT€ ttXXov jiT|Séva, ÜTro §€ TÛv èx0pœv nepiouXSaOai îrâoav t t \v  o^iaïav, 
àT€xv(3s 5c àriiAov ii\v kv ttoXci;)?  ... But, my good fellow, cease your 
questioning, and practice the fairer music of affairs and try 
something that will win you a name for good sense, and leave to 
others these dainty devices, whether we should call them babblings or 
follies, which will set you to dwell in empty mansions.
The subject of Callicles' argument has changed from the external 
p/?ys/s(society) to the internal physis(the human mind). His position is that 
to study philosophy according to physis' own law is natural life. Callicles 
has a different ideal for life from Socrates in that he is the supporter of the 
life of action rather than the life of philosophy of Socrates, for he has a 
morality of the powerful man to whom suffering wrong is more disgraceful 
and shameful. Callicles differentiates between two types of men: one is the 
practical(political) man; the other is the theoretical(philosophical) man. The 
theoretical man knows nothing of the actual laws in his city, or of the 
language he should use in his business associations, both public and private, 
with other men, or of human pleasures and appetites. The man is, in a word, 
totally ignorant of the ways of normal citizens. So when he enters upon any 
activity, public or private, he proves himself ridiculous, just as politicians 
will look ridiculous when they take part in philosophical discussions and 
arguments with Socrates. Callicles introduces into his argument the Antiope  
of Euripides in which the twin brothers Amphion and Zethos debate with 
each other, representing a contrast of two kinds of views of life. Callicles 
holds the position of Zethos, the man of action, who summons his brother 
Amphion, a harper, away from his life of speculation and idleness to a life
Callicles 27
of action.9 Theoretical reason only deals with what a thing is, while, 
practical reason, on the other hand, copes with how it is i.e. rather unstable 
things related with human life. The life of action leads to more "getting the 
better of others(TrXeove^ia)" than the life of philosophy does. And Callicles 
adds that there is no wisdom in 'an art(philosophy) which finds a man well - 
gifted and leaves him worse-able neither to help himself nor to save from 
the extremes of danger himself or anybody else, but fated to be robbed by 
his enemies of all his property(486 b). It is certainly true that "both in 
Homer and in later Greek thought the power and ability to defend friends, 
associates, and family is regarded as a part of someone's virtue".lo To gain 
favour in the assembly of Athens "a man must show that he is an agathos  
polites, willing to expend himself and his possessions to promote the city's 
prosperity; and to gain favour for any proposal of his he must naturally show
that it is conducive to the city's prosperity".^ i
What makes Callicles think that to study philosophy is an aid to 
education for a youth even though he himself is the person of action? He 
argues that "social education and nomoi mould the best and strongest among 
ourselves, catching them young like lion cubs, and by spells and incantations 
these make slaves of them, demanding that they must be content with 
equality and that this is what is right and fair"(483 e - 484 a). Does this 
mean that human consciousness and ideas are determined by a man's social 
environment and conditions? We can say "Yes" if he is not one of those 
strong enough by physis. However, the naturally stronger can overcome and 
shake off all such controls. In this procedure Callicles seems to suggest 
that to study philosophy leads the naturally stronger to be critical and 
sceptical of the accepted values, as he regards "the man who does not pursue 
philosophy as illiberal"(Tov sè |ifi <|)iXoao4)o<ivTa dveXeJe^pov 485 c) and one who 
will never aspire to fine and noble deed(485 d). This means that one must
study philosophy in one's youth in order not to be the slave of the "spells and
incantations". To have knowledge of philosophy is a good basis for freeing 
the young from unnatural moral obligations so that they can rise to study
9 Practical reason is different from theoretical reason according to Aristotle: "firstly, it 
works together with appetite, which is irrelevant to pure theory; secondly, it is 
concerned with the individual as well as the universal, for we cannot act in general; 
and thirdly, it deals with what is indeterminate and contingent" - Plato's Modern 
Enemies and the Theory of natural Law, J. Wild, University of Chicago Press 1953 p. 83
10 Plato Gorgias, T. Irwin, Oxford P. 172 and cf. Rep. 332 a-b, Euripides' Medea, 807-10
11 Merit and Responsibility, A. W. H. Adkins, Oxford 1960 p. 205
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practical things. But to study philosophy beyond the proper age leads one to 
be critical and sceptical not only towards the unnatural n o m o i  but also 
towards natural law throughout one's life. So if a man continues in 
philosophy longer than one should, then it will be the ruin of him, for he will 
waste his time and lose the desire to study the practical requisites for a 
citizen and a man of distinction. As Callicles maintains, to engage in 
philosophy is good just so far as it is an aid to education(<|)iXoao<|)ias pèv d'oov 
TTttiSeias xapiv KaXov 485 a). Callicles maintains that education should
be balanced in two stages; one is the right time of life for studying 
philosophy and the other is that for public matters; he admonishes Socrates 
to concur with his opinion about the proper way of life and to follow it in 
future. To Callicles theoretical knowledge or philosophy cannot be the final 
object of wisdom, for he identifies philosophy with an art which finds a man 
well-gifted and leaves him worse(iTis et)cj)UTi Xaj3oûaa t^xvti cjxSTa €8tik€ x^ipova 
486 b).
Before his next speech Callicles explains his position to Socrates: I 
identify the better with the more powerful(è[i€ yàp oiei aXXo t i  Xéyeiv to 
Kp€iTTous ctvai -n TO ^cXtioos 489 b-c). Socrates' refutation of Callicles, in 
which the majority are stronger than an individual strong man, looks fatal 
to Callicles' position if Socrates confines his position to the domain of 
physical power. Socrates deliberately does not differentiate between the 
m atter of quantity and that of quality. It is true that the quantitative  
physical power of slaves is stronger than that of the master, however, the 
master's strength lies in his ability to exercise his non-physical power: his 
social status, influence and adm inistration. A fter Socrates' refutation  
Callicles is given the opportunity to clarify his idea. So he once more 
identifies "the more powerful" with "the w iser and nobler"(489 d-e). 
Socrates identifies Callicles' account as saying that "one wise man is often 
more powerful than ten thousands fools and it is right that he should rule 
and they be subjects and that the ruler should have more than his 
subjects"{490 a). Also Callicles argues that it is natural justice that the 
better and wiser man should rule over and have more than the inferior (to ijto
■yàp ... TO SiKttiov etvai <})uo€i, to peXTiw ovTa Kai <))povi|iwTepov Kai apxeiv Kai ttXcov
exeiv Twv (*)avXoT€pwv 490 a). Socrates tries to refute this argument by citing 
the case of the doctor and the other people. Socrates asks whether, if people 
of various kinds, some strong, s o m e ,w e a k , and among them, a doctor, 
gathered together in the same place, with plenty of food and drink in
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common, the doctor, wiser in these matters, should have a larger portion of 
the food than the other people. In this case Callicles can refute Socrates, if 
he argues that the power of the doctor lies in his authority for treating 
patients. So the doctor can rule over the other people and have more power 
than the inferior(the patient) in treating them, for if he does not have 
enough authority he cannot exercise his power from the viewpoint of 
authority. Concerning what he means by "the more powerful" Callicles adds 
that "the more powerful" are above all those who are wise in affairs of the 
state and the best methods of administering the state, and not only wise but 
courageous, being competent to accomplish their intentions and not flagging 
through weakness of soul (tpwtov iacv tovs KpeiTTOus o ï e la iv  ... a v  €ls Ttt TTis 
iToXews TTpayiJiaTa <|)poviiJioi tSoiv, o V riv a  av  Tpoirov eS oIkoÎto, Kai (atî hovov c|)pdvi{Jioi, 
àXXà Ktti dv0p €io i, iK avo i oVtcs d d v  vo ifow aiv  èiriTcXciv, Kai |it| diroKdiJivwoi Bid 
iia X a K ia v  Tfjs # X T 18 491 a-b). This pronouncement is good evidence that 
Callicles lays emphasis on the excellence of one's role, and it can be 
regarded as a kind of an answer to Socrates' question of the case of the 
doctor. So we can say that Callicles thinks that it is proper that those who 
are wise and courageous in the affairs of the state should govern states, and 
this is the meaning of justice (Kai to SiKaiov toOt’ èoTiv), that these should 
should have more than the others, the rulers than the subjects (491 d).
III. Callicles makes his second speech(491 e - 492 d) to explain his 
idea of the relation of the wise with themselves, and of whether they are 
rulers or slaves:
 Why, how could a man be happy when a slave to anybody at all? No,
but what is the naturally noble and just is what I shall now describe 
to you with all frankness - namely that anyone who Is to live aright 
should let his appetites grow to the greatest extent(Tds èirieunias 
Tas èauToO kâv  cis picyiaTas c tv a i) and not check them, and through courage 
and practical wisdom should be competent to minister to them at 
their greatest and to satisfy every appetite with what it craves( ... Kai
p.T) KoXa^eiv, TaiJTais 6e ws jiey io Ta is  oifaais k a v o v  e lv a i 6 tttip€T€iv  6i’ àv6peiav
Kai <j)povTioiv). But this, I suppose, is impossible for the many; hence 
they blame such men through a sense of shame to conceal their own 
impotence, and, as I remarked before, they claim that intemperance is 
shameful and they make slaves of those who are naturally better. And 
because they themselves are unable to procure satisfaction for their
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pleasure, they are led by their own cowardice to praise temperance 
and justice(... Kai aÙTOi 00 Swaiievoi €KiTopi^ea0ai Tats T|Sovats irXifpwaiv 
èTraivoûoiv ttjv owcjjpooiJVTiv Kai ttiv SiKaioaiiviiv 6là ttiv a<iTWV dvaSpiav). For to 
those whose lot it has been from the beginning to be the sons of kings 
or whose natural gifts enable them to acquire some office or tyranny 
or supreme power, what in truth could be worse and more shameful 
than temperance and justice(<Ti dv> t^ à\r\Q€(q, aioxiov Kai KOKiov di] 
a{i)(|)poaijvT)s Kai SiKaiooovTis tovtois toîs dv0po)Trois)? For though at liberty 
without any hindrance to enjoy their blessings, they would themselves 
invite the laws, and the talk and censure of the many, to be masters 
over them. And surely this noble justice and temperance of theirs 
would make miserable wretches of them, if they could bestow no more 
upon their friends than on their enemies, and that too when they were 
rulers in their own states. But the truth, Socrates, which you profess 
to follow, is this. Luxury and intemperance and freedom, when they are 
well supplied, are virtue and happiness, and all the rest are tinsel, the 
unnatural catchwords of mankind, mere nonsense and of no account
(Tpu(()f) Kai dKoXaoia Kai èXeoOepia, èàv WiKoiipiav X^Tl» toOt’ o^tI v dpeTif T€ Kai 
€Ù8ai|Jiovia, Td Sè dXXa TaOf èoTlv Tà KaXXwirConaTa, Td irapd (j>uoiv oov0#aTa 
dv0pwTTWV, (jjXoapia Kai o\!»8evos d^ia).
In this speech , by contrasting the term s "courage and practical 
w i s d o  m "(dv8peia  Kai ct)po'viiais) with the term s "tem perance and  
justice"(ow(|)pooovnv Kai BiKaicoOvTi), Callicles claims that it is naturally noble 
and just(To KaTd W oiv KaXov Kai SiKaicv) that the man who so lives his life 
should rightly let his appetites , to which courage and practical 
wisdom(dv8p6ia Kai (|)poviiois) should minister for his satisfaction, grow to the 
greatest extent and not to check them. The w eaker majority who praise 
tem perance and justice(o(o4)pooifvTi Kai BiKaiooovTi) are stupid, for they are 
unable to procure satisfaction for their own pleasure owing to their lack of 
courage and practical wisdom. The courage and practical wisdom of 
Callicles' ideal man lead him to the life of luxury, intemperance and freedom  
which also make him virtuous and happy, whereas temperance and justice 
make him miserable.
It is true that Callicles raises the problem of freedom, which needs to 
get rid of "what is felt to be the overly restrictive and inappropriate
A
Callicles 31
heritage of traditional moral norms and requirements" .12 Freedom refers to 
the absence of coercion or constraint in body and mind imposed by anyone. In 
this respect a man is free insofar as he can choose between the alternatives 
available to him in such a condition that nobody disturbs or interferes with 
him while he is choosing by his own will. This kind of freedom can be called 
negative freedom; freedom from restraint and coercion. This is in accord 
with Socrates' idea of freedom: those who are in need of nothing are rightly 
happy(oi |jiii6evos 6ed|ievoL eij6ai|iov€s etvai 492 e). Citing the sayings of an 
anonymous Italian writer, he explains that an uncontrolled and non retentive 
desire is just like a leaky jar never filled. On the other side there is another 
kind of freedom called positive freedom; freedom for the satisfaction of
desire. Positive freedom can be possible only if our volition can fit the
natural conditions of the real world. We cannot fly like a bird, swim like a
fish or live forever even if we strongly desire to. Natural conditions ordain 
restraints on our ability to choose our alternatives. In this case we must 
presuppose an area in which it is possible for us to choose or make our own 
decisions, in order that our desire may be accomplished entirely by our 
human capacity e.g. freedom of speech, action and thought. We can say that 
we are free to bring about something if we are free to perform it. From this, 
if we think about the case of alternatives which are available to us and 
depend on our capacity in reality, then the growth of our knowledge and 
physical strength can increase our ability to extend our freedom. In any 
society the ruling class may have control over the property and freedom of 
the ruled class. So the ruling class have the ability to regulate and to
control the alternatives of choice of the ruled class. In this case the ruled
class usually lack the means or power to choose their alternatives
consciously or unconsciously, for the powerless class can be hindered from
knowing even what kinds of choices will be available to them. And moreover, 
even though we are entitled to be free to choose alternatives, we cannot say 
that we are entirely free if we do not have the means to achieve whatever 
we have chosen. We thus can say that, if anyone is free, it implies not only 
that there are no physical restraints or natural conditions preventing him 
from choosing his alternatives, but that he possesses the means to achieve 
the alternative he chooses. If all these conditions are satisfied, we might 
say that at that time the necessary conditions are met for the existence of 
freedom. All these necessary conditions can be reduced to the possession of 
power, for the possession of power can guarantee the potentiality for
12 Kerferd 1981 p. 122
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getting one's own way. It implies that "to have the power to do X" means "to 
have the means to do X", and also "to be free to do X". Callicles' desire like 
Nietzsche's, has a determined ideal "will-to-power" which overpowers him. 
That is the ideal of "the men of action for action's sake".13 For 
Thrasymachus of the Republic  I the will-to-power is unjust and this is the 
desire of the unjust stronger man, whereas Callicles calls this will-to- 
power "justice" according to the law of physis. As we have seen above, 
Callicles identifies the no m oi  of society with coercions which prevent a 
man from choosing his alternatives. So he thinks that the existence of the 
laws and customs of society places fetters and bonds on natural human 
desire and freedom. This means that the things that are laid down by the 
laws are bonds on physis, whereas those which are given by physis  are 
freedom to him who follows "physis's own law"(KaT« vdpov ye tov tt^ s <j)\ioews).
The central idea of Callicles' view of freedom is to live according to
the direction of physis ,  which pursues the fulfilment of all desires and 
involves the absence of any restraints and bonds on a man's desires, which 
leads him to the state of happiness. Callicles' ideal man urgently wishes to 
have a freedom which would guarantee his ability to do what he wanted for 
the purpose of satisfying every natural desire to the limit. However, he 
stands his ground on the idea of liberty and freedom in the life of luxurious 
happiness. He holds temperance and justice in contempt, for the possession 
of these two moral attributes prevents and inhibits him from having his 
freedom. To him self-denial or self-discipline and the justice of Socrates 
are nothing but restrictions acting as burdens to the pleasure he is seeking 
by means of practical wisdom and power. The powerful and intelligent man 
who constitutes Callicles' ideal man would have sufficient ability to
promote his own interest and need, so it follows that he would also enjoy
the necessary conditions for the obtainmerit of freedom. Callicles knows 
very well that the growth of his knowledge extends his capacity for 
freedom. The more powerful man can restrict the alternatives of choice and 
the freedom of the powerless man in order to satisfy his own interests more 
fully, since Callicles defines his natural justice as meaning that the wiser 
or the man who has more knowledge in civil affairs must rule over the less 
wise or the man who has less knowledge. In this respect Callicles is no 
different from Socrates or Plato in the matter of political philosophy. To 
Plato also "the class prerogatives are necessary for upholding the stability
13 Plato, the Man and His Works, A. E. Taylor, Metheun Reprinted 1952 p. 116
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of the state".1^  However, Socrates upholds the importance of self-control 
and temperance, but Callicles advocates that one should satisfy one's 
desires as much as possible, and never repress them, because to practise 
self-control and restraint is against one's natural desire.
From the viewpoint of hedonism let us think about Callicles' idea of 
pleasure. Hedonism means that only pleasure, i.e. a pleasant state of mind, is 
desirable and all other things apart from this are less desirable. It means 
that an action is desirable only to the extent that it leads to pleasure as a 
result. We can say that a man is in a state of pleasure if and only if he 
enjoys his activity for itself regardless of other considerations of 
consequences at any time when he does not wish the alternative in lieu of 
what he has chosen. To gain pleasure is to be in the state of mind which 
consists in the idea that one has attained something one desires. In this 
view, one's choice of pleasure is entirely derived from one's past 
experiences i.e. one's fundamental values are interrelated with one's past 
experiences. Callicles thinks that the weaker majority in fact praise 
temperance and justice "for their own interest"(483 d), for they themselves 
are unable to procure satisfaction for their pleasures. By means of praising 
justice and temperance the weak majority can acquire for themselves 
benefits which are the result of keeping nomoi, but which should actually 
accrue to the stronger. In this respect the human mind is basically filled 
with an egoistic desire for its own pleasure. So it can be said that Callicles' 
idea is a kind of psychological egoism to the effect that all human actions 
or desires are derived from the idea of a person's own pleasure and benefit. 
It means that the natural world is in the state of a ceaseless struggle of 
"every man against everyone else" for his own satisfaction. The individual is 
in the state of natural desire as having a natural right to protect and to 
enjoy his life by the use of all means and all actions, irrespective of the 
stronger or the weaker. Callicles' "right of physis" is derived from man's 
inclination to assert himself and seek power. And he raises the fundamental 
ethical question: why should I sacrifice my own interest and pleasure for 
the sake of others?
To Callicles pleasure is good, so if something does not give pleasure to 
him he will not pursue it. This means that there is a natural relationship 
between what is pleasant and what is good in his mind, which is
Popper 1973 p. 119 and Plato's Laws 690 b-c, 714 e - 715 a, and 890 a-b
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manipulated by the weak majority unjustly. What Callicles comes to crticise 
directly Is the tendency of making any prescriptive judgments whatsoever 
about the values to be followed in life. To him there are no objective normal 
values, rather they created by man for his own pleasure or desire. However, 
Socrates differentiates good pleasures from bad ones in that the end of our 
pursuit is not pleasure but the good. Against Socrates' view that "those who 
are in need of nothing are rightly called happy (492 d)," Callicles retorts 
that in that case stones and corpses would be supremely happy. And when 
Socrates asks Callicles about the happiness of the pervert whose desires 
are fully satisfied, then Callicles responds that such a life is awful and 
shameful (494 e4 ff). From this it evidently follows that this kind of 
pleasure is not what Callicles has in mind, for random desires which 
interrupt the well-ordered fulfilment of one's essential integrity cannot be 
the objects of the freedom he is talking about, for they are not natural but 
unnatural, also they contradict the law of diminishing utility. So Socrates' 
refutation cannot be justified. The main difference between Callicles and 
Socrates on the issues of pleasure is that Callicles thinks that pleasant is 
good, whereas Socrates thinks that good is pleasant. However, the main 
problem of Callicles' idea is that he has made no definite distinction 
between brutal appetite or sensual pleasure, and that intentional or planned 
desire which is combined with practical reason.
We have examined Callicles idea mainly as revealed through his two 
speeches: one is 488 b - 489 c, the other 492 a - 492 c. Callicles' idea is 
defined as that of the immoralist by both Adkins and Annas.i5 Adkins in 
particular argues that Callicles claims that "injustice is a preferable 
course of action to ju s tic e " .H o w e v e r, Callicles argues that "it is right for 
the better to have the advantage over the worse, the more able over the
less(6iKaiov èoTiv TOV dii€ivw toO TrXeov €x i^v Kai tov SovaTWT€pov toO
dSovaTü)T€poij 483 d)," "it is natural justice that the better and wiser man 
should rule over and have more than the inferior"(ToOTo yàp ... to skaiov clvai 
(j)oo€i, TO peXTio) ovTa Kai (()povi^ iwT€pov Kai apx€iv Kai irXeov €X€iv twv c|)auXoT€p(dv 490  
a) and that "it is the just that these (who are wise in the affairs of the 
state and courageous) should govern states, should have more than others, 
the rulers than the subjects (Kai to Skaiov toOt’ èoTiv, irX&v exciv tootoos t(3v
15 An Introduction to Plato's Republic, J. Anitas, Oxford 1981 p. 37 and Adkins 1960 pp. 
222-23
16 Adkins 1960 p. 222
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àXX(ov, Toùs apxovTas t(3v dpxopcvwv 491 d)". As we can see we cannot deny that 
he has a conception of justice and rightness. He simply has a different view 
of the meaning of justice. If we think about his idea in comparison with the 
Homeric ideal of power and honour, his idea will be revealed clearly. The 
Homeric heroes have "all an insatiable thirst for honour"i7|n order to declare 
their own excellence (dp€TTf), for the Greeks believed honour to be the 
aspiration of the individual towards that ideal and supra-personal sphere, in 
which alone he can have real v a lu e . is in the traditional thinking the Greeks 
always believed that unrivalled strength and prowess were the natural basis 
of leadership, which was closely interrelated with one’s excellence(dp€TTf), a 
special description of herioc strength and courage. As Adkins explains,19 
"The admired qualities are in fact best characterised as 'strength-bravery- 
and-wealth-leading-to-or-preserving-success'" which is the unitary and 
unanalysed physis of excellence(dpeTt[) for Homeric man, Agathos is the most 
powerful adjective available to commend a man in Homeric society, who 
must be brave, strong and successful.20 The agathos  claim against society 
affects ascriptions of responsibility. Adkins explains the relations between 
the claims of the agathos  and the physis of his society as follows2i:
If the agathos  chooses to make use of his advantage, his fellows may 
grow angry with him, and attempt to restrain him by force; but if for 
any reason they are unable to do this, his claim to act as he pleases in 
respect of the co-operative excellences is stronger than any claim 
they can bring against him; and if he feels that any thwarting of his 
desires would be failure, the aidos which he feels at not being agathos 
must be stronger than the aidos which he feels at not being pinutos.
On the other hand one of the most powerful denigrative words used of 
actions in Homer is aischron which is attributed to the vanquished for 
having been defeated, whatever one's intentions22 . Callicles also argues 
strongly; "by p h y s is  what is worse is more shameful, i.e. suffering 
wrong"(<|5ua€i pev yàp irdv aioxiov koriv okep Kai KaKiov, t o  à5iKCÎo0ai 483 a) In 
Homeric society, however, the quieter co-operative excellences must take
1  ^ Jaeger 1939 p. 7
18 Ibid p.8
19 From the Many to the One, A. W. H. Adkins, London, 1970 p. 30
20 Ibid p. 29
21 Adkins 1960 p 50
22 Adkins 1970 p. 28
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an inferior position in comparison with the competitive excellences which 
the society needs most.23 So it is not necessary "for men to possess any of 
the quiet virtues" which excellence commends for women "in order to be
agathos". 24
Let us return to the case of Callicles. In his first speech Callicles 
seems to regard the stronger as the physically stronger, as he gives two 
kinds of evidence: the cases of animals and the case of men like Darius and 
Xerxes. And the way Callicles describes how the stronger, just like a young 
lion cub, comes to be adapted to the life of nomos in his explanation of the 
contrast between nomos  and physis, strongly implies that the power of the 
stronger lies in physical strength. In addition to these Heracles' action from 
Pindar’s poem is cited for the purpose of supporting his position. However, 
he identifies the stronger with the better at 489 b-c when Socrates is 
trying to refute him. He adds that a rabble of slaves and nondescripts are of 
no earthly use except for their bodily strength collected together. 
Furthermore he puts the stronger in the same category as the wiser and
nobler. And Callicles concludes that it is natural justice that the better and
wiser man should rule over and have more than the inferior(490 a). As far as 
Callicles' position is concerned his view of natural justice can be 
interpreted as saying that it is just that the better and wiser should rule 
and get the better of the worse - as the Greek always traditionally believed,
if we think about the matter of just distribution according to one’s own
ability. This is natural for the traditional Greeks, who rank every man 
according to his ability. Concerning what he means by "the more powerful" 
Callicles adds that "the more powerful" are above all those who are wise in 
affairs of the state and the best methods of administering the state, and not 
only wise but courageous, being competent to accomplish their intentions 
and not flagging through weakness of soul(491 a-b). So we must understand 
Callicles’ idea in terms of his latter definition of the stronger, for the 
latter definition is the result of clarifying his former idea at Socrates' 
demand. His ideal man has the desire "to get the better of"(To TiXeovcKTeiv) 
others through his wisdom and courage, as equivalent to dpeTif of the 
Homeric heroes. If one is the stronger by physis, one must exert oneself to 
get more good things and incur fewer evils, for Callicles believes that dpcTif 
cannot be real the dperif if it does not bring happiness to the agent who is
23 Adkins 1960 p. 36
24 Ibid p.37
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exercising it. To be a superior, Callicles' ideal man, as a man of action, must 
study philosophy and all the accomplishments required for a gentleman and a 
man of distinction. To study philosophy leads one to be critical and sceptical 
of the accepted values as Callicles regards "the man who does not pursue 
philosophy as illiberal"(TÔv 6e pf| <|)iXoaoc|)oxivTa dveXenOepov 485 c) and one who 
will never aspire to be a fine and noble deed(485 d). At 492 a-b Callicles 
contrasts the terms "courage and practical wisdom"(dvSpeia Kai cjjpdviiais), 
corresponding to the competitive excellences in Homer, with the terms 
"temperance and justice"(aw(|)poauvTiv Kai SiKaioaùvTi), corresponding to the 
quieter co-operative excellences. The former two terms can be attributed to 
the man of action(the practical man), whereas the latter ones can be 
attributed to the man of theory(philosophicaI man). Callicles is in the 
position of admiration of <t>pdvTiais, which can be rendered "prudence in 
government and affairs" or "practical wisdom"(Sym. 209 a, Arist. EN 1140a 
24, 1141b 23, Isoc. 12. 204, 217). Callicles insists that "the agathos  is the
phronimos, and that the agathon, the end of life, is the pleasant; and hence,
since the man who is most ag ath os  is the man who can obtain the most 
agathon by means of his skill, he must be the man who obtains the most 
p leasu re".25 |n llliad  XV 641 ff, practical wisdom is mentioned along with 
physical strength and warlike prowess under the collective term "all sorts 
of excellence". The world of Callicle is in the state of competition as that of 
the Homeric heroes. It is a ceaseless struggle of "every man against 
everyone else". So Callicles' ideal man who is in the state of physis has a 
natural right to protect and promote his life by means of all his practical 
wisdom and courage. With the advantages of his high practical wisdom and 
innate astuteness, the efficient man can gain favours easily from the 
multitude, and control these less sensible men. His possession of power can 
guarantee the potentiality for getting one's own way which will lead to him 
achieving, through courage and practical wisdom, the life of luxury, 
intemperance and freedom which is to be identified with the life of virtue 
and happiness. Callicles urgently wishes to have a freedom which would 
guarantee his ability to do what he wanted for the purpose of satisfying 
every natural desire to the limit. In Athens, while she was flourishing, the
term arete  (dpcTTf) was used to approve the production of certain results in
the administration of government, for at this time the term dp€T-n came to 
approve not only "those who secure in the field of politics the ends secured
25 Ibid p. 272
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by traditional arete  (dpeTtf) on the field of battle, but those who secure them 
in the m anner  of traditional arete  (dpeTTf)"26
Conclusion
As we have seen above we can realise that the origin of Callicles' idea 
is derived from the Homeric ideal. Callicles' ideal man, aspiring to a fine and 
noble deed, just like the Homeric heroes has an insatiable desire to "get the 
better of" others. In the traditional thinking the Greeks always believed that 
unrivalled strength and prowess were the natural basis of leadership, which 
was closely interrelated with one's excellence(dp€Tif), a special description 
of heroic strength and courage. We can see in the Melian dialogue that
Thucidides shows how such a view of life might be used to justify the
attitude of the imperial democracy to its subject allies. Callicles' position 
approaches the Homeric hero's ideal of power and honour, affirming "the
individual's natural right against a hypocritical society".2? Plato also in fact 
agrees with "Callicles in wishing to get away from conventional justice in 
order to move to something higher", "appropriate above all to the ruler and 
the p h i l o s o p h e r , "28 for he too thinks that it is right that the better and 
wiser(in the sense of the philosopher-king) should rule over and have more 
than the inferior. Although both Callicles and Hippias criticise the nomos  in 
a similar way, their starting points are different, so their ideas are driven 
in different directions. Callicles prefers "physis' own law", that men are
unequal by physis, to the democratic ideal of equality; while Hippias, the 
Sophist, claims that democratic equality is too limited as being only for 
free citizens of equal privileges. The Sophist Antiphon, who argues that 
nomoi are imposed by force and contrary to physis{DK 87B40), also makes 
the similar distinction between what is just in natural terms and what is 
just in normal terms as Callicles does: the advantages which are prescribed 
by the laws are fetters on physis ,  whereas the advantages which are 
prescribed by physis make for freedom(DK 87B40).
26 Ibid p. 225
27 Dodds 1959, p. 267
28 Kerferd 1981, p. 119
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11. EUTHYDEMUS and DIONYSODORUS
Lives and Works
The two sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, were natives of 
Chios, who emigrated to join the colony at Thurii, where they spent a good 
many years but were then exiled. Spending their time In Athens they are 
depicted as teachers of two kinds of special techniques: one is to train their 
pupils to become first-rate physical fighters; they are themselves masters 
at fighting in armour, and can make anyone able to pay their fee an expert; 
the other is to train people so that in the battle of the law courts they are 
champions; they can compete themselves and teach others to speak, and they 
can compose speeches suitable to deliver in court. That both Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus were real people is established by references to them by 
Xenophon and Aristotlei, and we know from the Cratylus (386 d 3-7) that the 
theory of Euthydemus is that all things appear equal to all men at the same 
time and always(aoi SoKâ irdoi iravra 6po(ws etvai apa Kai àel). From Aristotle's 
statements about Euthydemus in the Rhetoric (ii 24 3-4 ) and the Sophistici 
Elenchi (177 b 12ff), it can be surmised that he was a well-known Sophist 
at Athens. Aristotle's remarks would also suggest that he had before him 
one of Euthydemus' writings containing sophistic argument not found in 
Plato's dialogue.
However, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are portrayed in this dialogue 
as inferior to the greater Sophists, Protagoras and Gorgias, in that Plato's 
treatment of them is severe and disapproving. Dionysodorus, especially, is 
described as a frivolous and shameless Sophist(297 a). Also they portrayed 
as itinerant professional teaçhers, non-Athenian citizens, boasting of 
themselves as teachers of virtue (273 d), so skilful in wordy warfare that 
they can contest with equal success apything which anyone says, whether
Concerning their historical existence, see Philologus 87, K. Praechter, pp. 121-135
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true or false(272 b), moreover they can help a man defend himself in the law 
court if he is wronged (293 c), and they are also called "all-wise" (iraoaocijoi 
drexvws) (271 c).
The Fallacies of the Sophists as Revealed in the Euthydem us
This dialogue, in which Socrates narrates what happened the previous 
day with the two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, has a dramatic 
structure, consisting of five scenes.^ Socrates and Crito get in on the act, in 
terms of the structure of the narrated conversation, in framing sections 
before and after the five scenes. In the introductory conversation Socrates, 
full of satirical humour, irony, and sarcasm, proposes that he and Crito 
should go and sit at the feet of the two sophists to learn how to use the 
sophistic fallacy. The first, third, and fifth scenes consist of examples of 
these fallacious arguments, in which the sophists show off their technical 
method of education leading a man of virtue (dper-n) by refuting their 
interlocutors. In the second and fourth scenes we can see the typical 
Socratic protreptic leading the young to pursue the love of real 
knowledge(<{)iXoao(j)ia), for it is the only way of leading a truly happy life. In 
the epilogue Socrates and Crito discuss the real good education which the 
son of Crito (Critoboulos) should be given.
Plato's serious task in this dialogue is to demonstrate the fallacious 
method of the so-called sophistic new education by contrasting it with the 
Socratic method. Cleinias is a young Athenian man of good family and great 
promise. He must have a good education and should be inclined towards
2 This dialogue has a lot of similarities to the Clouds of Aristophanes. It has been pointed 
out that Plato's versatility "in the dramatic representation of character has made some
of his dialogues resemble far more what we call 'Genteel Comedy' than a philosophical
exposition, " and "the entire Euthydemus  is nothing less than a dramatic satire, of 
boundless humour and variety, on the follies of the sophistic professors, and assuredly 
lies much nearer to Aristophanes than Aristotle".- The Euthydemus of Plato, E. H. 
Gifford, Oxford, 1905 p. 10. And we can see that this dialogue consists of five scenes
distinguished by the different characters who speak in each scene:
Introductory Conversation - Socrates and Crito (271 a - 272 d)
Sc I. Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Cleinias, and Socrates (272 e -277 c)
Sc II. Socrates and Cleinias (277 d - 282 e)
Sc III.  Dionysodorus, Socrates, Ctesippus, and Euthydemus (283 a - 288 b)
Sc IV . Socrates and Cleinias (288 b - 290 d)
Sc V. Euthydemus, Socrates, Dionysodorus, and Ctesippus(293 d - 304 b)
Epilogue - Socrates and Crito (304 c - End)
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philosophy and the practice of virtue and the act of being a good citizen. So 
Socrates Is afraid for him, as for other young men, that someone may get in 
first, turn his mind in some other direction, and ruin him. The dramatic 
effectiveness of this dialogue also reveals the dazzling presentation of 
fallacious arguments, whose purpose is not to lead the young to study 
philosophy but to refute and dispute. In this respect we can see Plato's 
intention to expose what was publicised under the name of education at that 
time of Athens.
The intended contrast between dialectic and eristic is the main 
theme in this dialogue: the sophistic art of eristic aims simply at 
refutation, regardless of the truth, whereas the dialectic of Socrates is to 
lead the answerer to the truth^. Plato usually identifies the term eristic 
[èpiaTiKîf - from èpi^w; strive, wrangle and quarrel (of sophistical refutation)], 
with the meaning of sophistry, in any case attaching it to whatever practice 
he considered at that time as a danger which must be avoided. By the term 
eristic or the case of quarrelling, he indicates that the aim of the Sophists 
is to win the argument, whereas the aim of dialectic is to discover the 
truth. This kind of skill is well exemplified in the Euthydem us. The reason 
why Plato constantly pillories eristic and distinguishes it from dialectic is 
that in truth his own dialectic very closely resembled "eristic"^. On the 
other hand "antilogic" or "the art of contradiction"[ dvnXoyiKtf - f r o m  
dvTiXoyew, dvTiXeyo) (to Speak against, to contradict)], which Plato attributes 
to the Sophists above all others, means a tendency to contradict, to 
maintain aggressively whatever position is opposite to that of one's 
interlocutor. Anti logic usually consists in confusing everything  
together(P/7aecfo 101 d). And antilogic is the power of making everything 
seem similar to everything else as far as possible (Phaedrus  261 c). Kerferd 
explains the difference between eristic and antilogic in two ways^: first its 
meaning is different, and secondly unlike eristic, when used in argument 
antilogic constitutes a specific and a fairly definite technique, namely that 
of proceeding from a given logos  to the establishment of a contradictory 
logos In such a way that the opponent must either accept both logoi, or at 
least abandon his first position. However, "the elenchus"[ eXeyxos from èxéyxw
3 Commentary on Plato’s Euthydemus, R. S. W. Hawtrey, American Philosophical Society 
1981, pp. 6-7.
4 Plato's Earlier Dialect, p. 83-84, R. Robinson, Oxford 1953
5 The Sophistic Movement, p. 63, G.B. Kerferd, Cambridge University Press 1981
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(to cross-examine, to question)] which Plato comes to approve is a contest 
in which both parties openly admit that the questioner is trying to refute 
and the answerer is trying not to be refuted. Socratic elenchus in the wider 
sense means examining a person with regard to a statement he has made, by 
putting to him questions calling for further statements, in the hope that he 
will determine the meaning and the truth-value of his first statement.6
Socratic elenchus changes an ignorant man from the state of falsely 
supposing that he knows anything to the state of recognising that he does 
not know anything as an epistemological prerequisite, thus supplying the 
motive which will lead him to knowledge. The whole essence of the elenchus 
lies in making visible to the answerer the link between his actual beliefs 
and the contradiction of his present thesis,? however, it only tells the 
answerer that he is wrong without giving the reason for it and does not give 
the man any positive knowledge.8 Socratic elenchus is incorporated into the 
larger whole of dialectic, though it is still negative and destructive in 
essence. It goes forward into Plato's new constructive instrument of 
"dialectic" [SiaXeKTiKif from SiaXeyopai (to converse with, to discourse with )]. 
To Plato the dialectical method is "the ideal method," as the art of
discussion(V| irepl TOUS Xoydus Tc'xvTi P h a e d o  90 b) or the procedure of 
discussion(fi peecSos twv xdywv Sophists 227 a ). In general it is always the 
search for "what each thing really \s" (R ep ub iic  533b). It means that 
dialectic searches for the essence of each thing and the formal and abiding 
element in that thing. Dialectic is the technical aspect of philosophy, 
directed in one sense to all existence and in another to essences only; it is 
the activity of philosophy.9 Dialectic is a necessary condition for the 
pursuit of the truth by using the faculty of reason as a way of thinking. 
However, dialectic is dangerous because it entails refutation; there is a
temptation to treat elenchus as an amusing game and practice it for its own
sake.
The technical method of Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus is 
a kind of eristic derived from the logical method of the Eleatic Zeno. Zeno's 
reductio ad absurdum is based on leading the respondent to the logically 
absurd antinomy. So they can refute any statement with equal certainty.
6 Robinson 1953, p. 10 
? Ibid, p. 16
8 Ibid, p. 17
9 Ibid, p. 70-71
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus 43
Their eristic method is very similar to the Socratic elenchus in appearance: 
the short questions give it a formal similarity. The Socratic dialectic by use 
of elenchus is represented as an art whose practice displays a real concern 
for one's soul, whereas the eristic of the sophists appears to be completely 
lacking in such concern. Also the Socratic method is a private one which 
cannot be achieved by formal teaching in front of the public. While the 
Socratic conversation, ascending in a straight line and approaching very 
important insights, culminates in aporia, the Sophists, who at least touch 
upon some serious topics, i.e. virtue can be taught, in the beginning and pose 
logical knots not easily untangled, end up by doing something simply silly. 
The Sophists pretend to teach virtue, however they would not and could not 
do it. On the other hand Socrates gives a basis for leading the young towards 
the state of virtue or knowledge by getting them to realise that they know 
nothing.
Aristotle classifies arguments into four kinds in his S o p h is t ic i  
E le n c h i;  didactic, dialectic, exami nation-arguments and contentious 
arguments (SiSaoKaXifcoi xai SiaX^KTiKol xal 'ïïeipaoTiKol xai èpioTiKoi).!® In this 
classification it is necessary for us to note the contentious arguments 
which reason or seem to reason from opinions which appear to be, but 
actually are not, generally accepted. Aristotle explains that there are two 
modes of refutation; one has to do with the language used, the other is 
unconnected with the language: of fallacies connected language there are six 
kinds; (1) equivocation (djAwvuiiia) (2) ambiguity (dp(|)ipoXia) (3) combination 
(oyv0eais) (4) division (6idpeais) (5) accent (irpoadjSia) (6) form of expression 
(axtipa X€^ews); of fallacies unconnected with language there are seven kinds;
(1) those connected with accident (irapa to (2) those in which an
expression is used absolutely but qualified as to manner or place or time or 
relation (to dirXws if (if) duXws àXXd Tffi if TTO0 if TTOTe if irpds t i  X€y€O0ai) (3) those 
connected with ignorance of the nature of refutation (to irapà Tifv tou èXeyxoo 
dyvoiav) (4) those connected with the consequent (to irapà to éiroVevov) (5) 
those connected with the assumption of the original point to be proved (to 
irapà (to) to kv dpx  ^ Xappav€iv) (6) those which assert that what is not a cause 
is a cause (to pf| aiTiov (5s aiTiov Ti0€vai) (7) the making of several questions 
into one (to Tà nXciw èpWTifliaTa kv iioieiv).
10 Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi, 165 b 8-10
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Let us go back to the Euthydemus  and examine the fallacies of the 
Sophists. There are XXI different kinds of fallacies in this dialogue. This 
classification is originally that of Bonitz.^ ^
(I) What sort of people is it that learn, the wise or the unwise? 
(noTgpoi €loi Twv àv0p(üTTü)v oi |iav0dvovTes, ol oocjjoi ii ol àjjia0€ts; 275 a7) - 
This question leads each answer into reductio ad absurdum because 
if the respondent answers that those who learn are the wise, then 
the questioner will refute this by saying that students in a school 
learn what they do not know; or if the respondent answers that 
those who learn are the unwise, then he will refute this by saying 
that the wise will learn a thing when a teacher recites it. 
Accordingly each answer will be refuted in this case. This sophism 
is based on the equivocation of |iav0dvav, ao(j)ds and djia0eis.i2
(II) Do those who learn learn what they know or what they do not 
know? (TroT€pov ol pav0dvovT€s pavOdvouoiv d èiriaTavrai  ^ d èiriaTavTai
276 d7). This question is very similar to sophism(l). The respondent 
is to be put into a dilemma because the sophists exploit on purpose 
the equivocation of |iav0dveiv, which can be used in two ways ; one is 
to have knowledge(^TTi0TiipTiv Xappdveiv) - when one has no knowledge 
at the beginning about something, then afterwards gains knowledge 
of it, the other is to understand (odvievai) - when one already having 
the knowledge uses this knowledge to examine the same thing done 
or spoken.
(III) You wish him to become what he is not and no longer to be what 
he is; therefore you wish him not to exist(ds {ilv oOk canv, povXco&e 
aijTov y€V€a0ai, ds 8' eoTi vOv, ptikcti €Îvai 283 d). This is a case of 
exploitation of an equivocation on the existential and the copulative 
sense of the verb "to be (dvai)," also there is an equivocation of the 
term ds, which can be interpreted as having two meanings; one is 
his attribute, the other is his existence.
Platonische Studien, H. Bonitz, Vahlen Berlin, 1880 pp. 93-151, and See Gifford 1905, 
pp. 35-39, and R. S. W. Hawtrey 1981, pp. 2-3
12 For detailed explanation of this sophism see Hawtrey's book pp 57-61
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus 45
(IV) Do you really think that it is possible to tell a lie Sokgî aoi oîdv
T ’ etvai {i)évôea0ai; 283 e l)?  This sophism uses the ambiguity of the
verb to be (dvai)  between its existential and its veridical senses.
However, Gifford classifies the fourth sophism as "ndrepov Xeyovra 
TO TTpaypa ir^pi od dv 6 Xdyos y[ pf) Xeyovra;" He maintains that the 
Sophists make use of the equivocation of the phrase "Xcyeiv n" as 
either "to speak of a thing" or "to utter a word". On the other hand 
Hawtrey rejects this on the ground that the term irpdypa should refer 
to a sentence, not a thing.
(V) No one says the things that are not(O0K d p a  y e  p-n d v r ’ , X e y e i  
odSeis 284 c2). This fallacy lies in the assumption that to speak of 
something is the same as to do something. The sophistic logic is as 
follows; (i) to speak is to do something (ii) not to speak is not to do 
anything (iii) therefore, to speak the things that are not is not to 
speak at all, so it is impossible for us to say the things that are not. 
Accordingly whenever a man says something, he says a thing that 
exists.
(VI) Are there indeed people who say things as they are? (elolv ydp 
Tives 01 Xcyouoi rd Trpdypara c5s è'xei; 284 C 9) By the phrase (6s exei 
Ctesippus, as Gifford says, refers to the proper relation between 
the subject and the predicate, but Dionysodorus makes the phrase ds 
exci refer to the conditions or qualities of the subject. For example, 
he rephrases the expression "speaking of cold things as they are" 
into "speaking coldly of cold things" by use of the ambiguity of the 
phrase ds exa.
(VII) Do you think there is such a thing as "speaking against" one ... 
when you say that( 'Os d v T o s  .. .  t o O à v n X é y e i v  . . .  T io ix l TOÙS X d y o u s ;  285 
d7)? This sophism identifies a thing(irpdypa) with a meaning or a 
explanation (xdyos). Hence if two people are saying the same thing, 
then no contradiction arises. If they are saying different things, 
even then there are no contradictions because they do not have the 
common basis of contradiction. So in both of these cases no 
contradictions arise.
13 See Ibid p. 98
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(VIII) Is there soul in things which have sense, when they have 
sense? Or do the soulless things also have sense(ndT€pov oSv il>ux'nv 
exovTtt vo€i Ta vooOvTa, ij Kai Ta dtl>vxa; 287 d7)? This SOphism USes 
the equivocation of the verb vociv, for it can have two meanings 
according to its application, one is "to mean" and the other is "to 
have in mind".
(IX) Is it not necessary for you to know everything if you are in the 
state of knowing(àXX ’ odsc dvdyKTi oe exei irdvTa èiTiOTaoÔai èiriOT-npovd ye 
dvTa; 293 c4)? This is the case of the fallacy of a dicto secundum 
quid ad dictum simpliciter i.e, this is possible by dropping the 
qualification; if Socrates knows something he is in the state of 
knowing something, but in this case the Sophists drop the 
qualification "something", so Socrates is in the state of knowing. 
Accordingly he cannot be "not knowing," for he cannot be both 
knowing and not knowing at the same time, consequently he knows 
everything.
(X) Is it by this same thing always or by this thing on one occasion, 
and by another thing on another occasion (irdTepov ... tcJ aüTy towtw y  ’ 
del, if cGTi [Acv oTe tout(o, eoTiv 8e oTe &Tepy; 296 a5)? In this case the 
term dei is used absolutely without qualification. The term àe( can be 
applied in two cases according to situations; one is "in each related 
case" and the other is "always" without qualification.
(XI) Then was a father being other than a father( ^Ap ’ o^v narnp ifv 
€Tepos wv TiaTpôs ; 298 a2)? Someone who is other than one's father 
is not a father. This is the case of the fallacy of the accident (napà 
TO ooppgpnKos). It is the result of what is predicated of the subject 
being maintained in its accident; If A is father of B, so A is a father. 
Accordingly C is not a father of B, so C is other than a father of B. 
As a result C is not a father by dropping the qualification of B.
(XII) Or do you think the same man being a father Is not a father(f| 
oi€i Tov aÜTov irapepa ovra oi3 Trapepa elvai ; 298 c2)? - SO your father iS 
the father of everything. This fallacy is similar to (XI). This is the 
case of a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid. This sophism 
also omits qualifications and uses the sentence absolutely.
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(XIII) Isn't the dog yours? ... being a father he is yours, so the dog 
becomes your father and you the puppies' brother(où ads èoTiv 6 Kdwv; 
... OdKoOv iraTTip (ov ads èariv, ware aos TraTTjp yiyveTai 6 Kvwv Kai ad 
Kuvapid)V d5cX<|)ds; 298 e 3-5). According to Hawtry this is the fallacy 
of composition. Again the meaning of father is used absolutely 
without qualifications. This fallacy runs as follows: If a dog is 
yours and he has puppies, he being yours is a father of puppies. So 
he is a father as yours by dropping the qualification of puppies, 
therefore he is your father. Aristotle explains this case as the 
identification of the attribute, which is true of the accident, with 
the subject.14
(XIV) But he does not want a lot of good ... neither he nor youfAXX’ 
oOSev SciTai ttoXXwv dyaBwv ... oiiV èiccîvos gvtc ad 299 a6). This is the 
case of a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter by omitting 
qualifications. All men want to have a lot of good things. A sick man 
needs medicine because it is good for him. So he needs to take 
medicine as much as he can. That is absurd. Also this idea 
represents the Socratic idea that "nothing is good without 
knowledge" in the dialogue 278 e - 281 e).
(XV) They see ... and do they see, whether Scythians or anybody else, 
things possible to see, or things impossible (ndTepov 6è ôpwaiv, ... , Kai 
ZKdOai T€ Kai ol dXXoi dvSpwiroi rd 8avara ôpâv f} rà à8dvara ; 300 a)? This 
is the case of both equivocation and ambiguity. The phrase rà 8avara 
dpav can be interpreted in two ways; one is as the active sense of 
the term 8a va to s "things which are capable of seeing", the other is 
as the passive sense of "things which can be seen".
(XVI) Isn't speaking of the silent possible ( '"H yap oax otdv f  ... 
aiywvTa Xeyeiv; 300 b)? This is the case of syntactical ambiguity 
because the phrase aiywTa Xeyeiv can be read in two ways; one is 
"speaking while silent," the other is "speaking of things that are 
silent".
14 Aristotle, 179a 36ff
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(XVII) Then you are silent also in speaking of things(Oi)Koûv teal rà 
Xéyovra aiyçs, eiirep twv dirdvTWV eoxiv [îà  Xeyd[i€va] 300 c) This SOphism 
is the same case as (XVI). The phrase "XcyovTa oiydv" can be read 
either as "to be silent in speaking" or "to be silent about speaking 
things".
(XVIII) And because I am with you now, you are Dionysodorus? (teal 
oTi vijv èyw' 001 Trdpeiiii, AiovaodGwpos el; 300 e3). This is the case of 
exploiting the philosophical term irapouaia by changing from the 
metaphysical sense to the physical one.
(XIV) It is appropriate to cut up and skin the cook(Tôv {layeipov 
tcaTatcoTTTeiv 301a). This fallacy is the case of ambiguity by using "to v  
payeipov" as a subject or an object of the infinitive KaTaKo'-rrTeiv.
(XX) Are you free to sell them [the gods] or give them away or do
what you will with them just as with the other animals? (dpa
001 aÙToàs diroSdoGai SoOvai dXX’ OTi dv podXTj (ootrcp tois dXXois
Mots; 303 a) This sophism is the case of equivocation on the term 
(ydv and the ambiguity of the term ads.
(XXI) Is Heracles a bravo or is the bravo Heracles (ttotcpov 6 ' HpaKXds 
Hanndf èoTiv f| 6 TTa-irird^  'HpaicXds; 303 a)? This is the case of 
ambiguity. Dionysodorus pretends to understand the exclamation 
"n vn n d f as a proper name, and besides this silly grammatical joke
assumes that if two words stand side by side they must be in
apposition .15
What are the means by which these two Sophists can defeat every 
respondent unchecked? Their means is an art of speaking by use of mere 
words by which they can control and easily deploy their aspects of eristic 
and verbal quibbling just like the many-headed Hydra(297 c). They reduce all 
things to words in that they will not identify the real world with the world 
of words, but only base their thoughts on words. It means that they do not 
have any objective criteria with which they can compare the words and find 
the way leading to the truth. According to Aristotle, names and a quantity of 
terms are finite, whereas things are infinite in number; and so the same
15 Gifford 1905 p. 36
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expression and the single name must necessarily signify a number of 
thingsi7. That is, names can be used as the means of fallacy. Accordingly it 
is necessary to clarify their way of using words, through which we can 
realise the fallacies of their sophistry.
The Sophists' Thought as Revealed in the Euthydemus
Our main task is to try to find out the thought of these two Sophists. 
On the face of it their use of fallacies seems to depend on a random method 
for their own purpose of defeating other respondents. However, the fallacies 
used in this dialogue, especially (III), (IV), (V), (VII), (IX), and (XI) are 
related to important problems which we frequently face in the history of 
Greek philosophy, for all these are concerned with the problems of change 
(becoming), falsehood, contradiction, being and not-being, the one and the 
many, and the theory of Forms. By means of these ambiguities the Sophists 
can refute everyone by carefully constructed sophistry, whether or not he 
speaks the truth. What is the basis of their thinking and logic? A.E Taylor 
says that "Plato reminds us repeatedly that his two Sophists had lived at 
T h u r i i " . i 8  r .k  Sprague also maintains that the Sophists in this dialogue are 
neo-Eleatics, that is, their arguments are based upon the the philosophical 
position of P a r m e n id e s . i9  Our treatment of these two Sophists' thought will 
be to investigate their relations with Parmenides by comparing their 
thinking with his. Through this examination we can find that the two 
Sophists, equipping themselves with Parmenides' way of thinking, lead their 
argument towards a Protagorean relativism of "whatever anyone believes 
true".
Parmenides first asked what is the common presupposition of all the 
views he had to deal with, and he found that this is the existence of what is 
not. The next question is whether this can be thought, and the answer is that 
it cannot. Therefore there is no nothing. Only that can be which can be 
thought(DK 28B5); for thought exists for the sake of what is (DK 28B8). Also 
Parmenides is regarded as the first great philosopher who made the explicit
16 Aristotle, 165 a 11-14
17 Plato, the Man and His Work p. 95, A.E. Taylor, Methuen and Co. Ltd, Reprinted 1952
18 Plato' Use of Fallacy, R.K. Sprague, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, p. xiii
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distinction between Knowledge and Opinion which was to be the main matter 
of Plato's philosophy. The idea of Parmenides' philosophy related to these 
Sophists can be found in his surviving fragments;i9
Fr. 3 ... for the same thing can be thought and can be i.e.lt Is the
same thing that can be thought and that can be( ... t o  y a p  aO T o  vociv  
e o T iv  T c  K a i e îv a i  DK 28B3).
Fr. 6 It is necessary to say and to think Being; for there is Being, 
but nothing is not (x p n  t o  X e y ^ iv  r \  v o c tv  f  è ô v  c p lic v a i' %oTi y a p  £ Îv a i ,  
puiScv Ô’ o{iK e o T iv ' DK 28B6).
Fr. 8 ... that Being is ungenerated and imperishable, whole, unique,
immovable, and complete .......  Not from non-Being shall I allow you to
say or to think, for it is not possible to say or think what is not. ... 
How could it (Being) have come into being? If it was, it is not, nor if 
it is going to be in the future. So, coming into being is extinguished 
and perishing is unheard of. Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike.
  It is the same thing to think and the thought that [the object of
thought] exists, for without Being, in what has been expressed, you 
will not find thought; for nothing other, besides Being, either is or 
will be, since Destiny fettered it to be whole and immovable ( ... ds
dycvT|Tov èôv Kai dvwXeSpoV eoTiv ouXov pouvoyeves t€ Kai dTpepes fjSe 
TeXeoTov' ... o u t ’ èK pri edvTos èdooto <))da6ai o' oû6e voeXv' ... ttws S’ dv Ke 
yevoiTo; el ydp eyevf, oi!ik  € o t ( i ), oùS' ei iroTe peXXei eoeoGai. t w s  yeveois pev 
direopeTai Kai diruoTos oXeGpos. oùSe SiaipcTov èoTiv, èirel irdv èoTiv ôpoiov' ... 
TaÜTOV S’ èoTi voeiv Te Kai ouveKev eoTi voTipa' od ydp aveu t o O èdvTos, kv (5i 
Trcc|)aTiop€Vov èoTiv, eGptioeis t ô  voeîv' oüSèv ydp < t] >  eoTiv fj eoTai dXXo irdpe^  
TOU èdvTos, èiiei t o  ye Moip’ èiréSTioev o5Xov aKivi^Tov f  epevai' DK 28B8).
In the world of Parmenides' philosophy, whatever exists can have the 
construed characteristic of Being absolutely. By systematic reasoning he 
excludes the middle stage between Being and non-Being and shows that to 
accept the phenomenal world would imply the assertion of the existence of 
non-Being. He also identifies the world of thought with the world of 
existence, for to him it is the same thing that can be thought and that can 
be. The object of thought, i.e Being, is in the state of Being without change
19 Texts and the Translations are those of L. Taran's Parmenides, Princeton, N. J. 1965
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and generation. If we think the existence of change or generation, in that 
case we must presuppose not-Being because change or generation means 
going from non-Being to Being or from Being to non-Being. In another words, 
if A can be changed into A', in the point of A, A* does not exist and also in 
the state of A', A is not existent because the change from A to A' must 
presuppose the existence of non-Being. Also if there is the change or 
generation of something, then it must come out of being or non-being. If it 
comes out of being, then it comes out of being. So there is no generation or 
change. If it comes out of non-being, then it is impossible, for out of nothing 
comes only nothing. Besides we must presuppose that nothing is the object 
of our speaking. Consequently that is impossible, for non-Being cannot be 
thought and cannot be an object of thinking. His important idea is that "it 
is". It, i.e Being, is existent and cannot not be. Nothing cannot be the object 
of speaking and thinking, for to think about nothing is not to think, and to 
speak about nothing is not to speak at all. M. 0 . Stokes summarises the 
meaning of Parmenides' ideas as follows^O:
1) No thought is possible except the subject's existence.
2) If anything different from the existent is included in a thought it 
is not a thought but a nonsense.
3) The reason why to think about anything other than the existent is 
nonsensical is that there is not (and never will be) anything else to 
think about.
4) Logic constrains the existent to be odxov and dKiv^Tov.
We can easily find that the main defect In the philosophy of 
Parmenides is that it makes no differentiations between relative non-Being 
and absolute non-Being i.e Nothingness. To take an example, we might say: 
"it is a pencil or a book" (a pencil or a book exists) if a man asks what it is 
on the table. In this case the pencil or a book is an object of our thinking and 
speaking (reference). If there are no pencils or books on the table, then we 
must say that pencils or books are not existent on the table, or do not exist 
on the table. This is the case of a conditioned situation, for definitely there 
are objects of reference in these questions. In this case we can say that 
relative-Nothingness in lieu of absoIute-Nothingness should be used, for if 
we presuppose the Being of something, we can have an object of reference in
20 One and Many in Pre-Socratic Philosophy, M. C. Stokes, p. 139, Harvard University 
press, Cambridge, 1971
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our thinking and speaking. On the other hand, there is the case of absolute- 
Nothingness which cannot be the object of speaking and thinking. If we want 
to think about non-existent thing, i.e a unicorn or dragon, even though they 
do not exist in the world we can have a conception of them. However, how 
can we think about absolute-Nothingness? If we think or speak about 
something, then we must postulate something which can be the object of our 
thought or speaking. So we must presuppose absolute Nothingness to be 
something. By doing this it is possible for us to get a conception of the 
absolute Nothingness. And later we must withdraw our postulation. As a 
result, to think the absolute-Nothingness remains nothing in our minds.
We have discussed the main defect of the philosophy of Parmenides.
Let us try to find out the basis of the Sophists' ideas. In classification III
there is the dialogue between Socrates and Dionysodorus ; "Then you wish 
him to become one that he is not and no longer to be one that he is ... you
want him to be destroyed". If Socrates wants Cleinias not to be ignorant, his
ignorance will become non-existent by education. Dionysodorus construes 
this absurd result by omitting the qualification dpaGTfs. This is the tactful 
exploitation of Parmenides' philosophy in that he would not differentiate 
between relative non-Being and absolute non-Being, between an attribute 
and existence. He would not admit a change of attribute. In fact a sick man 
can be a healthy man or vice versa. In this case the existence of man does 
not change i.e he still remains as a man even though his attributes can be 
changed or substituted. It means that the change or substitution of 
attributes is to be conceived as dependent on the continuity of an object. 
The denial of the change or substitution of attributes leads to the flat 
denial of the Sophists' doctrine "virtue can be taught".
As we can see from Parmenides' Fr. 3, it is the same thing that can 
be thought and that can be. In the world of his philosophy everything that can 
be thought is existent. The identification of thought with existence is also 
exploited by the Sophists to contradict the respondent just as in the case of 
classification (IV). They maintain that it is not possible to tell a lie. If a 
man makes a statement, even if it does not correspond to the fact, he talks 
of another thing which is existent in speaking and thinking. Being existent, 
it is fact. In this process of the Sophists' logic we find that Euthydemus on 
purpose deceitfully puts the phrase r à  o v r a  in the same category as 
Td\TiGfi(284 c). The difference between r à  o v r a  and rdXTiGfi can easily be
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explained if we think about a unicorn or a dragon once more. Even though 
they can be the object of our mind, actually they can still be not existent, 
for they can be in the category of Ta ô'vTa, not TaXiieiî. So the Sophists 
eventually raise the impossibility of contradiction on the same grounds. Let 
us consider their assertion (285 d); (i) if two men describe the same thing, 
there is no contradiction, (ii) if neither of them speaks a word describing 
that thing, there is no contradiction, (iii) if one man speaks the truth, and 
the other does not speak the truth, then no contradiction occurs because no 
one speaks what is not. This result comes from the non-differentiation 
between the two senses of the verb eîvai : between the existential and the 
copulative(prescriptive) sense, for the qualification of the phrase "is not" is 
dropped. Dropping the phrase "is not" raises two points in the state of 
things. One is that it has the meaning of "what is not"-existential, the other 
means "other than"-copuiative. Falsehood should be explained by use of the 
meaning "other than", however, the Sophists unreasonably turn this case to 
their own advantage by making the respondent confused. This problem is 
made use of in other sophisms in classifications (IX) and (XI) of this 
dialogue. Let us think about sophism (IX). If Socrates knows something, then 
he is in the state of knowing something. It is impossible for the same thing 
to be and not to be (ws 6t) to O to  dSuvaTov eoTiv t o  avTo elvai t €  Kai |if|, 293 d) So 
if he knows one thing, he knows all things because he is in the state of 
knowing - by omitting the qualification "something". In Plato's P arm enides  
we can find a similar expression used by Zeno; "if things are many, they 
must be both like and unlike. But that is impossible : unlike things cannot be 
like, nor like things unlike( el moXXà èoTi Tà ovTa, (5s apa Set duTà o|ioia Te elvai 
KOI àv()|ioia, TOÛTO Sè 6f| àSuvaTov oure yàp Ta dvdjioia d|ioia oure rà dpioia àvdpioia 
oîdv Te elvai; 127 d)". Comford explains as follows - if things are many, they 
must be both homogeneous and heterogeneous. For (i) each of them must be 
one, and what is one is homogeneous; therefore they are homogeneous. But 
(ii) if they are many, they must be distinguishable , and therefore unlike one 
another ; therefore they are heterogeneous.^i The other sophism(XI) uses the 
same fallacy. If Chaeredemus is a father of Patrocles<the brother of 
Socrates>, Sophroniscus<the father of Socrates> is other than a father of 
Patrocles. He cannot be a father and not a father at the same time. So 
Chaeredemus is the father of all things. However, that Sophroniscus is other 
than a father leads to the fact that Sophroniscus is not a .father by dropping 
the qualification. So Socrates is fatherless.
21 Plato and Parmenides , F. M. Comford, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1939 p. 68
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Finally we must think about the refutation of the theory of Forms. 
Similar criticism of the theory of Forms is pointed out by R.K Sprague in 
another of Plato's dialogues, the Parmenides.^^ Her main point is that by an 
Eleatic either - or question, Parmenides asks a question based on the two 
incompatible interpretations of "partake(Trapcîvai)". The thing that partakes 
of the Form receives the Form either as a whole or as a part, and there is no 
other way of partaking. In the first case, that of the Form being received as 
a whole, the Form will turn out to be separate from itself. Also in the 
second case, he goes on to show that reception of the Form as a part 
involves dividing the unitary and perfect Form into pieces, which is 
impossible. The reason why, according to Sprague,23 he is able to draw this 
conclusion is that he has interpreted "partaking" in a physical sense only. 
Let us return to the case of Euthydemus. The conversation between Socrates 
and Dionysodorus is as follows:
What about you, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, have you ever seen a 
beautiful thing? ... Were they different from the beautiful, he asked, 
or the same as the beautiful ... I said they were different from the 
beautiful itself, but each of them had some beauty with it. Then, he 
said, if you have an ox with you, you are an ox, and because I am
with you now, you are Dionysodorus? ... But how can it be, he said,
that when a different thing is with a different thing, the different
thing should be different?( ’AXXà Tiva tpottov, g(j)% éTcpou éTcpo^
TTapayevoiJiévou to €Tepov eT€pov av €iti ; 300 e - 301 b)
This fallacy which Dionysodorus uses is based on the Eleatic logic, as in the
case of P a rm e n id e s , which denies the dualism of two distinct sorts of 
Being, the theory of Forms. The relationship between Forms and particulars 
is regarded as the most difficult problem in Plato's theory of Forms. In this
question Socrates faces a dilemma, for an Eleatic question forces him to
be in reductio ad absurdum. If Socrates answers that beautiful things are 
the same as the beautiful, then there is no difference between particulars 
and the Form. If they are different from the beautiful, they are other than 
the beautiful. So they cannot be not beautiful. Sprague indicates two points, 
one is that Dionysodorus has taken presence in the purely physical sense, the
22 Parmenides' Sail and Dionysodorus' Ox, R.K. Sprague, Phronesis 1967, p. 91-98
23 Ibid p. 96
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second is that he has destroyed the contrast between Forms and particulars 
by dealing in terms of particulars o n ly .24 His reduction of Socrates' 
statement to absurdity depends on the substitution of a physical particular 
for a universal and ideal Form. So if an ox comes near to Socrates, then 
Socrates comes to be an ox by eliminating the dualism of the relation 
between ox-ness and oxen.
It is necessary for us to examine the saying of Euthydemus in the 
Cratylus : all things appear equal to all men at the same time and always( ... 
TTdoi TTctvTa ÔJKOIOS cTvtti apa xai dei 386 d 3-7). Kerferd argues that Euthydemus 
differed from Protagoras on the application of the Man-measure doctrine.25 
The Man-measure doctrine of Protagoras implies subjectivism on the 
relativity of values. It means that only our own views can be the criteria of 
the nature of all things, which exist independently of us. Protagoras' 
doctrine must have been a reply to the Eleatics, who denied the evidence of 
senses and the reality of opposites. Protagoras agrees also with Heraclitus 
on the point that opposites co-exist inseparably. However, if we think about 
the statement of Euthydemus more carefully, we can realise that his theory 
is basically interrelated with the Eleatics. If a thing, ungenerated and 
imperishable, whole, unique, immovable, and complete, exists, then it is now 
altogether, one, and continuous irrespective of time, for it was not once nor 
will it be. Since it remains the same and in the same place, it lies by itself 
and abides so firmly where it is(TaviTov f  èv TaùTw re pevov KaS’ éauTo t€ KeiTai 
XOÎJTWS epireSov au0i pcvet DK 28B8). Let US suppose a perfect spherical shape. It 
will be to be seen the same in every respect and time. So we can easily 
understand that Euthydemus' theory is based on Parmenides' philosophy and 
applies it to Protagoras' subjectivism in that this viewpoint is centered on 
each man. We might say that his idea of objects external to us is basically 
absolute objectivism even though he leads his argument into the Protagorean 
tenet "whatever anyone believes true". To him the external world exists 
independently of human sensations, and just as in the world of Parmenides 
he denies a conception of time by using the phrase apa xai àà . In that case all 
things are equally to all at the same time and always.
C o n clu s ion
24 Plato’s Use of Fallacy, R. K. Sprague, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1962. p. 26
25 Kerferd 1981, p. 54
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We have seen the two Sophists' art of speaking which is very 
effective in putting down their respondents or opponents, and examined the 
relations between Parmenides' philosophy and their thought. In appearance 
their way of conducting arguments seems arbitrary. However, we can find a 
consistency in their thinking based on the Eleatics. Of course they are not 
natural philosophers nor members of the Parmenidean school. They merely 
exploit the Eleatic philosophy for their own procedure of refutation. They 
have reduced the Eleatic ontological theory into vain words which do not 
correspond to the facts i.e. they deal not in things but in words(278 b). 
However, they raise similar philosophical problems to those of the Eleatic 
philosophers. Above all we must note that Plato indirectly criticises the 
Eleatic philosophy. In his other dialogues the Sophist and the Parm enides, 
the same problems are raised and examined.
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H i P P i A S
Life and Works
Hippias was a native of Elis, son of Diopithes and a pupil of
Hegesidamus, according to Souda.i About his birth and death nothing is 
known to us. His widowed daughter married Isocrates. His third son, 
Aphareus, became a tragedian active in the middle of the fourth century. 
Plato depicts him in the Protagoras as a contemporary of Protagoras, 
Gorgias and Prodicus. In the Hippias Major (283 a) Protagoras is described as 
being far older('irpeo3uT6pou ô'vtos) than Hippias is(vewrepos wv). So it is guessed 
that he was about the same age as Socrates.
The main references to him are found in the writings of Plato and 
Xenophon. Apart from the dialogues named after him, the Hippias Major and 
the Hippias Minor, Plato mentions him in some of his other works, the 
Protagoras and the Apology . Also we can find a dialogue between Socrates 
and Hippias in Xenophon's Memorabilia and Symposium.
Hippias was an important man in his city as the best judge and 
reporter of anything said by other governments, and frequently discharged a 
number of diplomatic delegations for his city. He was also an itinerant
teacher, and hence travelled to a lot of places. He visited Athens at least
twice, Sicily, and, most often of all, Sparta. In Sicily he had a great
reputation and made a lot of money (Hippas Major 281 a-b). At Athens he 
was treated as an honorable guest at Callias' house where he was a 
prominent member of a company which included Protagoras, ' Prodicus, 
Alcibiades, Callias and Critias. All these journeys might have given him a 
universality of knowledge through his various contacts with the most
1 Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker II, Diels/ Kranz , p. 326
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distinguished persons in Hellas. He carried on his activity at Olympia, the 
festival of Hellas, where armed with material of every sort, epics, 
tragedies, dithyrambs, and speeches for display, he continually professed 
his willingness to perform what he prepared, and to answer any questions 
which anyone might wish to ask (H/pp. min. 363 c - d).2
Hippias had attained such powers of memory by drinking certain 
potions: once having heard them he could repeat as many as fifty names. 
Xenophon also says that Antistenes introduced Callias to Hippias of Elis 
from whom he learn the art of memorising. So he had a vast amount of 
knowledge, especially in mathematics, astronomy, language, geometry, 
mythology, rhythm and harmonic science. He also discussed painting and 
sculpture. Of his various writings, however, nothing is left to us.
Writings ascribed to him include the Register of Victors at Olympia 
(’ OXuinriovficwv dvaypacj)Tf) in which he mentioned his native state and the 
games, and the Collection (Zuvaywyîf) which consists of a collection of 
various notices, anecdotes and pieces of information concerning the history 
of philosophy and religion; one of them is about Thargelia of Miletus: 
Thargelia was a woman of Milesian decent who was married fourteen times, 
fair in looks, and wise in other respects, so that she controlled cities and 
rulers Another is the Trojan Dialogue (TpwiKos SidXoyos) which includes a 
speech : Nestor at the fall of Troy counsels Achilles' son, Neoptolemus, as to 
the pursuits which a man should follow to achieve a good reputation by 
recommending to him a great many excellent and customary practices.
Diogenes Laertius (I 24) writes that Aristotle and Hippias say that 
Thales ascribed a soul even to inanimate things, arguing from the magnet 
and from amber, Proclus mentions in his On Euclid (p. 65) that Hippias of 
Elis has recorded that it was in geometry that Mamercus, brother of
2 The appearance of the Sophists at Olympia has a threefold significance according to
Guthrie' s view - A History of Greek Philosophy II I,  Cambridge University Press 1969 p.
42-43,
(a) They considered themselves to be in the tradition of the poets and rhapsodes. So
recitation at a pan-Hellenic festival was a way of making a new work known.
(b) It was agonistic, competing for prizes in set contests as did the poets, musicians 
and athletes.
(c) The festivals were occasions for members of Greek city-states to meet together 
and forget their differences, and the public appearance there of the sophists was 
symbolic of a pan-Hellenic outlook that went naturally with their habit of staying in 
different cities in turn.
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Stesichorus the poet, gained his reputation. In mythology he maintained that 
the stepmother of Phrixus is not Demodice but Gorgopis. On language he 
mentioned that the word "tyrant" passed on to the Greeks in the same period 
as the time of Archilochus, and the names of the continents [Asia and 
Europe] from the daughters of Oceanus. On astronomy his only pronouncement 
is that the Hyades are seven in number. He also composed elegiac verses for 
the statues commemorating the Messenian boys' chorus drowned on the 
voyage to Rhegium. He also remarks, regarding Homer's Iliad , that Homer 
made Achilles the best man of those who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, 
and Odysseus the wiliest {Hippas Minor 364 c).
Plutarch quoted Hippias' remarks in his lost work, the On Slander : 
Hippias says that there are two kinds of envy; one Is just, when one 
begrudges bad men the honour given them; the other kind is unjust, when one 
begrudges it to good men. The envious have double the distress of others; for 
they are vexed not only, as others are, by their own ills but also by others' 
good. Also he says that slander is a terrible thing because the law provides 
no redress against slanderers, as it does against thieves. Yet slanderers are 
thieves of one's most valuable possession, namely friendship. Hence, 
violence, wicked as it is, is more just than slander, in that it is not 
concealed. This represents his ethical views on nomos.
In addition to his diverse knowledge Hippias was, practically, a 
dexterous man. He once visited Olympia, wearing all the clothing he made 
and carrying only things he made for himself - engraved rings, a seal, a 
skin-scraper, an oil-flask, sandals, a cloak, a tunic and Persian girdles. This 
practice of his was based on his idea that the proper end of the individual 
man is self- sufficiency.
In Xenophon's M em orabilia  (IV 4 ff), the author reports that Socrates 
converses with the Sophist Hippias, when Hippias maintains that laws are 
compacts made by the citizens themselves concerning what they must do 
and what not, and that laws can be amended and rejected at any time.
According to Plato Hippias shares certain common characteristics 
with the other sophists; the qualities of conceit and self-admiration, in that 
he has not met anyone superior to himself in anything and knows better than 
anyone else how to impart virtue(dpeTii). Especially in the Hippias Major
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(282e) he is depicted as an ostentatious money-maker by being made to say 
that he has made more money than any other two sophists put together.
Hippias' Thought as Revealed in Plato's Dialogues P rotagoras  
and Hippias Major
Out of the five above-mentioned dialogues of Plato, we can investigate 
Hippias' thinking through two: the Protagoras and the Hippias Major. What he 
says in the Protagoras is related to his ethical views. On the other hand, his 
discussion with Socrates in the Hippias Major is a good expression of his 
natural philosophy.
L Hippias in the P rotagoras
In the Protagoras (337 c - 338 a) Hippias says:
Gentlemen, I regard you as all related, all akin, all fellow citizens - by 
nature, not by convention. For like is by nature akin to like, but 
convention, a tyrant over mankind, ordains many things by force 
contrary to nature. Surely it is shameful if we, who understand the 
nature of things and, being the wisest of the Greeks, have for that very 
reason come together to the very shrine of wisdom in all Greece and to 
this, the greatest and most magnificent house of that very city, should 
achieve nothing worthy of our reputation, but quarrel among ourselves 
like the most worthless of men. I beg and counsel you then, Protagoras 
and Socrates, to regard us as arbitrators and come to an agreement( ’ n
avSpes ... o i irapoVres, fiyo û p ai èyw dpâs ouyycvëls Te Kai clKeious Kai iroXiTas  
a ira v ra s  e lv a i —  (|)uoei, où vopy' ro  yàp opoiov T($ ônoitü <|)ùaei ouyyev^s  
èoTiv, 6 8è vonos, TÙpavvos wv tôjv àvGpwirwv, iroXXà napà r f jv  <j)ùoiv ^ là^era i —  
flIJias oùv a loxpôv rf |v  pèv <j>ùoiv rw v  npaypaTw v elSévai, 0o<()WTaTOUS Se ôVras  
TWv'EXXtfvwv, Kai K at aÙTÔ roO ro vOv ouveX-nXuGoTas rfîs  Te'EXXàSos d s  aùrô  rô  
TTpuTadov TT^ s oo(|)ias Kai aÙT^s Tf)s uoXetos d s  to v  ney ioTov Kai ôXjîiWTaTov 
o Ikov  TovSe, lATiSèv to ù to u  Toù à^iü)[iaTos à^iov dirocjj-nvaoBai, dXX wairep toùs  
<{)a\jXoTaTous tw v  àvGpwirwv 6iac()epe00ai àXXifXois. èyw pèv oùv Kai Seojiai Kai 
oujjipouXeùw, â  rïpwTayopa Te Kai ZwKpaTes, ouppTÎvai ùpâs wotrep ùttô SiaiTitTWV 
finwv 0uppi(3a^ovTWV els tô  iieoov,... ).
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In relation to this we must refer to the conversation which Xenophon 
reports Hippias having had with Socrates in his Memorabilia (IV.iv. 14-25). 
He maintains:
Laws can hardly be thought of much account, or observance of them, 
seeing that the very men who passed them often reject and amend 
them. (Nouons S’ ... ttw s av t i s  fiyilcfûiTo airouSaXov irpSyiia €Îvai t) t ô  ireiSeoOai 
aÙToXs, ous y€ iroXXdKis dpdpevai at irdXeis irdXiv elptfvTjv iroioOvTai) ... 
Unwritten laws are uniformly observed in every country. ... the gods 
made these laws for men.( Tods ( ’Aypd<j)oiis vdfious) y’ èv n&o% ... coTd
TaÙTÔV o ^ l^ o jiè v o u s . ... 0€OÔs TOUS VÔ|IOUS TOUTOUS TOXs dv0pWTIOlS 0eXvai* )
In this paragraph we can find the distinction between n o m o s  
(convention) and physis (nature) which was of considerable importance in 
the period of the sophists. So it is necessary for us to get an idea of what 
Hippias really means by the contrast between these conceptions. The term 
nomos, traditionally translated either as "law" or "convention" or "custom" 
according to what seems best to fit the context, and the whole range of 
terms that are cognate with it in Greek, are always prescriptive and 
normative and never merely descriptive - they give some kind of direction or 
command affecting the behaviour and activities of persons and things^. On 
the other hand the term physis is usually translated by "nature" which is 
the static concept of "the way things are".4
Hippias regards the participants in Protagoras and Socrates' 
conversation as all related, all akin, all fellow-citizens - by nature because 
like is by nature akin to like. However, convention, he says, a tyrant over 
mankind, ordains by force many things contrary to nature and makes them 
wrangle. In this aspect we must keep in mind that Hippias is a polymath and 
natural philosopher. His preference of nature to convention betrays his 
knowledge concerning the nature of things which makes him undertake the 
role of arbitrator between Protagoras and Socrates. This means that "the 
physis of the universe, which is the object of the natural science, must 
determine the guiding criteria of human conduct."5 Nature, as K. Popper 
maintains, consists of facts and of regularities, and is in itself neither
3 The Sophistic Movement, G,B Kerferd, Cambridge University Press 1981 p. 112
4 Ibid. P . l l l
5 The Sophists, Mario Untersteiner, Translated by K. Freeman, Oxford 1954 p. 278
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moral nor immoral: it is we who impose our standards upon nature, and who 
in this way introduce morals into the natural world, in spite of the fact that 
we are part of the natural world.^ We are products of nature, but nature has 
formed us with the power to alter the world, to foresee and to plan for the 
future, and to make far-reaching decisions for which we are morally 
responsible.
Ideal or universal law, which is contrary to actual law, is suggested 
in the fifth century B.C. as a basis for something more general and 
everlasting than custom or c o n v e n t i o n . ^  The natural philosophers commonly 
believed that the whole universe or nature is governed by natural law 
because they thought that there is a universal cause, from which every thing 
comes and to which everything is destined to return. In the fifth century B.C 
the name physis was regarded as the abiding and eternal something of 
which and from which this natural world was made. However, in this 
condition man is not easily defined because of his free will, whereas 
animals or inanimate objects exist according to their necessity. So to live 
by conformity to natural law can be interpreted in two ways, one negative, 
the other positive. The former represents non-human brutality, the latter 
human morality. Those who are in favor of physis  can have quite different 
views, which may be either egoistic or altruistic. If we look around at the 
natural world, we will be confused. On the one hand we find that the natural 
world is very unequal, e.g trees, the physical build of men, the sizes of 
fishes in the sea; on the other hand, planets in the heavens and successive 
seasons are very regular. Questions about the relation of nature to value 
give diverse answers according to the views of the natural philosophers. 
Philosophical views of nature can be related to the problems of evaluation 
in complex ways. Accordingly, to infer the natural laws which men should 
follow from the laws by which animals are ruled, is to risk falling victim to 
a simple ambiguity. In this case natural justice is that only the strongest 
man can live to the highest degree of his powers and at his convenience. 
Might is right, and nature has endowed him to get as much as he wants. 
Actual human laws are utterly absurd and unnatural because the strongest 
man must live against his nature under these laws. The real natural man is
Ù The Open Society and Its Enemies I, K. R. Popper, Routledge and Kegan Paul Reprinted 
1973 p. 61
7 Concerning the contrast nomos and physis, see Introduction IV .
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the cruel tyrant. Is it the egalitarianism of the beaver or the hierarchical
life of the bee that is the proper exemplar for human society?
What is the meaning of nature in the context of Hippias' statements? 
Does it have any relation to the negative meaning of nature? If it does, how 
could he dare to say that convention is a tyrant over mankind? If not, how 
can we discover his real intention? We need to confine the meaning of 
nature to a restricted sense because the meaning of nature can be variously 
applied according to the interpreter. Hippias' intention will be revealed if 
we think the meaning of convention is the oppression of natural right, as he 
says. An actual law or convention can be imposed by men, so it can be 
transformed according to the manner of the situation. It describes a way of 
life, norms of conduct and the source which guarantees them, the mores of a 
political or social group, law-and-order, conventional beliefs, and religious
practices. It is possible to judge whether it is right or wrong, acceptable or 
not, since it does not represent a matter of fact, but ordains formulations 
for our behaviour. Popper defines the term "norm", i.e. " Norms are man-made 
in the sense that we must blame nobody but ourselves for them; neither 
nature nor God".8 So if they are unacceptable and intolerable it is our task 
to change them. E. R. Dodds rightly explains the contrast between nomos and 
physis:
Nom os (convention) could stand for the Conglomerate, conceived as 
the inherited burden of irrational custom; or it could stand for an 
arbitrary rule consciously imposed by certain classes in their own 
interest; or it could stand for a rational system of State law, the
achievement which distinguished Greeks from barbarians. Similarly
physis  could represent an unwritten, unconditionally valid "natural 
law," against the particularism of local custom; or it could represent 
the "natural rights" of the individual, against the arbitrary  
requirements of the State ... . ^
So in the case of Hippias, physis can be interpreted as freedom from 
the coercion of conventional and arbitrary thinking. His main role is as an 
arbitrator between Protagoras, who prefers long speeches, and Socrates who
8 Popper 1973, p. 61
 ^ The Greeks and The Irrational, E. R. Dodds, University of California Press 1950 p.l82- 
183
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wants to have a conversation by short question and answer. Hippias’ 
knowledge of all the manifestations of physis enable him to act rightly in a 
troubled situation. If each insists on his own conceited views, they cannot 
continue conversing any more. The participants in this conversation come 
from different Greek cities. Their customs and conventions are different 
according to their cities. They are somewhat conditioned in a conceited and 
subjective way because our social structure, just like a tyrant, regulates 
and determines our ways of thinking and life. Our subjective mind cannot 
apprehend the meaning of physis  as long as our mind is attached to our 
private opinions and interests. In this way we can agree with F. Dûmmier's 
view that Heraclitus' luvos xdyos can be identified with the <j)dais of Hippias, 
while the 16(ti 4>pdvTiois of Heraclitus responds to the vdpos of the Sophist.io 
Let us think about the ideas of Heraclitus as revealed in his surviving 
fragm ents:!!
Therefore it is necessary to follow the common, but although the 
Logos is common the many live as though they had a private 
understanding (Sio Set èireoôai tô < ^uvô >• toO Xdyou S’ èdvTos luvQÛ {wouoiv 
ol TToXXoi (5s ISiav exovTes (})pdvTi0 iv DK 22B2 ).
Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things
are One(oÙK èpoO àXXà toû Xdyou àKod0ctVTas dpoXoyetv 0O(|)dv €0tiv ev Tiavra 
elvai DK 22B50).
The thinking faculty is common to all(^uvdv tori naoi tô ({îpoveeiv DK  
22B113).
Those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all, as a 
city must rely on its law, and with much greater reliance: for all the 
laws of men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as 
much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and is still left 
0Ver(|ôv vdtû XeyovTas l0xup((e00ai xpf) T($ u^viS ndvTWV, dkw0nep vdpy iidXis 
Kai TToXù l0xupOT€p(i)s' Tpé<|)OVTai yàp irdvTes ol dv0p(i)TT€ioi vdpoi ùttô  evôs toO  
0€iou' KpaTei yàp to o o û to v  ôkooov e0èXei Kai è^ apKeî moi Kai irepiyiveTai DK 
22B 114)
!9 Kosmopolitanismus or(ier Panhellenismus? E. Schutrumpf, Hermes, C 1972, p. 5-29 
11 Texts and translations are those of G.S Kirk, Heraclitus - The Cosmic Fragments except 
Fr. 113 and 116 which are those of G.S Kirk/J. E. Raven's The Pre-Socratic Philosophers.
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All men have the capacity of knowing themselves and acting with
moderation (dvSpojiroiai Traoi pÉTEOTi yivwoKciv èwuToùs kûi aw<j)pdv€Îv DK
22B116).
The majority cannot recognise the Logos even though they have the 
common thinking faculty, for they rely on their private and fallacious 
understanding. What they should recognise is the Logos, which is perhaps to 
be interpreted as the unifying formula or proportionate method of 
arrangement of things.12 Heraclitus suggests that all human beings have the 
potential to realise the Logos, as in the case of Hippias, in principle but they 
would not do that because of their ignorance. Hippias also thinks that we are 
part of nature, so we can grasp the idea of natural or universal law which 
underlies the changing world, for like is akin to like if we discard private 
opinion acquired by conventions or customs contrary to nature. The law or 
formula of nature, is regarded as more objective, universal and lasting than
custom or personal understanding. Since there is a universal law or formula
which is essential to the ways of all things, men and all natural things are 
subject to this. So we should follow it. What is common to human beings is 
rationality. Only the man who thinks with reason can do that. If not, and we 
follow nomos, we will be the most worthless of men (tous 4»auXoTdTous twv 
dv0pw"TTwv). The main idea of Hippias indicates improvement from the 
individual to the universal, from disorder to order, to a fuller and more 
complete reality. Also we can identify the natural law with the unwritten 
iaw of which Hippias speaks in the M em orabilia. The unwritten law, which 
is divine in origin and universal in application, is given to men by the gods
as the worship of the gods and respect for parents. As we can see in
Fragment 114 of Heraclitus, ol dv0pwTT€ioi vd^oi is contrasted with eîs 0€îos 
vdpos. According to Reinhardt in his Parm enides  (215f), ol dv0pwircioi vdpoi 
does not refer to the vdpoi of the city, but to the precepts or habits of 
mankind in general; thus the sense of vdpos is changed within the limits of 
the fragment: there is an opposition like the sophistic vdpos - <|)uais, with 
dv0pwiT€i.oi vdpol representing vdpos and the ets 0etos vdpos representing <t>uais.!3 
From this viewpoint the relationship between the luvds Xdyos and the iS ia  
(t)pdvTiois corresponds to that of the ets 0eios vdpos and the ol dvopwtreioi vdpoi.
!2 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, G.S. Kirk/ R.E. Raven, p. 188 
!3 Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments, G. S. Kirk, Cambridge 1954 p. 50-51
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On this epistemologica! view of Hippias we can find that his method is 
analogous to the theory of Empedocles. In his surviving fragment 109,i4  
Empedocles says, "For with earth do we see earth, with water water, with 
air, bright air, with fire, consuming fire; with Love do we see Love, Strife 
with dread Strife (yctixi pev yaîav dirwnap^v, uSaTi S’ uSwp, al0€pi S' al0€pa Siov, àîàp 
ITU pi TT0p diSiiXov, aTopyfjv Se oTopyg, veiKos 8è tc v c i k c ï  Xuyp(§ DK 31B109)". 
Empedocles, for whom sense-perception and knowledge respectively are 
based on an act of perception or thought in which like deals with like, gives 
an explanation of perception by attraction of similarities.!5 The attraction 
of like to like is supposed to cover a whole range, from the basic form of a 
part of one root being aware of another part like itself and moving towards 
it, through compounds that can sense and combine with similar compounds, 
to perfect mixtures that are assimilated to their like, the process of
highest thought. So we can deduce that a part of physis, the internal physis  
of man, can make contact with the external physis, the whole of nature. 
That is the way leading to physis.
We have seen that Hippias' thinking is related to the pre-Socratic
philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles. In addition to this we need to 
consider, as regards his idea of physis, if it can be applied to pan-Hellenism 
or cosmopolitanism. At that time the consciousness of pan-Hellenism was 
strong because of the great pan-Hellenic festivals at Olympia during which 
quarrels among Greeks were temporarily called off. At these times the ties 
of a common language, religion and culture overruled the differences
between the s t a t e s . d . Tarrant and M. Untersteiner maintain that Hippias' 
thinking includes cosmopolitanism.i7 However, it is to be shown that this is 
unconvincing if we consider his idea more analytically.
Hippias implies that even if men have the potential to apprehend
physis they cannot be equal in reality because of nomos. If we think once 
more about what he says, we can see that he knows that the difference of 
human inequality does exist. He differentiates between wise men who 
understand the nature of things and ignorant men who do not. The Hellenic 
race are all related, all akin and all fellow citizens by nature. We know that
!4 Text and Translations are those of Kirk /  Raven 
!5 Untersteiner 1954 p. 285
16 Guthrie II I,  p. 162
17 The Hippias Major attributed to Plato, D. Tarrant, Cambridge Univ. Press 1928. p.xxii.
The Sophists, p.283-284
H ippias 67
their common basis is the Greek language which is the main criterion for 
distinguishing between Greeks and barbarians. If we are sure that Hippias' 
ideas is based on Heraclitus, we can infer his thinking from Heraclitus who 
says in his surviving fragment 107 that the eyes and ears are bad witnesses 
for men if they have barbarian souls (KaKol pdpTvpes dvOpwiroioiv ôcj)0aXiJioi Kai (5Ta 
a^ppdpous i}>uxas èxdvTwv DK 22B107). So a barbarian soul does not understand 
the Greek language in which the Logos of physis is hidden. To experience and 
feel something through eyes and ears cannot be a good criterion for finding 
the truth, for these faculties are lacking in reason. Also these experiences 
are in the state of change according to one's condition. Only through thinking 
and reasoning can man be led into the logos of physis. What is the vehicle of 
thought? It Is language. If we do not use language, we cannot think 
systematically. So we can infer that the relationship between wise men and 
ignorant men corresponds to that between Greek and barbarian in Hippias'
ideas. His idea corresponds to that of Plato in that the Hellenic race is
friendly and akin to itself, but foreign and alien to the barbarians ... Greeks 
are still by nature the friends of Greeks( tô pèv 'EXXtivikôv yevos aùTo aùTy 
olKdov elvai Kai auyycves, t(§ 6è pappapiKÔ ô0v€iôv T€ Kai àXXoTpiov ... "EXXqvas
%XXT|oiv ... <|)ùaei pèv (j>iXous eîvai Rep. 470 c) .
IL Hippias in the Hippias Major
The Hippias Major along with the Euthyphro  and Laches  presents a 
Socratic question in the form of the 'What is X' question. In each case 
Socrates is looking for a common character in those particulars by which all 
these can be named under an abstract conception. Hippias, greeted by 
Socrates, is interrogated by him about what he has done during his absence 
from Athens, then about "What is the fine itself(aùTÔ tô KaXôv oti èoTi)?" The 
consequences of this question are divided into two stages. The first 
consists of Hippias' own answers. However, the second is a more appropriate 
line of reasoning initiated by Socrates' alter ego. Socrates also adds that 
all fine things are fine by means of the fine in which case the fine is 
definitely SOmething(Tà KaXà iràvTa tô KaXy kan KaXà ... OvTi y i Tivi TOUTy 287 
c-d).
To this question Hippias answers that a fine girl is a fine thing 
(irap0èvos KaX% KaXdv 287 e). However, this answer is rejected because a fine
H ippias 68
girl cannot be the condition of making those fine things fine and even the 
most beautiful maiden is ugly in comparison with the race of the gods. 
Socrates defines the "fine itself," by which everything else is ordered and 
appears to be fine when its form is added { ... aùrô tô m X d v ,  <5 koX r à W a  T\dvra  
KooneiTai Kai KaXà ())aiv€Tai, èireiSàv îrpooyévTjTai ckcivo tô clS o s , 289 d). In this Càse 
Hippias says that this can be nothing else than gold, in that gold makes 
things fine when added to them. If so, Socrates responds, was Pheidias who 
did not give his Athena eyes of gold ignorant of this fine thing of which 
Hippias speaks? To this Hippias replies that whatever is appropriate to a 
particular thing makes that thing fine. Then, Socrates says, the wooden ladle 
is more appropriate than the golden one to the soup and the pot. Hippias, 
supposing that the fine is the sort of thing that will never be seen to be foul 
for anyone, anywhere and at any time, concludes that it is always finest, 
both for every man and in every place, to be rich, healthy, and honored by the 
Greeks, to arrive at old age, to make a fine memorial to his parents when 
they die, and to have a fine, grand burial from his own children { ... del Kai
iravTl Kai iravTaxooû kciX X io to v  elvai dvSpi, ttX o u to O v ti, ùyiaivovTi, Tipwpev(^  ùttô t ô v  
'EXXîjvwv, d(j)OKOnlvw ds yfjpas, to u s  aÙToû yovèas TeXcuTîfoavTas KaXws TTcpioTciXavTi, 
ÙTTÔ TWV aÙToû èKydvwv KaXws Kai peyaXonpcnws TatjjTjvai 291 d-e). But Socrates 
rejects this answer on the ground that it is awful, unholy and foul for some 
heroes, Achilles, Aeacus and Heracles.
From this second stage Socrates takes the initiative in this 
investigation and tries to get answers from Hippias. Socrates suggests 
through the unknown, Socrates' alter ego, that anything else is fine if this 
has been added to it: 'this', being 'the appropriate itself - the nature of the
appropriate itself ( aÙTÔ 6fl ToOtO tô  TIpItTOV Kai TTIV <|)U01V aÙTOÛ TOÙ TTpCTTOVTOS ...
TOÙTO Tuyxdvfi dv t ô  KaXdv 293 e). This time also the suggestion is rejected 
because the appropriate makes things be seen to be fine rather than actually 
be fine. So the appropriate cannot be the fine. Socrates proposes another 
suggestion that the fine is useful ( t o ù t o  ... d dv xpùoi^iaov -q 295 c). He gives an 
example that eyes are fine not when they are in such a condition that they 
are unable to see, but whenever they are able to see, and are useful for 
seeing. Also in the cases of all utensils and means of transport on land and 
sea, boats and warships, and the tools of every skill, music and all the 
others, we look at the nature it has, its manufacture, its condition; then we 
call what is useful "fine" in respect of the way it is useful, what it is useful 
for, and when it is useful; but anything useless in all these respects we call
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fOUl( ... dTTopXcTTovTes TTpos CKaoTov avTwv fj iT€(|)UKev, {  €ipyaaTai, {  Keirai, to  pkv 
Xpilaiiiov KaXdv <j>a|.i€V elvai, to  8è TaoT% irdvTxi oxp^OTOv alaxpdv* 295 d-e). 
Accordingly what is able to accomplish a particular thing is useful for that 
for which it is able. Thus ability is fine, but inability foul(Auva|Ais ncv apa 
KaXdv, dSuvajjiia Se alaxpdv 295 e). However, when people do bad work, they do 
it by ability. So ability and the useful cannot be the fine. At this point, 
Socrates suggests another alternative: what is useful and able for some 
good purpose is the fine(... to xpdo t^^dv t€  Ka\ to ÔovaTÔv èm to  dyaBdv Ti TTOiliaai, 
TOUT' €OTi TO KttXdv 296 o). So they agree that the beneficial is the fine. But 
this is rejected by Socrates himself, the reason being that, if the beneficial 
is the maker of good, the fine which is the cause of good will be different 
from the good, for the cause is different from what it is a cause of. Once 
more they are confused. At last Socrates suggests that the fine is what is 
pleasant through hearing and sight(... to jcaXdv èoTi to  8C dKof^s t€  Kai sc dt|>eo)s 
T|8d... 298 a). Then if the pleasant through sight and hearing is fine, whatever 
is not pleasant in that way clearly would not be fine. But Socrates does not 
think that pleasure through sight is fine because of this definition: 
because, if that were the cause of its being fine, the other = the one through 
hearing - would not be fine. So he construes that they have some quality that 
itself makes them fine, that common thing that belongs to both of them in 
common and to each privately ( ' Exovoiv dpa t i  to aOTO d iroicî adTàs KaXàs eXvai, 
TO KOlVÔV TOÔTO, 6 Kttl d|l(|)0T€pai8 adTttîS €TTeOTl KOlvfi Kai èKaTCp(Jt l8lÇ" 300 a). Then,
Socrates says, if something is attributed to both pleasures but not to each
one, they would not be fine by that attribute (El dpa t i aoTai al fjSovai 
d|i(})dT€pai TT€TTdv0aoiv, éKOTepa 8e oOk dv Todry ye T($ iraBduaTi elcv KaXai 300 b ).
To this suggestion Hippias responds strongly that what is attributed to
"both" is also attributed to "each" as in the cases of just, health, sickness, 
wound, etc. And he criticises Socrates and the unknown for not looking at 
the entities of things (Td dXa twv irpayjidTwv) and chipping away at the fine 
and other elements by taking each separately and cutting it up with words (
... Kpou€Te 8k dTToXa|ipdvovT€s to KaXov Kai eKaoTov twv oV twv ev toîs Xd'yois
KaTaT€nvovT€s 301 b) because they both do not realise the greatness of the 
natural continuous bodies of being ( ... p^ydXa d^ds XavOdvei Kai 8iav€Kfi ow i^aTa 
TTis odoias TT^oKOTa 301 b). Hippias also adds that Socrates presupposes there 
is some attribute or being that is true of both of these but not of either on 
its own, or of each but not of both. However, Socrates counters this view  
with the argument that in the case of numerical terms such as one, two, 
odd, and even, this suggestion cannot be applied. Hippias agrees that it is
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not entirely necessary that whatever is true of both and each is true of each 
and both as well.
Hippias is outraged with this logic-chopping, flakings and chippings of 
speeches divided up into small bits. He sarcastically answers that what is 
fine and worthwhile is the ability to present a speech well and finely in a 
law-court or council. So Socrates answers that, when he goes home to his 
own place and the unknown hears him saying those things, the unknown 
(Socrates' alter ego) will ask if he is not ashamed that he dare discuss fine 
activities when he has been so plainly refuted about the fine. Thus this 
discussion ends in aporia.
We have considered the synopsis of this dialogue. Through this
dialogue we can find that the view of Plato, using Socrates as a mouthpiece, 
is contrasted with that of Hippias. Let us think about Hippias' thinking in 
detail. In the first stage his answers can be arrived at by our own
experience and come from defining the nature of the fine in an abstract
sense. In his first answer he certainly identifies the fine(To KaXov) with
something fine (kûXôv). However, we can say that Hippias is appealing to the 
nature of a fine girl in order to state the nature of the fine.^8 This is the 
reason why there is no difference between the nature of a fine girl and the 
nature of the fine in respect of the notion of the fine. In this point of view 
he gives an instance of an empirical example rather than a definition of the 
nature of the fine. Again Socrates asks, in his second question, what makes 
things fine when it is added to them. It is evident that Socrates is asking 
Hippias for the abstract idea that can be the common character of fine 
things. But Hippias understands this concept physically and suggests gold 
which indicates a material substance. It is true that by the addition of gold 
something will be made finer. He does not suggest that gold can be the only 
answer. This answer is the very opposite conception of what Socrates 
wants. Hippias' third answer is that it is always finest for everyone to be 
rich, healthy, and honored by Greeks, to arrive at old age, to make a fine 
memorial to his parents when they die, and to have a fine, grand burial from 
his own children. This time Hippias' reply is a definition of broader scope 
and is on a higher level. He tries to raise the ordinary aspirations of social 
existence to the level of the fine itself.i^ However, to Socrates this answer
Plato Hippias Major, Translated with Commentary and Essay, P. Woodruff, 1982. p. 49 
19 Plato 2, Paul Friedlânder, p. 109
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also can be found in ordinary life and is one of a great number of many fine 
things.
On the other hand, in the second stage, Socrates suggests more 
abstract answers to Hippias for what the fine' is. Stage two is an exercise 
in the logic of Socratic definition. Socrates tries to take the incompleteness 
of "fine" into account, proposing to define it by such similarly incomplete 
predicates as "the appropriate" and "the able".20 His suggestions are as 
follows: the appropriate, the able, the beneficial, and pleasure through sight 
and hearing. In these proposals we can find that the concept of one quality, 
aimed at by the Socratic method, is contrasted with many instances of this 
quality, supplied by Hippias' answers. Socrates wants to find the fine which 
is one thing that makes all fine things fine. Also he differentiates between 
to appear(c|)aiveaeai) and to be(dvai). The appropriate (to irpéTiov) is a cause of 
being seen to be fine, not to be fine. So the appropriate cannot be fine. This 
distinction between reality and appearance is based on Plato's thinking that 
the objects which we perceive and experience through our senses are not 
real because they vary according to our senses and to conditions. Many fine 
things appear to us at different times and in various conditions in a way 
which we call fine. These, however, cannot be identified with the fine 
itself, for the condition of its existence presupposes an objective world in 
which the models of natural things exist. The basis of objective reality is in 
those ideal forms which cannot be recognised in the world known to sense- 
perception. His second attempt to identify the fine with "being able" shows 
us his ethical view "No one does wrong willingly". Someone's ability leads 
him to do either wrong or right. Thus "being able" can be a necessary 
condition for him to achieve the fine but not a sufficient condition. So 
"being able" is not enough to constitute the fine without knowledge of what 
the fine is. Because of lack of knowledge many people, even if they have 
power and ability, do wrong things. The third definition is that the fine is 
the beneficial. This puts the true Socratic and Platonic position even more 
precisely .21 In this case his reasoning is absurd; the beneficial is the cause 
of good, but cause and effect are different just as in the relationship 
between father and son, therefore the beneficial is not the good. If we think 
about the relation between father and son, it is true that the father, being a 
'cause' of the son, is different from the son. However, if we think of them in
20 Woodruffs 1982 p. 62
21 Guthrie I I I  p. 186
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respect of being human beings, they have no differences. Does this mean that 
the beneficial is bad? Here we have a Socratic fallacy.
The last suggestion, that pleasure through sight and hearing is fine, 
displays the opposing philosophical positions of Hippias' natural
materialism and the Socratic or Platonic idealism in that what is 
attributed to "both" collectively cannot be attributed to "each"
distributively. Socrates presupposes some other quality which "both" share 
in common but Hippias denies the possibility of the existence of such a 
thing. He maintains that phenomenal reality is the whole of reality.
The question that opposes one and many is the fundamental issue in
Pre-Socratic philosophy. As F. M. Cornford puts it :
The conflict of materialism (many) and idealism (one) was not an 
entirely fresh issue that arose for the first time among the 
contemporaries of Plato. Ever since the sixth century the schools had 
been divided into two traditions: on the one side the Ionian science of 
the Milesians and their successors, on the other hand the Italian 
tradition of the Pythagoreans and Parmenides. The Ionian, all through, 
had been seeking the real nature of things in some ultimate kind of 
matter or body, such as water or air or all the four elements. The 
Italians had sought reality, not in a tangible body, but in supersensible 
things. The Pythagoreans made numbers the real nature of things; and 
Parmenides' One Being was not a tangible body but an object of 
thought, possessing none of the opposite qualities which our senses 
delusively profess to reveal. Accordingly, the lonians had been 
essentially materialists, not merely monists.22
What is the meaning of the materialism on which Hippias' thought is 
based? Materialism is concerned with the nature of the world in a way 
which gives to matter a primary position and accords to ideas a secondary 
one. A material thing can be defined as being made up of parts possessing 
many physical properties. In this respect we can find that the view of the 
materialists is that the real is nothing other than tangible bodies. Against 
these two philosophical backgrounds, we must consider Hippias' 
philosophical ideas. Kerferd rightly remarks that "the materialists
22 Plato’ Theory of Knowledge, F.M  Cornford, Routledge and Kegan Paul p. 229
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mentioned in connection with the battle of the gods and the giants in the 
S o p h is ts  (246 a-c) may well include people like H i p p i a s " . 2 3  When he 
answers Socrates' question "what is the fine itself by which every fine
thing is to be fine when it is added (TrpooYevTiTai)?", he gives an answer based 
on m aterialism -gold-because he understands the meaning of "is added"
physically .
Bearing in mind this view-point, it is necessary for us to consider the 
final argument between Hippias and Socrates carefully. Their argument is as 
fo llo w s .
Socrates says, "both fine things have something that itself makes 
them fine, that common thing that belongs to both of them in common and to
each privately. ... what is not attributed to me to be, and what neither I am
nor you are, and this can be attributed to both of us. And there are other 
things besides, which are attributed to both of us to be, things neither 
of us is C Exouoiv apa t i  t o  aviTO 6 t t g u i  aOTas KaXas elvai, t o  k o iv o v  t o ô t o ,  6 Kai
à|A<j)OT€pais ai) Ta IS eireoTi Koivft Kai êKaTcpa i6ig- ... o \ki\T' d p i pi] S' av où d, to O to
àpc{)OT€pous TreiTovGevai fjpas otov f  etvai- €Tepa S’ av, a apcjjoTcpoi TT€Trov0apev d v a i,
TavTa oùS€T€pov d v a i  f)pwv 300 a-e)". Against this Hippias argues:
"But Socrates, you do not look at the whole of things, nor do the people 
you are used to talking with. You people chip away at the fine and the
other entities by taking each separately and cutting it up with words.
Because of that you do not realise how great they are - naturally 
continuous bodies of being. And now you are so far from realising it 
that you think there's some attribute or being that is true of these 
both but not of each, or of each but not of both. That is how 
unreasonably and unobservantly and foolishly and uncomprehendingly 
you operate (’ AXXa yap sf| ov, <3 SwKpaTes, Ta pev oXa t w v  irpaypaToiv où 
OKoirds, oùS* èKeîvoi oîs où eiwOas SiaXéycoBai, KpovTC Sè airoXapPavovTes t o  
KaXov Kai ÊKaoTov t w v  ovTwv kv TOÎS Xoyoïs KaTaT€pvovT€s. Sià TavTa o u tw  
peydXa ùpds Xav0dv€i Kai SiaveKîi oiopaTa tt^s oùaïas TT€<j)VKdTa. Kai vvv t o o o v t o v  
oe XéXiiBev, tooTe o’îei dvai t i  f\ irdBos ij oùoiav, t| ircpi pèv àp<j>oTepa TavTa 
€OTiv dpa, irepi 6è éKaT€pov ov,  ^ aù irepi pèv éKOtTepov, ircpi Sè dp<[)dT€pa ov- 
ovTws àXoyioTws Kai doKeiTTios Kai evifSws Kai àSiavoifTws SidKaia0€ 301 b-c).
23 Plato and Hippias, G.B. Kerferd, Proceedings of the Classical Associations 60 1963, p.36
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Against this argument Socrates responds, "we have been instructed by you 
that if two is what we both are, two is what we each of us must be as well; 
and if each is one, then both must be one as well. The continuous theory of 
being, according to Hippias, does not allow it to be otherwise; but whatever 
both are, then each is that as well; whatever each is, both are( vvv 6& irapd
00V ffSTi dveSiSaxOim^ v o t i  el pev Svo dpcjjoTepoi eopev, 6vo Kai éKttTepov fjpwv dvdyK'n 
elvai, el 6e ets èKctTepos, eva Kai dp4>OTepovs dvdyK^ - où yap oldv Te SiaveKel Xdyw Tfjs 
oùaïas Kara 'iTTiriav aXXws ex i^v, ’aXX’ d dv ap(j)OTepa t o v t o  Kai éKarepov, Kai d
tKOTepov, dp<})dTepa eîvai. 301 e)." However, Socrates concedes later that of 
some things this is true (Hippias* view), and of others it is not (Socrates' 
view ).
Hippias' main contention is that Socrates cannot look at the whole of 
things and the natural continuous bodies of being because he takes each 
separately and cuts it up with words. However, if we want to understand his 
thinking more clearly, we need to understand the terms Hippias uses: whole 
things (tù dXa), the continuous bodies (SiavcKij awpaTa), attribute (irdOos) and 
being (oùoia). Hippias also remarks concerning "a whole" in the Hippias Minor, 
"You (Socrates) are always weaving the meshes of an argument, selecting 
the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead of grappling 
with the matter in hand as a whole (del av Tivas to io v t o v s  nXeKeis Xdyovs, Kai 
dnoXappdvwv d dv  ^ SvaxepeoTaTOV to v  Xdyov, to v t o v  €XXI Katd opiKpov e(|)a'iiTdp€vos, 
Kgi OÙX dXw dytovi^ xi irpdypaTi irepi orov dv 6 Xdyos  ^ 369 b-c). According to 
A risto tle :
the whole means that which so contains the things it contains that 
they form a unity; and this in two senses - either as being each 
severally one single thing, or as making up the unity between them. 
For (a) that which is true of a whole class and is said to hold good as a 
whole (which implies that it is a kind of whole) is true of a whole in 
the sense that it contains many things by being severally one single 
thing, because all are living things. But (b) the continuous and limited 
is a whole , when it is a unity consisting of several parts(To sè aw€xcs 
K a i TreiTcpaopevov, d T a v  €v t i  €k uXaovwv ^), especially if they are present
actually .24
24 Aristotle's Metaphysics I, 1023 b, 26 - 1024 a, 10, W.D Ross
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Hippias' usage of whole things is similar to Aristotle's (b). The surface of a 
whole has a beginning, a middle and an end which can be named as parts. So 
Hippias must have thought that the representation of an object is a whole. It 
means that he sees things as they are. It is true that an object given in our 
direct perception as an individual is, on closer scrutiny, seen to be 
identified with a whole made up of parts. When we conceive an object as a 
whole, we conceive that the first reality belongs to the members of a whole. 
That is the main reason why Hippias does not differentiate an attribute 
(iraG o s) and a being (o O a ia ) . Hippias treats these as equivalent.26 O v o ia  has 
diverse meanings in Plato's usage; (1) "Essential nature" Phaedrus  237c, o n  
OÙK laaai ttjv  ovoiav émoTov. (2) "Essential substance" Phaedo 78c, avTTi f| oùoia 
^8 X d y o v  S iSopev t o v  e îv a i.  (3 )  "Being" as a characteristic of essential 
substance. Republic  585b, KoOapas oO aias p eT exe iv . (4) "Property," in the 
common material sense, Theaetus 144c, o ù a ïav  pdXa ttoXXtiv KaTeXnre.26 On the 
other hand Plato's use of irdeos is as an attribute of o d a i a ;  "affectus," 
"status," and "perturbatio (tam corporis quam animi)": Protagoras  352 a, d 
eoTiv aÙTOis t o  irdBos, o <j)aoiv vnd  t w v  fjSovwv ir)TTdo0ai. Cratyius 419 C, ffv èv 
TovTw T($ TraOci laxei t o  owpa.27 Through the contrast between an attribute and 
a being, we can find that this corresponds to the relationship between a 
whole and a part. Above all, the most important idea of Hippias is hidden in 
"the natural continuous bodies of being (8iav€K ii ow^aTo rj\s ovo ias  irgirvKOTa)". 
The term "SiavcKTî" is used only once elsewhere in Plato's dialogues, in the 
Laws (839 a) (vd jios ... 6ir)V€Kf|s yevd iicvo s). Empedocles uses it in his surviving 
fragment 59:28
But as one divine element mingled further with another, these things 
fell together as each chanced to meet other, and many other things 
besides these were constantly resulting ( at)Tap k-nê. Kara nctCov cjiiaycTo
S aijA o vi 6a i | iw v  T a v T d  t €  ov^nCwTgOKOV, oTni} 0vv€K vp o€v & a 0T a , dXXa t c  irpos t o îs  
TToXXà 6itiv€k1) è|€yévovTo DK31B59).
In relation to this term "SniveKfi," it is necessary to understand Empedocles' 
use of "ùveKes" (far-stretching) in his Fragment 17:
25 Woodruffs 1982 p. 86
26 Tarrant 1928 p. 79
27 Lexicon Platonicum, D.F. Astius, Rudolf Habelt Verlag 1956
28 Texts and Translations are those of G.S. Kirk/ R.E. Raven
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Nay, there are these things (four elements) alone, and running through 
one another they become now this and now that and yet remain ever as 
they are (dXX’ aùV eoTiv Tavra, Si’ àXXdXwv Se 0eovTa y iyvera i dXXore dXXa xdi 
fiv€K€s aUv époîa D K 3 1 B 1 7 ).
As we can see from his uses of the terms "Si-nveK-n" and "ùvexes," Empedocles' 
intention is to account, in a naturalistic manner, for the organised matter of 
living things into wholes by using these words. He presupposes that the 
elements are everlasting; the physical particular things are, we know 
unstable compounds, which come into being as the elements are run through 
one another and degenerate after the separation of what has been mixed. The 
elements are made into a unified whole under the law of attraction between 
likes. Four parts to the one organic whole which has no voids might well be 
called a continuous unity. He also recommends, "to use whatever way of 
perception makes each thing clear"( y v iw v  i t i o t i v  epvxe, vde i S’ ■§ SriXov c K a a ro v  
DK 31B4). Empedocles speaks in the same way of all the senses, and says 
that perception is due to the "effluences (d iro p p o a i)"  fitting into the channels 
of our senses for he defines colour as "effluence from shapes commensurate 
with sight and perceptible by it ( c o t iv  ydp xpo& airoppoTj axTipdTwv otjjci ovpp^Tpos 
Kai aloO-nrds Meno 76 d)". Empedoclean sensation is a purely physical process 
based on his theory of the attraction of like to like. So we can say that the 
term "Siavexfi" of Hippias is a representative expression of an external object 
which we can perceive through our senses. Hippias regards a physical object 
as a whole which does not have any voids.
In Lysis 214 b4-5 Socrates tells Lysis, "And it is not also so with the 
writings of those sages which tell of these very things, namely that like 
must, of necessity, always be dear to like? And it is perhaps these who 
converse and write about nature and the concept of the whole (oùkovv koX to îs  
t (3v oo^wTaTwv ovyypdpixaoiv tvTCTux^^os TavTa aÙTà Xeyovoiv, o t i to ojioiov Tw 
01101(0 dvdyKTi del 4>iXov elvai; eloiv Sc ttov  oùtoi ol irepi (t)V(j€(os tc xai tov dXov 
SiaXeydpevoi k«1 ypdc^ovTcs)." We can easily recognise that Empedocles and 
Hippias are included among those sages because their ideas have common 
characteristics; (a) natural philosophy, (b) materialism, (c) the theory of 
perceptive knowledge, and (d) their conception of things as whole entities 
which denies the void. So we can conclude that Hippias was influenced by 
Empedocles in his epistemological view of natural philosophy.
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Hippias' idea of "the natural continuous bodies of being" is related to 
his suggestion that both of a pair have an attribute if and only if each of 
them does; whatever both are, that each is as well; and whatever each is, 
both are. It means that attributes are distributed throughout a
physical object, so that they cannot be isolated within a total whole which, 
as a collection of attributes, has continuity. To put it in another way, if we 
concentrate on parts of a thing, we cannot see the whole of what they made 
up. What Hippias abhors is the tendency to chop up properties and whole 
things so that one is inclined to consider the properties of the parts as 
independent of those of the whole and vice versa.29 That is his main point. If 
we think about his examples, gold, silver and ivory(xpv0oî fj dpyvpoî i\ 
èX€<t)dvTivoi 301 a), his theory is well applied because each thing is one and 
the same without any difference between the whole and its parts. So the 
continuity of a physical object and the continuity of its kinds and kind- 
bound properties throughout all of its parts become coextensive  
continu ities.30 As Kerferd puts it, this doctrine(Siav£Kfi awjiaja tt^s oùaïas 
TreirvicdTa) can be expressed as "continuous physical objects that spring from 
b e in g ".31 He reduces all material objects to what can perceived by our 
senses. Hippias' idea about the phenomenal world is that the nature and 
status of material objects exist external to us and give their 
representations to our sensual perception. However, the weakness of his 
theory is that material objects unnoticed can be causes of our sensation. 
That is the main difference in position between Hippias and Socrates or 
Plato who try to explain the phenomenal world by the use of abstract ideas 
which do not exist in this phenomenal world.
Conclusion
We have examined both the ethical views of Hippias in the Protagoras  
and his idea of natural philosophy in the Hippias Major, Hippias' idea of 
ptiysls in the Protagoras implies the idea of more objective lasting or 
universal law which underlies the changing world and is essential to the 
ways of all things. And we examined the possibility that Hippias' idea is 
interconnected with both Heraclitus' meaning of the Logos i.e. unifyng
29 The Continuity Theory of Reality in Plato's Hippias Major, M. L Morgan. Journal of 
History of Philosophy 21 1983 133-158, p. 145
30 Ibid. p. 150
31 Kerferd 1963, p.36
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formular and Empedocles' epistemological theory i.e. the attraction of like 
to like (like is by nature akin to like). Also we have realised that Hippias' 
idea of physis can be applied to pan-Hellenism rather than cosmopolitanism. 
Through detailed analysis of the Hippias Major Hippias' neglected idea, "the 
natural continuous bodies of being," can be revealed to be interrelated with 
Empedocles' theory of effluence, based on materialism. Hippias' idea that the 
nature and status of material objects exist external to us and give their 
representations to our sensual perception can be interpreted as Hippias' own 
interpretation of Empedocles' theory for the purpose of explaining the 
continuity of a physical object throughout all of its parts, i.e. that 
attributes (Weij) are distributed throughout a physical object.
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P R O T A G O R A
Life and W ork
Protagoras of Abdera in Thrace was the oldest and most famous of the 
fifth-century Sophists. The date of his birth and death is uncertain, but it is 
guessed that he lived from 490 B.C. to 421 or 420 B.C. In Plato's Meno  (91 d- 
e) Protagoras is said to have lived for seventy years and to have been a 
Sophist for forty years. In the third century A.D. Philostratus stated(L/Ves of 
the Sophists I 10) that Protagoras was a child at the time of Xerxes' 
expedition against Greece(480 B.C.), who in return for the generous 
hospitality of Protagoras' father permitted the Magi to give him personal 
tultion(DK 80A2). Philostratus suggested that Protagoras borrowed his 
agnosticism from the Magi. From the age of thirty Protagoras embarked on a 
professional life as a Sophist and went from one place to another in the 
Hellenic cities as a teacher of political art and rhetoric in return for money. 
Stobaeus(lll 29, 80) states that Protagoras said that art was nothing 
without practice and practice is nothing without art(DK 80B10). And in his 
work entitled the Great Logos Protagoras says: Teaching requires natural 
endowment and practice; learning must begin in youth(<})vo6(os Kai doKifaews 
SiSaoKaXia 6cÎTai; airo vco'ttitos 6e dp^agevovs 8(1 gavGdveiv DK 80B3). His practical 
teaching, based on the art of persuasion and arguing, aimed at the personal 
and political careers of prominent young men. Diogenes Laertius(IX 61) 
states that Protagoras was the first to say that on every issue there are 
two arguments opposed to each other (DK 80A1).
He visited Athens a number of times where he became a friend of 
Pericles, who, having planned a pan-Hellenic enterprise, chose him to frame 
a legal code for the Athenian colony of Thurii in 444 B.C.. In Athens he also
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enjoyed friendship with the wealthy Callias and with Euripides, in whose 
house he gave a reading of the first part of his book. On the GodsA
After the military disaster of the Sicilian expedition in 411 B.C. 
Protagoras was accused of impiety, owing to his views on religion, by 
Pythodorus, son of Polyzelus, one of the Four Hundred, which led to his being 
exiled from Athens at the end of his life and to all his books being burnt in 
the market place. It is said by numerous authorities that he died by drowning 
on a sea voyage because of shipwreck after leaving Athens.
Protagoras had wide interests: philosophy, politics, ethics, theology,
rhetoric, cultural history and literary criticism. Numerous titles of books 
are ascribed to him : The Art of Debating, On Wrestling, On Mathematics, On 
Government, On Ambition, On the Virtues, On the Original State of Things, On 
Those in Hades, On Human Errors, Direction, Trial over a Fee, Contradictory 
Arguments in Two Books. However, many of these names were associated 
with him in later centuries and none of his works is extant except in a few 
quoted fragments.2 According to Diogenes Laertius (IX 50) Protagoras was 
the first to distinguish the tenses of the verb, to expound the importance of 
the right moment, to conduct debates, and to introduce disputants to the 
tricks of argument(DK 80A1).
We can find a lot of information concerning Protagoras' thought and 
life in Plato's dialogues. In the Phaedrus (267 c) Socrates says that 
Protagoras wrote a book on writing, the Correct Diction. Protagoras also 
wrote on wrestling and other arts according to Theaetetus in the Sophists  
(232 d). In the Euthydemus (286 b-c) Socrates attributes to Protagoras and 
his followers the contention "how can a man who says nothing be answering 
him who is speaking? (6 sè gf) xéywv t(15 Xeyovn TTws < av>  dvTiXeyoi;)". Hippias 
states in the Hippias Major (282 e) that he met Protagoras when Protagoras 
was living in Sicily, where he had a great reputation, and that he was a far 
older man than himself. Socrates makes mention of Protagoras' man- 
measure theory once in the C ratyius  (386 a): man is the measure of all
1 Diogenes Laertius IX  51 : concerning the gods I cannot know either that they exist or 
that they do not exist, or what form they might have, for there are many things to 
prevent one's knowledge: the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of man’s life 
(iT cp i gei> 0e(3v o ù k  cxw elS ïva i, ov& t5s d o iv  ovG’ i5s o<iK d a iv  ov0’ ô t to îo i  t iv c s  ISeav' iroXXà yap 
T a  K w X vovTa d S évai t) t ’ dS-nXoTTis tcai (îpaxùs wv o' (lies to v  dv0pwTfov).
2 A History of Greek Philosophy II I,  W. K. C. Guthrie, Cambridge University Press 1969 
p.264
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things ("iravTwv xpiii^aTov g€Tpov" eXvai av0pwïïov) and in the Theaeteius (152 a) ; 
man is the measure of all things - alike of the being of things that are and 
of the not-being of things that are not(iravTwv xgn^orwv gcTpov" av0pwirov cXvai, 
"twv gèv oVtwv (5s €oti, twv Sc gf) o’vtwv (5s oùic cotiv). Protagoras said too that a 
soul is nothing apart from its sensations, according to Plato's Th eae te tus  
(152 ).
Protagoras’ Thought as Revealed in the Protagoras
In the P ro tagoras, Socrates addresses Protagoras as a teacher of 
culture and excellence, the first to claim payment for his services(349 a). 
Protagoras admits himself to be a Sophist and educator(317 b). And he says 
that he might be the father of any one of his listeners, who include 
Socrates, Prodicus and Hippias (317 c). He boasts of himself that he could 
improve the state of the young Hippocrates if Hippocrates were to join 
him(318 a). And he claims that he is better than anyone else at helping a 
man acquire a good and noble character, worthy indeed of the fee which he 
charges and even more (328 b). When Socrates and Protagoras meet(318 c), 
Socrates asks Protagoras what Hippocrates, a well-born and wealthy friend 
of Socrates who is anxious to make a name for himself in the city, will 
achieve if he comes to be one of his followers.
To this Protagoras replies that Hippocrates will progress towards a 
better state if he joins him; the proper care of his personal affairs, so that 
he may best manage his own household, and also of the state's affairs, so as 
to become a real power in the city, both as speaker and man of action (to sè
gct0T|ga èoTiv eùpovXia Ti€pi t ( 3v  oIk€1(0V, 6it(0s av apioTa t t ) v  aÙToO okiav SioiKot, K ai 
TT€pi T(5v tt)s iroX€(i)s, oTT(os Ttt TT)s TT()X6Ws GvvaTWTaTos ttv €iT| Kai TTpoTTdv Kai X^yciv
318 e).3 Socrates interprets this as a claim to teach the art of politics, and 
to make men good Citizens(Tf|V iroXiTiKfiv t€xvt|v Kai ÙTTiox î^o0ai Troieîv avSpas 
dyaOovs iroXïTas 319 a) with Protagoras' agreement. However, Socrates is in 
doubt over this, as he has believed that this kind of art cannot be taught(aùTÔ
3 A similar maintenance of the functions of man who has dp€Tii can also be found in the 
Meno : ... oti èiriOuveî Tavriis ttis oo<t>ïo5 Kai dperns fi ol dv0p(i)iToi rds tc olKias Kai tùs irdXcis KaXws SioiKovoi, Kai tovs ydvïas tovs aiÙTwv 6cpaiT€Vovoi, Kai noXÏTad aKi ^€vovs iïiToGé(ao8ai tc 
Kai dTTOTr€|wl>ai ^nioTavTai d|C(i>s dvGpos dyaOov. TaÙTTiv oùv tt|V dpcT^v oko'ttci irapd Tivas dv 
ncgTTovTcs aÙTÔv ôpGws TTCgiToigcv M bho 91 a-b.
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(TcxvTiga) ... où SiSttKTov dvai 319 a). At the same time Socrates gives two
reasons why he cannot believe that it can be taught and furnished to any man
by another: (1) the Athenians, allowing any citizen to speak on questions of
the running of the city, treat any citizen's opinion about statesmanship as
equally worth listening to as any other's, regardless of qualifications, 
because they do not think that this is a subject that can be taught, as 
opposed to the technical matters for learning and teaching on which there 
are experts; (2) the wisest and best of the Athenian citizens are unable to 
hand on to others the excellence which they possess(ol aocjxvTaToi Kai dpiaroi 
Twv TToXiTwv TavTT)v TT|v dpcTTfv i\v cxo^^iv 319 e): Poricles gave his sons the 
very best education in everything that depends on teaching, but in his own 
wisdom he neither trains them himself nor hands them over to any other 
instructor(d Se aùrôs ao(|)ds èariv outc aÙTÔs iraiScvci ovtc tw dXXw irapaSiSwaiv 
320 a); they simply browse around on their own like sacred cattle, on the 
chance of picking up excellence automatically (kdv ttov aùTogaToi irepiTvxwaiv 
TÙ dp€Tù 320 a).
Prior to our main argument we must carefully consider Socrates' two 
reasons. Socrates holds that the Athenians are wise(oo(|)di 319 b). What 
makes him think so? Socrates' first question is based on the fact that the 
Athenian political system is a participatory democracy which endows the 
citizens with social equality and the right to take part in decision-making. 
According to his first reason Socrates' opinion of the Athenians' wisdom is 
based on the Athenian political system. From this ambiguous pronouncement 
of Socrates we cannot be sure whether the Athenian political system came 
to be a participatory democracy on account of the Athenians' wisdom or the 
Athenians' wisdom is due to the political structure of Athens. For Socrates' 
second reason we must ask if the question it entails is valid. As we can 
understand, Socrates' attention is entirely concentrated on the wise and 
supremely good individual, who possesses excellence regardless of what his 
son Is like. Even if we admit that the ability to give instruction in political 
excellence depends on possessing it oneself, we cannot be sure that someone 
who does possess it will be a good teacher of it, for to have political 
excellence is entirely different from teaching it; that is a kind of art or 
skill. His second reason is that the wisest and best of the Athenian citizens 
are unable to hand on to others the excellence which they possess(ot 
ao(})ii)TaToi Kai apioToi t w v  t t o X it w v  TavTfjv t t | v  dpcTifv cxovoiv 319 e). Perlcles, 
for instance, is the wisest of the Athenian citizens; however, he is not the
Protagoras 83
best teacher even if he possesses excellence. At the same time Protagoras 
could refute Socrates' position on the grounds that to be a good citizen one 
is required to have political skills such as the capability for persuasion and 
negotiation as well as intellectual abilities such as the good judgement of 
current situations and the ability to predict the future, at which Protagoras 
is said to be an expert.4
At any rate Protagoras has no choice but to answer Socrates' 
objections, for he is faced with "the choice of admitting that virtue cannot 
be taught and that his profession is a fraud, or of declaring that the theory 
of Athenian democracy is false, and his patron, Pericles, is ignorant of the 
true nature of political excellence".5 Protagoras replies by means of both a 
myth and an explanation from 320 c8 to 328 d2. Concerning the great speech 
that Plato puts into Protagoras' mouth in this dialogue, it has been 
suggested that Plato is substantially reproducing the views of the historical 
Protagoras himself, taken from one of his published works, the On the
Original State of Man.^ According to 0 . 0 . W. Taylor Protagoras' reply can be
analysed as follows:^
A. Reply to Objection (1) (the Athenians do not recognise experts in
political matters);
(i) Story of Prometheus (320 c8 - 322 d5),
(ii) Explanation and expansion of story (322 d5 - 324 d1).
B. Reply to Objection (2) (Good Citizens do not teach their sons to be
good : 324 d2 - 328 c2).
C. Summary : (328 c3 - d2).
A (i). Once upon a time, there existed gods but no mortal creatures. To
create mortals the gods formed them within the earth out of a mixture of
earth and fire and the substances which can be compounded from earth and 
fire. Prometheus and Epimetheus were charged by the gods with the task of
equipping them and allotting suitable powers to each kind. By means of
4 Plato Protagoras, Translated with Notes by C. C. W. Taylor, Oxford 1976 p.72
5 The Place of Protagoras in the Athenian Public Life, Classical Quarterly 1941 p. 7
6 Guthrie I I I ,  p. 63-64
7 C. C. W. Taylor 1972, p.76
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begging Prometheus to allow him to carry out the distribution himself 
Epimetheus was entitled to carry out the allocations of power to created 
beings; to some creatures he gave strength without speed, while he equipped 
the weaker kinds with speed; some he armed with weapons, while to the 
unarmed he gave some other faculty and so contrived means for their 
preservation. Thus he made his whole distribution on a principle of 
compensation(iTraviaœ v), taking care, by means of these devices, that no 
species should be destroyed. He also provided for their comfort against the 
changing seasons, clothing them with thick hair or hard skins sufficient to 
ward off the winter's cold, and effective also against heat. He shod them, 
some with hooves, others with hard and bloodless skin. Next he appointed 
different sorts of food for them - to some grass of the earthy to others the 
fruit of trees, to others roots. Some he allowed to gain their nourishment by 
devouring other animals, and these he made less prolific.
When it came to the turn of man, Epimetheus found that he had used up 
all means of preservation, leaving man naked, unshod, unbedded, and 
unarmed. Prometheus therefore, being at a loss to provide any means of 
salvation for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena their technical skill, 
together with fire(Txiv k'vr^xyov oocf)iay ovv wvpi 321 d). In this way man 
acquired sufficient means of life, but had no political wisdom(Tijv pkv odv 
TTÇpi TOV ^(ov oo<p(av av6p(t)Tros ravTxi Tr\v Se iroXiriKrjv oüik eïx^v 321 d). Thus
equipped, man, having a share in the portion of the gods, began to work to 
erect altars and images of the gods because of his divine kinship(Sià rijv ro(/ 
SeoO ovyyéveiav 322 a). And by the art which he possessed, man soon 
discovered articulate speech and names, invented housing and clothes and 
shoes and bedding, and got food from the earth. At first men lived in 
scattered groups; then the ravages of wild animals drove them to come 
together and found fortified cities; however, they were unable to prevent 
themselves from injuring one another for want of political skill, of which 
the art of war is a part (TroXiriKfjy yàp rexvvv ovttm dxov, fjs pépos iroXepiKr) 322  
b). So Zeus, fearing the total destruction of the human race, sent Hermes to 
implant in man the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice 
(alS(S Kai SiKTiv 322c); man was thereby entitled to bring order into his 
cities and create bonds of friendship and union. Justice and respect for 
others were distributed to all alike, so that each could have his share, 
unlike what had happened with the distribution of arts. So, by Zeus' law, if
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anyone is incapable of acquiring his share of these two excellences he shall 
be put to death as a plague to the city.
By means of myth Protagoras explains the origin and development of 
human society. From the fifth century onwards the rationalistic explanation 
of the origin of human life and culture was expounded by the natural 
philosophers(Democritus, Anaxagoras and his pupil Archelus). His view is 
based on human progress(evolution of society) as an inference from pre- 
Socratic physical theories about the evolution of life from inanimate 
matters, which were a reaction against earlier mythical explanations of 
human degeneration. Nature cannot be a sufficient condition for the 
organization of community, so something (political excellence) is to be 
added to the state of nature(innate capacity). Also we can find another 
piece of evidence in favour of the view that Protagoras is a supporter of the 
natural philosophers' theory: his account of how the gods formed 
them(mortal creatures) within the earth out of a mixture of earth and fire 
and the substances which are compounded from earth and fire(Tvrrovoiv avTà
0€Ol 7TÎS CVSoV &K vns Kttl TTVpOS g€l^ aVT€S Kttl T(3v 00(% TTV pi Kttl 7%) KCpCtVVVTai 320 d)
corresponds to a similar account by Empedocles in his surviving fragment 
9.8 The gods at first made all animal forms including man, and later the two 
Titans gave powers to them. Natural conditions had been given to them 
before they came out into the light. Human development can be classified 
into two stages according to this myth; the first stage of human 
development can be characterised as the period of technical civilisation for 
which Prometheus supplied the equipment^; the second stage as the period 
of political art(al8d)s xai sïkti). From the first stage we can see that 
Protagoras' idea is based on the equilibrium i.e. well balanced order that 
controls the world of living beings according to Epimetheus' distribution "on 
a principle of compensation (è irav iaw  v)". But, as Guthrie puts it, "nature's
8 Empedocles Fragment 9 : And when they (sc. roots) are mixed in the form of a man 
and come to the air, or in the form of the race of wild beasts or of plants or of birds, 
then they say that this comes into being; but when they are separated, they call this 
wretched fate (ol 6’ o t €  pev icarà ^ ô -ï o , p i - y é v f  els alOep’ i -K w v T a t  t î  tcaja 6ript3v àypoTepwv yevos Ti KttTO 0apvti)v k o t ’ olwvwv, t o  re pev t o  -\éyovaï ycvéoGai, eÙTe 6’ diroKpivGwai, t o  S’ aù 
SvaSaipova t t o t p o v  ' DK 31B9) Text and Translation are from The Presocratic Philosophers, 
G.S Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, Cambridge Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1983 p.291).
9 The Fragility of Goodness, M. C. Nussbaum pp. 94-95 In her book she contrasts the 
term t c x v t i  with the term t v x t i ,  i n  that the term T e 'x v 'n  is closely associated with practical 
judgement or wisdom with foresight, planning, and prediction; it is a deliberate 
application of human intelligence to some part of the world, yielding some control over 
the term tùxti-
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device for preservation seems to operate only at species level and to ignore 
the individual".10 So skills in the diverse arts and crafts(wisdom) were 
distributed among human beings, not the same skills to all men, but 
different skills to different men. Reason is an essential distinction of 
human beings, by which they can make use of fire and technical instruments 
and control subject matter. In this stage the social nature of human beings 
is in the state of the imperfect individual. Although technical arts 
sufficient for the existence of human beings were "innate in men as rational 
creatures" who had practical intelligence, the moral qualities necessary for 
social and political life were not, but were only acquired after the dangers 
of living widely dispersed had been experienced.n Protagoras might think 
that the individual's inner mind consists of anarchistic inclinations for his 
own benefit. The nature of the individual is not self-sufficient, so he must 
create a political community which can be self-sufficient and complete. 
Protagoras indicates that the difference between mankind and animals lies 
in the possession of a social consciousness, which animals whose instinct 
is to get the better of the others lack; this social consciousness operates by 
forming communities under laws for the restraint of aggression. 
Communities can be constituted only by human beings who can use language 
for discussion and mutual c o n c e s s i o n . 12 However, it is ambiguous whether 
political excellence is a pre-condition of the political community or a 
product of it.
However, in the second stage, the ordering principles(alSo)s t€ kcA 6(kii) 
are distributed to men on a different basis from the technical skills: all men 
should share in them, but this does not mean that these two ordering 
principles are possessed in equal measure by all. We can explain this by 
saying that the powers of animals and the skill of human beings in crafts 
naturally belong to them, for they were given to them before they came out 
of the earth.13 In contrast to this first stage, all men, in the second stage, 
possess some share in justice and political excellence, but this share is not 
possessed by nature, but gained through instruction and practice(323 c3 - 
324 d1), for these two principles are acquired after human beings have come 
into existence. Through the medium of two moral requirements(alS(os Kai 8ikti)
1  ^ In the Beginning, W. K. C. Guthrie, Metheun & Co Ltd. 1957p. 86
11 Guthrie IV , p. 217
12 Isocrates I I I  5f. treats language as the essential condition of law and art.
1  ^ Protagoras' Doctrine of Justice and Virtue in the Protagoras of Plato, JHS 73 1953 
p.42-43
Protagoras 87
imposed by the intervention of Zeus, the human mind can be developed in 
such a way as to render coexistence and culture possible. Protagoras
upholds Hesiod's idea(the Works and Days 276-280) that justice is Zeus' gift 
to mankind, and the quality which distinguishes them from animals that eat
one another. As Protagoras argues "man is the measure of all things", he
thinks that norms are superimposed upon the original or natural state of 
affairs by man, but with the help of Zeus.i^ The main function of human 
political excellence is to live in harmony with each other in a political 
community. This means that the qualities of respect for others and a sense 
of justice(alS(5s T€ Koti SiKTi) constitute political skill itself, for these two 
moral principles are the necessary and sufficient basis for the existence of 
the political community.i5 in addition to this Zeus ordered Hermes to
distribute these two moral principle to all men (èiri iravras ... Kai iravTas 
g6T€xd'vTwv) and to lay it down as his law that if anyone were incapable of 
acquiring his share of these two moral principles he should be put to death 
as a plague to the city. However, these principles were not distributed in 
the sarrie degree among the Athenian citizens. The possession of them 
differs in degree, for Protagoras basically presupposes the differences of 
human intellectual abilities: as for the people, they have no real 
understanding of their own, but only praise what their leaders tell them(317 
a); some citizens have more correct opinions, others less(322 d); but why 
should we look into the opinions of the common man, who says whatever 
comes into his head? (353 a). If we assume that all men are to be regarded 
as sharing equally in these two moral principles, we can guess that all 
Athenian citizens would be equally qualified to give advice with equal 
abilities, and would throw the Athenian government into a state of 
confusion, for nobody could surpass any other citizen. Even though the 
citizens of the political community have unequal abilities and attributes, 
they have equal rights before the laws, Also if these two moral principles 
were distributed equally among the Athenian citizens, there was no reason 
for Zeus to lay It down as his law that if anyone were incapable of acquiring 
his share of these two moral principles he should be put to death as a plague 
to the city. From this it can be deduced as a rhatter of course that these two 
principles were not given to man by nature.
1^ The Open Society and its EnemiesI, K. R. Popper, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Reprinted 
1973 p. 66
1^ Kerferd 1953 p. 43
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Let us interpret the evolution of the political community of 
Protagoras* myth in another way. If we believe that he was an agnostic, as 
his extant fragment talking of the gods tends to show, then we can remove 
the role of the gods from his myth. As we can read in our present text(321 
c-d) man comes into the world endowed with reason. Reason is said to have 
the mind's power of determining right and truth and drawing conclusions. In 
this respect the role of Prometheus can be interpreted as human 
Forethought(foresight and anticipation), whereas the role of Epimetheus can 
be interpreted as human Afterthought(reflection). The development of human 
society seems to be the synthesis of human foresight and human reflection 
i.e. the process of trial and error in human mental and physical actions, 
which leads to the achievement of a higher quality. The contradictions in 
thought, nature, and society are driven into a further phase of development 
by a kind of necessity just as in Hegel's dialectical movements. The reason 
why contradictions occur is that human Forethought cannot always predict 
for the future, so after mistakes have been made the other function of the 
human mind. Afterthought, reflects on what mistake has been made, and at 
the same time tries to correct and modify it; but Afterthought takes time to 
perceive a truth. The problem of the distribution of skill in the arts results 
from the mistaken role of Afterthought, whose main function must be the 
examination of Forethought's action. Human life takes its origin from the 
state of nature in which Forethought and Afterthought are in conflict with 
each other for the higher application and realisation of nature. Human 
reason, which has this inner contradiction, is moving towards the 
development of Its own sufficiency. So man is qualified to have knowledge 
of technical skills together with fire, which is how Protagoras  
characterises potential ability. It means that natural necessity leads men to 
discover the means of life by use of the technical skills. So the individual 
man has awakened to a control of the external world by means of his reason. 
In this state human beings live in scattered groups using languages, living in 
houses, wearing clothes and cultivating the soil. However, human desire 
cannot be satisfied with life in this natural state, for men are devoured by 
wild animals and killed by each other. Protagoras posits that the state of 
nature is anarchic, everyone set against everyone else, as Hobbes thinks. 
Uncontrolled and brutish life forced men to combine for survival, and to 
realise that communal life is impossible without submission to laws. By 
hard experience man came to learn to act justly and respect the rights of 
others and so to constitute political communities. By realising the necessity
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of moral principles, man recognised that he should subjugate his self- 
seeking desires to respect for norms, for he has found from experience that 
he cannot live safely in scattered groups. The social nature of human beings 
arises from the state of the imperfect individual, so the human mind is 
driven by necessity to create a political community which is perfect and 
self-sufficient. Struggles among people are the prerequisite for the 
existence of moral principles, by which they can minimise the sacrifice they 
need to make for their mutual survival. This progress has been achieved 
through the synthesis of the subject(human reason) and its object(nature). 
So, as Untersteiner says, man stands within the world of universal nature 
which represents the victory of the human collective reason which 
generalises .16 In Protagoras' thinking man's development of a nature{4>uais) 
which is imperfect and deficient has eventually been transformed into the 
political community which, being perfect and complete, set up the laws(vdgoi 
326 d). In the world of Protagoras man's life is not subject to his natural 
state, rather it has overcome the difficulty of nature by the practice of 
Forethought and Afterthought, and has come to control it by establishing 
laws.
A (ii). Thus it is that in a debate involving skill in building, or any 
other craft, the Athenians believe that few are capable of giving advice. But 
when the subject of their consultations involves political excellence(€is 
ovp0ov\i)v 7roXiTiKj}s àp€TTls 322 e -323 a), which must always follow the path 
of justice and moderation (ifv Sd 8ià 6iKaioa\fv7)s wâoav lévai Kaï ao)(})poaifvr)s323 
a), the two qualities amounting to the excellence of a citizen, they listen to 
every man's opinion, for they think that everyone must share in this kind of 
excellence; otherwise the state could not exist. Another proof that all men 
do in fact believe that everyone shares a sense of justice and civic 
excellence(p€T€X€iv diKaiooifvi}s re Kai Ti)s aXXr^ s ttoXitik7\s dperfjs 323 a) is 
provided by the fact that, even if someone is known to be wicked, yet if he 
publicly tells the truth about himself, his truthfulness is regarded as mad. 
People do not regard excellence as innate or automatic, but as something to 
be acquired by instruction and taking thought(SiSaKTo'v t€ Kai è i èwip^Xdas 
irapayfyy^aeai 324 c); for no one is angered by the faults which are believed to 
be due to nature or chance, such as being ugly, dwarfish or weak. In the 
fields of injustice, irréligion and everything that is contrary to civic 
excellence(i^ àSiKia Kai âaéfi i^a Kai auXXif^ S-qv irâv to kvavTwv Tfjs noXiTiKrjs àp€Ti\s
16 The Sophists, M. Untersteiner, Translated by K. Freeman, Oxford 1954. p,63
Protagoras 90
323 e - 324 a) indignation and admonition are universal, evidently because 
of a belief that such excelience can be acquired by taking thought or by 
instruction. So punishment is inflicted on the wrongdoer as a deterrent for 
the sake of the future, to prevent him from doing wrong again. This argument 
therefore shows that it is possible to impart and teach excellence.
In reply to Socrates' first question Protagoras proves the reason why 
the Athenians listen to everyone's opinion on political wisdom, for they 
think that everybody shares a sense of justice and civic excellence(323 b). 
So if a man declares himself unjust, he will be regarded as mad, due to this 
conviction held by the Athenians. In addition to this he demonstrates that 
the Athenians do not regard excellence as innate or automatic, but as 
something acquired by instruction and taking thought. And they believe that 
excellence can be instilled by education, indignation, admonition and 
punishment which is inflicted as a deterrent for the future.
B. The second objection is given not in the form of a myth, but as an 
argument(logos). In the following argument Protagoras answers the 
questions: how all men come to have their share in excellence; why good 
citizens cannot teach their sons excellence; why the sons of outstanding 
citizens so often fail to show the excellence of their fathers. If there is 
justice and moderation and holiness of life (SiKaioavvi) Kai am^poavvri Kai ro 
doiov elvai 325 a), or, to concentrate these into a single concrete concept, 
excellence(dpeTi]v), it is this in which all must share and which must enter 
into every man's actions whatever other occupation he chooses to learn and 
practice; anyone who lacks it, man, woman, or child, must be instructed and 
corrected until by punishment he or she is reformed, and whoever does not 
respond to punishment and instruction must be expelled from the state or 
put to death as incurable. Good citizens teach and admonish their sons from 
childhood and throughout their lives. As soon as a child can understand what 
is said to him, his nurse, mother, tutor, and the father himself vie with each 
other to make him as good as possible, instructing him through everything 
he does or says. If he is not obedient, they try to straighten him out with 
threats and beatings, like a warped and twisted plank. In school, children's 
education lays more emphasis at first on their behaviour than on their 
letters or their music. Later they are educated to learn good poems by heart 
containing much admonition and many eulogies, and panegyrics of the good 
man, so that they may be inspired to imitate them and long to be like them.
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Also the music masters make the minds of children familiar with rhythms 
and melodies, and by analogous methods instill self-control and deter the 
young from evil-doing, for rhythm and harmonious adjustment are essential 
to the whole of human life. The citizen's life is an unceasing progressive 
process of learning goodness. All this is done by those best able to do it - 
that is, by the wealthy - and it is their sons who start their education at 
the earliest age and continue it the longest. When they have finished with 
teachers, the state compels them to learn the laws and use them as a 
pattern for their life, lest left to themselves they should drift aimlessly. 
We know how, when children have not yet learned how to write well, the 
writing master traces outlines with a pencil before giving them the slate, 
and makes them follow the lines as a guide for their own writing; similarly 
the state sets up the laws which are the inventions of good law-givers of 
ancient times, and compels the citizens to rule and be ruled in accordance 
with them(è's dk Kai rj wo'Xis vopovs t^ TToypa^ aoa, àyaBêv Kai iraXauSv vopod€T(Sv 
€ÙpfipaTa, Karà tovtovs àvayKcc^ €i Kai apx^iv Kai apxeadai 326 d 5-7).
Excellence is something in which no one may be a layman if a state is 
to exist at all. As in the case of flute-playing, differences of achievement in 
excellence are to be explained by different levels of natural aptitude on the 
part of the students. The general application of the education would lead to 
differences between the individual students, based on their natural aptitude. 
The son of a good flute player would often be a poor one, and vice versa, but 
at any rate would be good enough in comparison with someone who knew 
nothing about flute playing at all. The man who In a civilised and humane 
society appears to us the most wicked must be thought just if one has to 
judge him in comparison with someone who has neither education nor a court 
of justice nor laws nor any constraint compelling them to be continually 
heedful of excellence(, dans aoi dSiKofraros 4>a(v€rai dvdpiowos t(Sv kv vdpois kol 
àvdpojiTois T€dpappévo)v, SfKaiov aùràv dvai Kai Sripiovpydv tovtov tov irpdypaTos, d  
8koi aÙTov Kpiveodai npds àvBpioirovs oïs prfTÇ waiô i^a kvTiv pi)T€ ôiKaaTufpia vépoi
pi)6k àvdyKi) pr)S€p(a 6ià iravTos dvayKa^ovaa àp€Tfjs kmpeXdodai 327 c). In Athenian 
society the teachers of excellence are just like the teachers of the Greek 
language, it is very difficult to find who they really are. So that if we can 
find someone who is even a little better than the others at advancing us on 
the road to excellence, we must be content. Protagoras claims that he is one 
of these, rather better than anyone else at helping a man acquire a good and 
noble character.
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Protagoras answers Socrates' second question by means of an 
argument(Xd'yos). Protagoras argues that excellence is that in which all must 
share and which must enter into every man's actions whatever other 
occupation he chooses to learn and practice' His presupposition is that the 
basis of all human activities is excellence, so he argues that excellence can 
be taught by all the ubiquitous forces of the community from childhood to 
old age: parents, nurses, music teachers, grammar teachers, and the agents 
of laws and punishment. Protagoras intends punishment not as a means of 
brutal revenge, but as a means of education and improvement to protect and 
defend the political community. The aim of punishment Is to encourage the 
sense of right as well as to restrain anti-social activity. Why does 
Protagoras forbid the individual from carrying out personal retaliation? The 
main reason might be that an individual's intention to carry out revenge is 
not based on the laws of the community, which deal with the justice of the 
community and not with personal wrath. In Protagoras' society tà  Sixaia is 
identified with Tà vdgiga (327a and 327b) in that the laws of the political 
community play the part of a moral teacher and urge citizens to observe the 
laws. Laws promote the citizens' mutual safety and interest, which are the
regulating guides for a political community : t*i tioXis .....  Kai apx^iv Kai
apxeo0ai(326 d). In this community the greater emphasis is laid on the 
interest of the whole community, which determines the standards for 
behaviour of the individual, rather than on the interest of the individual. 
Personal morality is nothing other than social devotion to duty in the 
observance of the laws. Protagoras asserts that life in Athens is a kind of 
education in the excellences required for community life just as it might be 
an education in the native language. It is therefore very difficult to find the 
teachers of it, for those who teach it have no special names, as many 
Sophists before himself adopted a disguise and worked under cover(316 d - 
317 a). Protagoras' argument implies that one's political excellence can be 
acquired as a result of continuous practice, conscious or unconscious, 
within one's own society, not by nature. All citizens of the political 
community possess moral excellence which is the basis of the community's 
survival and existence. The individual and the political community are 
closely interdependent. The moral inclination of the individual equips the 
political community for survival, and the political community cultivates the
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moral sense of its members through laws and customs.i7 Also within the 
community a man can develop his characteristic natural aptitude by himself; 
by doing this he can carry out his work efficiently. In this respect 
Protagoras identifies himself as the successor of the educational tradition 
of Homer, Hesiod and other older poets, who dealt with the ideal of human 
qualities. The wisest and best of the Athenian citizens too believe that 
excellence can be taught, both publicly and privately(325 b), and throw all 
their energy into it. And the reason why many of their sons turn out 
worthless is the lesser natural aptitude of their sons for learning 
excellence. Agairist Socrates' view that excellence cannot be teachable and 
excellence depends on the chance of picking it up automatically(320 a), 
Protagoras lays emphasis on moral teachings being instilled into one's 
mind(326), as well as on the unconscious teaching of social tradition and 
customs. Basically the acquisition of excellence according to Protagoras 
comes through natural aptitude, instruction and taking thought, as we can 
find in his surviving fragment: Teaching requires endowment and practice; 
learning must begin in yOUth{c|)VO€0)s Kai aoKifaews SiSaoKaXia SeiTai; airo veoTTiTOS Se 
dp^ag€vovs S€i gav0dv€iv DK 80B3). The relationship between the influence of 
natural aptitude and deliberate education which are conducive to the 
acquirem ent of dpcrn is a salient point in his educational philosophy. 
Protagoras' position is the opposite one to that of the aristocracy, which 
stressed the importance of one's own nature(àvSpe(a ... àirô (jjvaews Kai €ùTpo-nids 
Twv 4>vxt5v y i7 V€Tai 351b). Natural aptitude does not depend on heredity, as we 
can see from the case of the flute player. The possession of dpeTif does not 
depend on noble birth, but all can possess it who can afford it. From this we 
can understand that Protagoras is a teacher of political excellence as well 
as a teacher of moral and social values i.e. prudential and utilitarian ends 
are connected with ethical and social purposes.
C. Protagoras claims to have shown by the myth and argument that 
excellence is teachable and that the Athenians believe it to be so, and that 
at the same time it is quite natural for the sons of good fathers to turn out 
good-for-nothing, and vice versa.
12 Let us think of Glaucon's account - Republic I I  358e -359a, And Aristotle also lays 
emphasis on the important factor for the permanent existence of the political 
community.- Pol. Ill, 6. 1278b
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Above all we must examine whether or not Protagoras can justify
himself as a teacher of political excellence(dp€Tii), thus refuting Socrates by 
his myth and argument. The very thing which Socrates believes unteachable 
is the subject of Protagoras' teaching: the proper care of a man's personal 
affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also of the 
state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the city, both as a speaker 
and as a man of action. Then Socrates identifies Protagoras' subject with 
the art of politics and with a promise to make men good citizens{Tii v 
iToXiTiKTjv Kcti OTTioxctoSai TToictv dvSptts dya6ovs TToXiras 319 a), and gives
two reasons why he does not believe that excellence can be taught(319 b - 
320 b). The Socratic fallacy is hidden in that no differences are made 
between the moral terms and the technical terms. It is pointed out that 
Protagoras does not "make out sufficient justification for his claim to be 
able to teach statesmanship as a s p e c ia l ity " .A n d  J. S. Morrison argues 
that Protagoras' argument is "based entirely on the ambiguity of of the
phrase dyaeoi TroXîTai".i9 Adkins also points out in his article dperif, T€xvr\, 
Democracy and Sophists (JHS 1973 p. 3-12) that Protagoras is confusing co­
operative excellences(al8ws Kal 8ikt)) with administrative and political 
skills(iroXiTiKii T€xvii). When Protagoras tells Socrates that from himself 
Hippocrates will learn only what he has come to learn(318 e), this means
that Protagoras will teach whatever the pupil asks for according to the
pupil's question (ad hominem). Protagoras' answers take up the same position 
as Socrates' viewpoint, as Protagoras affirms above : (a) Socrates identified 
the art of politics(TT|v itoXitikt|v T€xvnv)20 with the excellence of politics(t«v 
TToXiTwv TauTTiv TT|v dp€Tiiv); (b) the viowpoint expressed in Protagoras' myth 
and argument concerns the Athenian political community. Morrison also 
argues that "the 'political virtue' about which he has latterly been arguing is 
not 'being good at politics' but good citizenship"(ibid). But we must note that 
Socrates identifies Protagoras' subject with the art of politics and with a 
promise to make men good citizens(Tf|v ttoXitikt|v tcxvi^v fcal tSTrioxeXoeai ttoicîv 
dvSpas àyaQoxis iroXiTas 319 a). It is Socrates who identifies Protagoras'
Plato : The Man and His Work, A. E. Taylor, 1952 Reprinted p. 243 
Morrison 1941, p.8
T h e  te rm  "w is d o m "  in  th is  e x p la n a tio n  has a s tro n g  im p lic a t io n  o f  th e  m e a n in g  
" te c h n ic a l s k ill"  as P ro ta g o ra s  uses th is  te rm  in  the p hrase  " s k il l  in  th e  a rts , to g e th e r  
w ith  fire(TT|v evxexvov ao<t>{av aüv irxipi 319 d ); fo r  w an t o f  p o lit ic a l s k ill (iroXiTiKTiv -yap t€ x v t| 
oüTtiw €Îxov 322 b ); co u n c il in v o lve s  p o lit ic a l v ir tu e (d s  ovppovXTiv iroXiTiKiis dpexfis 323 a); a 
sense o f  ju s tic e  and c iv ic  virtue(neT€X civ  fiiKaiooyvns tc xaX ttis oXXt|s ttoXitiktIs dpexiis 323 
a); in ju s t ic e , ir r é l ig io n  and  e v e ry th in g  th a t is  c o n tra ry  to  c iv ic  v irtu e (ii\ dSixia Kctl f| 
daépcia Kal ouXXtiIÎStiv irdv to èvavriov Tf|s ■noXiTiK'ns dpexfis 324 a).
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subject with a promise to make men good citizen. In addition to that we 
must keep in mind that Socrates treats the moral term dpern as a kind of 
skill, as we can see from the phrase "ToûTo(T€xviipa) , SiSaicTov €lvai"(319 b). 
So we can say that it is Socrates who changed the subject of their argument 
from Protagoras' profession to "the art of politics and with a promise to 
make men good citizensMv itoXitiktiv rexvriv mi i^iriaxeioSai irouXv dvSpas àyaÔoùs 
TToXiTas). At any rate the main problem with which Protagoras is confronted 
is the possibility of an identification of excellence(dpeTif) with a kind of 
art(T€xvTfi), for Socrates thinks that only a kind of art can be taught, so how 
can citizenship be taught: an art is a special skill, possessed by only a few 
members of the society, and passed on from one member to the next, usually 
by apprenticeship; excellence(dpcTTf) is not confined to any one occupational 
group, nor by the fifth century to any one class, and thus it was uncertain 
how it was transmitted, if indeed it was not inborn.^i Accordingly, we must 
consider whether or not Protagoras' thinking is consistent through his myth 
and argument. Let us examine his use of terms to see whether or not they 
are consistently used in his myth and argument.
A(i)A In the myth of Prometheus we must note that Protagoras puts 
the meaning as the term technical wisdom(TT|v evrex^ov ao4>(av 321 d) in the 
same category of the term technical art(T€xvTi). Also we can find the same 
usage in 321 d(Tov |5iov ao4)(av and tt v^ 6è ttoXitiictiv OÙK €Îxev). At 321e(TTtv dxx-riv 
TÎÎV T€ epiTupov T€xvTiv) Protagoras uses the term technical art(TcxvTi) in lieu of 
the term technical wisdom(ao4)ia). And in the second stage of the myth 
Protagoras uses his terms as follows: by art human beings soon discovered 
articulate speech and names(c|)iovT)v Ka\ ovdpiaTa Tax& Si-npôpwoaTo t x^vti 322  
a6); their practical skills were sufficient to provide foodM Sthaioupyktî tcxvti 
aOTots irpos gev Tpo(|)Tiv Uaviî po 0^os 322 b3); for they did not possess the art of 
politics, of which the art of war is a part(iToXiTiKT|v yàp t^xvtiv ovnw elxov, fjs 
g€pos TToXegiKTj 322 b5); not having political art(ovK exovTcs ttjv ttoXitiktiv t€xvtiv 
322 b7); as the practical skills were distributed((5s at Tcxvai veveg i^Tai 322 
c5); if only a few shared in them as in the other skills(el dXiyoi adTwv 
g€Téxoicv woirep aXXwv tcxvwv 322 d5). In the myth of Prometheus Protagoras 
makes no differences between ao(j)ia and Tcx^n: however, when he uses the 
term t€xvt) alone. It definitely means a kind of practical skill. And we must 
keep in mind that Protagoras does not use the moral term dpeTif in the myth
1^ The Purpose of Plato's P r o ta g o r a s ,  M . Gargarin, Transactions of the American 
Philological Association 100 1969 133 - 164 p. 142
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of Prometheus. But the art of politics{TTiv TroXiTiic-nv rexviiv) is used three 
times in the meaning of excellence in politics(Twv ttoXitwv rauTTiv tt|v dpernv) 
in the viewpoint of Socrates. The terms diSws t€ Kal 8ikii are sent from Zeus to 
be the principles of organization of cities and the bond of friendship(322 c). 
The terms diSws t€ Kal 81kti are "human forces which render association 
possible, but as such are only ministering powers, for they serve as ordering 
principles maintaining the balance of things".22 And these terms are indeed 
"converted to awc^ poauvvt^  re Kal 6iKaioouvT^"(323 a3, c1-2 and dS).^^
A (il) In this explanation and expansion of myth Protagoras uses his 
terms as follows: in carpentry or any other skiil(iT€pl dperns tcktoviktîs {  ... r\ 
dxx-ns Tivos 8T)gioupyiKfis 322 d7 ); to consideration of how to do well in running 
city(€ls a\)gpouXT|v TToXiTiK-ns dperns 323 a); which must proceed entirely through 
justice and soundness of mind(iiv 8ei 8id 8iKaiooiJVîis irdoav levai Kai aw({)pGvvTis 
323a); to share in that sort of excellence(g€T€xeiv tt^ s dperns 323 a3); share in
justice and the rest of the excellence of a citizen(geTexeiv SiKaioadviis ndoav
levai Kal aa«j)poouvris 323 a2); in the case of the other skills(èv yàp raïs dXXais 
dperaîs 323 a7); any other skilI(dXXT|v fivTivoûv tcxvtiv 323 a9); in the case of 
justice and the rest of the excellence of a citizen(èv 8è 8iKaioouv%) Kal èv
TToXiTiKij dpeT% 323 b2); advice about this sort of excellence(rrepl Taurus ttis
dperiis ougpouXov 323 c 4-5); one such quality is injustice and impiety and in a 
word whatever is the opposite of the excellence of a citizen((5v èonv %v Kal fi 
d8iKia docjJeia Kai ouXXripSriv irdv to èvavTiov Tfjs TroXiTiKiis dperfis 323e -324d) 
excellence is something to be handed on(rrapaoK€uaoTov elvai dperriv 324 a6) 
excellence can be produced by education(rrai8€UTrîv eîvai dperifv 324 b6) 
excellence can be taught(8i6aKTov dperriv 324 c5). It is worth noticing that he 
consistently identifies the term dperrf with the term rexvii, which is used in 
the same sense to A(i). The term rexvri's meaning is confined to that of 
practical skill in this section, whereas, when the term dpeTrf is used alone, 
its meaning represents political excellence i.e it is a moral term. And he 
suggests that the opposite of the excellence of a citizen is injustice and 
impiety. In this respect it is evident that SiKaioouvri and ow(|)poouvri are the 
main parts of political excellence. Like Socrates, he identifies excellence in 
politics(TT|v iToXiTiKT)V dp^Tifv) with tho art of politics(Tf)v ttoXitiktîv rexvriv).
22 Protagoras and The Greek Community, D. Loenen, Amsterdam p. 8 
Protagoras or Plato? II, J. Maguire, Phronesis 22 1973, p. 119
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B. In reply to Socrates’ second reason Protagoras uses his terms as
follows: as far as concerns the quality in which they themselves excel(ijv sè
a0Toi dp€T-nv dyaSoi 324 d5); justice and soundness of mind and holiness- 
human excellence, in a word - if this is the quality which everyone must 
have and always display(S iK a io o u vT i K a l o w ^ ^ o o u v ^  Kcà t o  d o io v  eîvai, ■ K ai 
ouXXaiipSTjV ev aÙTÔ upooayopcuw  c lv a i  dvSpos dpgTiffv 325a1-3); brought up tO be 
good(gTi8€ 0€paTr€\i0€îoiv els dpcTiiv 325 c5); such trouble is taken about 
excellence both by the state and by private individuals(TooauTTis o\5v T-ns 
èiTigeXeias guotis irepl dpeTT^ s isicy Kal 8îigoolq 326 e1); if excellence can be 
taught?(cl 8i8aKTov èoTiv dpeTrf; 326 e4); excellence is something of which no 
one must be ignorant(TouTou to û  TrpdygaTos, Tfjs dpeT-ifs, ... , oüSeva Set ISiWTeueiv 
327 a); from another's justice and excellence^ dX X ifX w v 8iK a io o ifv ii K a l dpern 
327b); compelling them to be heedful of excellence(dpeTfis èiTigeXeîo0ai 327  
d2); the craft they learn from their father(aijTTiv TauTnv t-hv Texviiv Ijv sfj irapd 
TOÛ iraTpos gega0TfKaoiv 328 a2-3); it is just the Same with excellence and all
the rest(ouT(j) 8e dpeTfîs Kai twv dxxwv irctvTwv 328 a7); to lead forward to
excel le nce(Trpoj5i0doai €ls dpcTifv 328 b). In the course of his argument he 
demonstrates that his sense of the term dp€Tif can be identified with 
"8iKaioouvTi, o(o4)poouvTi Kal t o  ooiov €Îvai". Later Protagoras confirms to Socrates 
that justice, self-control and holiness(f| SiKaioauvii Kal aw<i)poauviii Kal ôoiottis) 
are parts of excellence which is a unified entity(329 d). And he does not use 
the term t x^vti in the area of morality. For the purpose of making his moral 
term clear he differentiates it from the technical term as he confines the 
term tcxvti to the area of practical skills.
As we have seen above in the myth of Prometheus(Ai), Protagoras 
makes no differences between oo4)ia and tcxvti; however, when he uses the 
term Tex'i^ 'n alone, it definitely means a kind of practical skill. He does not 
use oo<j>ia to explain, for he wants to show how the technical term, when it 
is used with the adjective, can be identified with the moral term without 
losing its original meaning in the viewpoint of Socrates. In this respect we 
can realise that the term oo<t)ia, which can be used of practical sk\W(Theages 
216d), is employed as a mediate meaning between the term t^xvti and the 
term dpcTii. However, in the explanation and expansion of the myth(Aii), 
Protagoras consistently identifies the term dpcTif with the term t€xvii only if 
the term t^x^ii is used with an adjective. The term tcx^ti's meaning, when it is 
used alone, is confined to that of practical skill in this section, whereas, 
when the term dpcTrf is used alone, its meaning represents political
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excellence, i.e. the moral term. So Protagoras put the two moral terms 
SiKaioauvn and ao)4)poa\jv'n in the same category as the term dpeTif. In the course 
of his argument(B) he does not use the term t€xvti in the area of morality any 
more. He might think that it has been sufficiently demonstrated how the 
moral term can be interchangeable with the technical term. So he affirms 
that his sense of the term dpeTif can be identified with "SiKaioauvTj, ofa)cj)poaGvifi 
KoX TO doiov elvai". In his argument Protagoras' viewpoint is centred on the 
moral term, so he differentiates it from the technical term as he confines 
the term T^x^n to the area of practical skills. It is clear that, even though 
Protagoras identifies the moral term with the technical term in his myth, 
his use of the moral and technical term is consistent throughout his myth 
and argument, for when the term t^xvti and the term dpern are used alone, 
their original meaning has not been changed and has been used coherently.
We have examined Protagoras' terminology and seen that, when it is 
used exclusively, it is consistent in his myth and argument. Now we must 
investigate whether or not Protagoras explains his avowal to be a teacher 
of citizenship coherently. In the myth of Protagoras the qualities of respect 
for others and a sense of justice(alôt5 tc koX Siktiv), which constitute the 
excellence of citizenship, are distributed in order to promote the existence 
of order and the union of friendship in political communities. The main 
function of this political excellence is to live in harmony with each other in 
a political community. This means that the qualities of respect for others 
and a sense of justice(al5(âs re Kal 6ikti) constitute the necessary and 
sufficient basis for the existence of the political community. It means that, 
so far as a man is an Athenian citizen, he has a share of political 
excellence(good citizenship). However, these principles were not distributed 
in the same degree, for the Athenian citizens had unequal attributes and 
abilities. It is good evidence for justifying himself the teacher of political 
excellence. In reply to Socrates' first question Protagoras proves the reason 
why the Athenians listen to everyone's opinion on political wisdom, for they 
think that everybody shares a sense of justice and civic excellence(323 b). 
So if a man declares himself unjust, he will be regarded as mad, due to this 
conviction held by the Athenians. In answer to Socrates' second question 
about why the wisest and best of the Athenian citizens are unable to hand on 
to others the excellence which they possess(ol aoc|)coTaToi Kal apioToi twv 
iToXiTwv TaoTf)v TTjv dpcTifv Tffv (xo^Giv), Protagoras gives as the reason why many 
of their sons turn out worthless the lesser natural aptitude of their sons for
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learning excellence, against Socrates' view that excellence cannot be 
teachable and excellence depends on the chance of picking it up 
automatically{320 a). Protagoras lays emphasis on moral teachings being 
instilled into one's mind(326), as well as on the unconscious teaching of 
social traditioh ' and customs. Protagoras' argument implies that one's 
political excellence can be acquired as a result of continuous practice, 
conscious or Unconscious, within one's own society, not by nature. All 
citizens of the political community possess moral excellence which is the 
basis of the community's survival and existence.
C o n clu s ion
As we have seen above, when replying to Socrates' two questions, 
Protagoras has given a coherent answer to Socrates' two questions through 
both myth and an argument and showed that good citizenship is a kind of 
political art which as a kind of theory is to be applied in practice. As both of 
them (Protagoras and Socrates) agree, if political excellence(gpod  
citizenship) can be identified with art(T€xvn), then it can be taught. Also 
Protagoras has shown that political excellence, as a kind of art, can be 
manifested according to one's natural aptitude, but needs practice and 
taking thought, for a good natural aptitude neglected is not so valuable as a 
poor aptitude given practice.24 The gist of Protagoras' reply is that he has 
shown what excellence really is and why it can be teachable, as Socrates 
grants when he says: I used to think that there was no human diligence 
available to men for making good men(dv0pwTTiviiv èTrigéx i^av fj dya0oi ol dyaOoi 
yiyvovTai), but now 1 am convinced(328 e). Protagoras has refuted Socrates' 
assertion that his contentions and assumptions cannot be justified, and 
shown that "Socrates' fundamental assumption, viz. that what the Athenians 
believe is true, actually leads to Protagoras' conclusion".25 Socrates tried to 
confuse him by means of his fallacy, but Protagoras successfully explains 
his theory of the teachabiiity of politicai excelience and his avowal to be a 
teacher of political excellence(good citizenship). As Kerferd says "if there 
is any confusion it is due to Socrates not to Protagoras".^ 6 And we must note 
that Protagoras, in opposition to the other Sophists(Hippias, Antiphon and
^4 The Palamedes  of Gorgias shows the relations between knowledge and good action 
(àpcT-q); d  gcv o5v oo4>ôs d p i, oiÎk TipapTov ' d  S' -fipapTov, o-ù ao<j)ds d p i.
25 C. C. W. Taylor 1976 p. 100 
Kerferd 1953, p. 44
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Callicles), is consistently in the position of the supporter of vd'gos which is 
interrelated with his relativism; moral standards are reguiated according to 
the current respectability of a society. Protagoras seems to suggest that, in 
so far as a poiitical community does exist, the iaws of that community 
satisfy the minimum standard of moral requirements for its survival, which 
benefits every citizen.
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V. T H R A S Y R A A C H U S
Life and Works
Thrasymachus came from Chalcedon in Blthynia, a colony of Megara. In 
Aristophanes' Banqueters which was produced in 427 B.C., he is made fun of 
as a quibbling rhetorician, and this proves that the time of his activities in 
Athens was before that of Gorgias. The Speech for the People of Larissa is 
one of Thrasymachus' great speeches which might have been written under 
the ruie of Archeiaus of Macedon, who came to power in 413 B.C. The period 
of his prime activity falls in the last three decades of the fifth century. 
Neoptolemus of Parium saw his tomb at Chalcedon two centuries later (DK 
85A8). Nothing else is known to us about his personal life.
Cicero mentions in his On the Orator (III 32) that Prodicus, 
Thrasymachus and Protagoras at once wrote and spoke about the nature of 
the physical world(DK 85A9). According to the Souda there is a list of his 
writings: Deliberate speeches(o\jg|3ouX€UTiKous), Textbook on Rhetoric(T€xvTiv 
piiTopiKifv), Trivia('iraiyvia), and Subjects for Speeches(à<|>opgàs p'nTopucds)."’ 
Dionysius of Haiicarnassus(Demosthenes III) cites a part of a speech 
Thrasymachus wrote under the title of On the Constitution (ITEPI n o A lT E iA Z ),  
which is the opening of a speech to the Athenian Assembiy (DK 85B1). The 
subject of this speech is Athenian politics in the period of the 
Peioponnesian war, which were in a confusion of distress, uncertainty and 
anxiety. The writer of this speech reflects on the past, when their ancestors 
administered the city's affairs in a correct fashion and with an honest 
political life-style. The speech is of mainly political Interest as showing a 
conservative and oiigarchic aristocrat's poiiticai philosophy. Thrasymachus 
could not have delivered it in the Athenian Assembly, for he was a foreigner.
1 Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker I I  - H. Diels/ W. Kranz, p. 321
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The speech should be regarded as a species of pamphlet, for circulation and 
for recitation before chosen a u d i e n c e s . ^
Thrasymachus was a forensic orator and a teacher of rhetorical style. 
Aristotle regards him as the rhetorical successor to Tisias in his O n 
Sophistical Refutation (XXXIV 183b 29). Theophrastus considered him the 
inventor of the middle style, an amalgam of the severe and the simple, and 
the originator of a diction which is wholly appropriate and indeed essentiai 
to forensic speeches and to every genuine contest(DK 85A3). Piato says in 
his P h aed ru s  267c-d, "he(Thrasymachus) mastered tearful and moving 
speeches on old age and poverty ... and he was a great one for enraging many 
and charming the enraged again by his spells". Dionysius of 
Haiicarnassus(lsaeus 20) mentions that Thrasymachus was clear-cut and 
precise, formidable in invention and in giving his meaning distinct and 
striking expression; but his works are all technical or showpieces(DK  
85A13). He demonstrated the use of period and clause, and introduced the 
current style of rhetoric. And he tried out new departures in the use of 
rhythm, especiaiiy the Paean.
He was a Sophist in the recognised sense, in that he charged for his 
instruction (R e p u b lic  337d), travelled to foreign cities, and though 
speciaiizing in rhetoric was prepared to answer ethicai questions also.^ 
Hermias, the Christian commentator on Plato, quotes him in one of his 
writings: "he (Thrasymachus) wrote something to this effect: that the gods 
take no notice of human affairs, or they would not have left out justice, 
which is the greatest of goods among men; For we see that men make no use 
of it (eypa4>€v €v Xoyii) èauToO to io O to v  t i ,  o t i  oi 0€Oi oOx 6pwoi rà àv0pwmva- o0 yàp 
àv TO gcyioTOV Twv èv àv0pwirois àya0(3v Trapâôov t t |v  SiKaiooovriv ôpwgev yàp to ù s
àv0püJTToos TaoTxi g-n xpwg€vous DK 85B8)." This represents an ideaiistic way of 
thinking about justice. His teachings on justice are mentioned in another of 
Piato's dialogues, the C leitophon  (410 d-e), in which Cleitophon takes a 
position on the side of Thrasymachus and attacks Socrates on the ground 
that Socrates reaiiy wants to avoid addressing him in regard to justice and 
attaining it. Consequently Cleitophon will betake himself to Thrasymachus 
and anyone else who can give this instruction. In the Phaedrus  (267 d) Plato
2 Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, H. D Rankin, Barns and Noble Books 1983. p. 61
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describes Thrasymachus as a man who is unbeatable at casting aspersions
and dispeliing them (SiapdXXeiv T€ kœl àTroXvoaoSai 8ia(3oXàs ô0ev8T) K pctT ioTos).
Thrasym achus’ Thought as Revealed in the Republic  i
The main argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the 
R epublic  I is about identifying what "the just" is. The main theme of this 
dialogue is to identify what his conception of justice and the reciprocal 
coherence of his suggestions on justice are. Whether or not Thrasymachus 
has a mutuaiiy consistent view on justice in his sayings, which has come to
be a central matter of debate in recent years, is pinpointed as the main
problem of interpreting and understanding his ideas. Is he fundamentally 
confused, and driven from one position of difficulty to another by Socrates'
criticism? Is he a hasty and confused thinker as J. Annas says?4 Or is
Thrasymachus a mere child in argument as B. Jowett contends?^ Is 
Thrasymachus, on the other hand, merely drawing out what appear to him to 
be the logical consequences of Greek values as A. W. H. Adkins argues?® Or, 
as Harrison argues, is Thrasymachus manipuiated by Plato consistently to 
meet his own artistic requirements?^ On the other hand it has been 
suggested that Thrasymachus "has advanced two different criteria of 
justice ... without appreciating that they do not necessarily coincide".® Yet 
P. Nicholson judges that "he is also shown to have considerable self-control 
and integrity, for he extricates himself rather well from a situation where 
everything is weighted against him."9 Plato's hatred for him is "plain enough 
from the outbursts of rudeness and bad temper in which he makes him 
indulge".10 Is it Plato's intention to reveal that the rhetorician cannot reason 
logically? He is depicted as rude and arrogant, boasting that he can give a 
better answer about justice, accusing Socrates of hypocrisy and pretence, 
and revealing his shailowness by asking for money. Our task is to 
concentrate on explaining what Thrasymachus really intends to say on
4 An Introduction to Plato' Republic, J. Annas, Oxford 1981 p. 38
5 The Dialogue of Plato, Translated into English with Analysis and Introductions I I-  B. 
Jowett, Oxford 1871, p.6
® Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece - A. W. H. Adkins, p. 119 
7 Plato's manipulation of Thrasymachus - E. L. Harrison, Phoenix 21 1967 pp. 27 - 39 
® Plato's Republic: A  Philosophical Commentary, R. C. Cross and W .D Woozley, Macmillan 
1964 p. 41
9 Unravelling Thrasymachus' Arguments in the Republic - P. P. Nicholson, Phronesis 
19 1974 pp. 210 - 232
A History of Greek Philosophy HI, Guthrie, Cambridge University Press 1969 p. 297
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justice and the consistency of his accounts of justice in this dialogue. So it 
is necessary for us to note the three propositions of Thrasymachus on 
justice in this dialogue as they are generally suggested to be:
A. Justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger {... etvai to
SiKaiov OVIK ctXXo ti fj to toO KpeiTTovos aijgc{)cpov) (338 c).
B. Justice is obedience to the law (to yàp to KcXeodgeva -iroictv ... vino Twv 
dpxovTWv SiKttiov elvai TaviTa noieiv) (340 b).
C. Justice is the good of another (fi gèv SiKaioouvTi k o i t o  S iK a io v  dXXoYpiov  
àyaSôv tw  o V t i )  (343 c).
According to Kerferd the position of Thrasymachus has been classified in 
four ways:ii
I. Moral obligation has no real existence, but is an illusion in men's 
minds (Ethical Nihilism) - Burnet, Taylor, Cornford, Barker, 
Nettleship, and Joseph.
II. Moral obligation has no existence apart from legal enactment 
(Legalism) - G rote, Gomperz, Lindsay, Bosanquet and Winspear.
III. Moral obligation has real independent existence, and arises from 
the nature of man (Natural Right)i2 - Stallbaum.
IV. Men always do in fact pursue what they think to be their own 
interests and must from their nature do so (Psychological Egoism) - 
Joseph.
D. C. Reeve analyses the position thus: "the majority (Barker, Crombie, Cross 
& Woozley, Guthrie, Irwin and Nettleship) favour A; a good number of recent 
writers (Annas, Henderson, Kerferd, Nicholson and Sparshott) support 0;
The doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republ ic,  G. B. Kerferd, Durham University 
Journal 40, 1947 pp. 1 9 - 2 7
12 J. Annas says (in her book p. 37) that this is immoralism. The immoralist holds that 
an important question about justice is to be answered by showing that injustice is 
better.
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while B is the minority candidate, supported in print by only a few hardy 
souls (Hourani and Anscombe)."i®
Let us analyse the conversation between Socrates and Thrasymachus in 
more detailed ways. Above all we must consider each problematical matter 
in all its aspects, and later we will discuss whether Thrasymachus' position 
can be justified by his own argument or not. We will also discuss how we 
can find a way to justify Thrasymachus' position.
I. In answer to Socrates’ question "what is justice?" Thrasymachus 
claims that "justice Is nothing other than the interest (advantage) 
of the Stronger"(... cîvai t o  S iK a io v  o O k  oXXo n  f| t o  t o o  K p e iT T o v o s  
oog4>€'pov338 c) And he explains, "each form of government enacts the laws
with a view to its own interest, a democracy democratic laws, a tyranny
autocratic ones, and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim
that the just for their subjects is that which is for their - rulers' - interest
and the man who deviates from this they chastise as a lawbreaker and a 
wrongdoer"(338 d - e). Socrates attacks him on the ground that the rulers in 
the various states are fallible or capable sometimes of error. In this case it 
is just not only to do what is the interest of the stronger but also the 
opposite, what is not to his interest (339 c - d).
We can raise two questions: one is whether the proposition is a 
definition of justice; the other is what the meaning of this proposition is. 
N. R. Murphy interprets this situation as follows:
"Naturally enough, ... , Plato makes him begin with an exhibition of 
fireworks; but his epigrammatic appraisement of justice as 'the 
interest of the stronger' is rather a consequence of its being what it is 
than a definition of it".i 4
Also G. Hourani agrees that Thrasymachus "is only concerned to make an 
impression of daring cynicism, and states his thesis as a definition because 
it is more arresting in that form".i® In addition to that, he maintains that
13 Socrates Meets Thrasymachus - D. C. Reeve, Archiv fiir Geschite der Philosophie 47 
1985, p. 47
14 The * Interpretation of Plato's Republic N. R. Murphy, Oxford 1951. p. 2
15 Thrasymachus' Definition of Justice in Plato's Republ ic,  G. F. Hourani, Phrpnesis 7 
1962 p.112
Thrasymachus 106
"Justice is the interest of the stronger" is not meant as a definition but as 
an important generalization of an empirical fact, and a synthetic 
proposition, for a definition he says "no other facts could be relevant but the 
usages of language," whereas the proposition "Justice is obedience to law" 
is a true definition "for without it there would be no connection between 
justice and the rulers" Also he criticises Thrasymachus for being "either 
ignorant or careless about the difference between definition and
description".17
On the other side to Hourani's view, Kerferd, who thinks that 
Thrasymachus' proposition is an incomplete proposition, retorts that Plato's 
questions are not about the meaning of the a word or about linguistic usage 
but about something which he regards as a thing, so concludes that 
"synthetic statements conveying factual information is exactly what Plato 
is looking for in such cases".1® D. J. Allan also shares Kerferd's view saying 
that "Thrasymachus, unlike Polemarchus, knows what is meant by a 
definition, and strives to include the whole of justice in a general 
fo rm ula ."19 However, D. C. Reeve argues another view on the problem of 
definition :
there is strong textual support for thinking that A rather than C 
(originally B in Hourani's writing) is Thrasymachus' definition of 
justice. First, he states A when Socrates asks him to say what justice 
is and then repeats it no fewer than five times (339 a1-2, 339 a 3-4, 
341 a 3-4, 343 c 4, 344 c 7); C, on the other hand, he mentions only 
once (343 c 2). ... Second, at 343 a 1-2 Socrates himself states that
"it was clear to all that the account of justice (6 toO SiKaiovj xdyos) had 
turned into its opposite (els ToOvavriov TrepieiaTtjKei)". 20
However, Reeve's suggestion raises some problems in the 
interpretation of this case if we ask whether A can subsume C and if his 
argument from A to C can be logically consistent. Moreover, Reeve 
disregards Thrasymachus' position in that Thrasymachus is a rhetorician
16 Ibid, p. 112
17 Ibid, p. I l l  - 112
18 Thrasymachus and Justice : a Reply, G. B, Kerferd, Phronesis 9 1964, p. *13
19 Plato : Republic Book I - D. J. Allan, London Metheun 1940 p. 26
20 Reeve 1985, p. 248
Thrasymachus 107
rather than a philosopher, who is not accustomed to the Socratic dialectical 
questions and answers. So Thrasymachus cannot express his thought 
sufficiently in the Socratic elenchus. Also another important fact is that 
the phrase "the account of justice (d to ij  SiKctiou xdyos) had turned into its 
opposite (eis TodvavTiov irepieioTdJcei)" is comes Socrates, who is the main 
opponent of Thrasymachus in this dialogue, not from Thrasymachus himself. 
This is important textual evidence to bear in mind in trying to understand 
Thrasymachus' position.
As we have seen from the above enumerated views, it is not easy to 
come up with a convincing idea on what Thrasymachus' proposition really 
means. First of all we must examine the disputative problem over the 
definition of justice at issue. Let us take an example. In Plato's M eno  (76 d) 
Socrates gives to Meno an exemplary definition of colour: colour is an 
effluence from shapes commensurate with sight and perceptible by it ( c o t i v  
y à p  xpoa dTTOppofj axqgaTW V di|)ei ouggeTpos K ai ala0T|Td's). As we Can see in this 
example, if A(definiens) is a definition of B(definiendum), then A and B can 
be conversible. In this respect the proposition A "Justice is nothing other 
than the interest of the stronger" is an incomplete proposition, as Kerferd 
says, for the conversion of this proposition is not always true. The interest 
of the stronger can be something other than justice. However, Kerferd is 
wrong if he maintains that Plato's definition is only concerned with 
something which he regards as a thing, for if we think about the case of the 
M eno, the example there is construed from the empirical factual world. On 
the other hand Hourani's maintenance concerning a definition that "no other 
facts can be relevant but the usages of language for a definition"2i cannot be 
convincing, for in the case of the theory of Forms Plato's definition is about 
Forms which are perfect and unchanging definitions. Hourani disregards the 
ontological claim in the definition of Plato's Forms. R. E. Allen, talking of 
Plato's definition of a Form, says the following:
it (real definition) is definition not of words which are true of things,
but of the nature of those things of which words are true. Real
definition is analysis of essence, rather than stipulation as to how
words shall be used or a report as to how they are in fact u s e d .22
21 Hourani 1962 p. 119
22 Plato' s Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms - R. E. Allen, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul 1970. p. 79
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So we can realise that Plato's definition can comprise both of these. In the 
case of Thrasymachus' proposition A it cannot be suggested as a definition 
of justice, for it lacks the condition of conversibility between definiens and 
definiendum. Another important point is that "the word which Thrasymachus 
uses is 'd'rrdKpiais'"23 instead of Xoyd's. It is a good indication that he (and with 
him Plato) does not think A is a definition of the just. Accordingly we might 
say that it is a kind of description based on the empirical world, rather than 
a definition. He just wants to show how this world operates under the name 
of justice.
Let us think about another problem which we have to face, which 
raises the question of the real purport of Thrasymachus' proposition A. Does 
this mean that "an action is just if and only if it serves the interest of the 
stronger, and that it is the fact of an act's serving the interest of the 
stronger that gives it the characteristic of being just?"24 Or does It express 
"the attitude of mind that seeks to deprive justice of any reference to a 
valid standard, i.e. the good"?2s Someone might suggest that Thrasymachus 
thinks that norms in the name of justice are arbitrary inventions to exploit 
the subjects for the rulers' interest. Or as Callicles says in Plato's Gorgias, 
it is just for the strong to rule and the subjects must follow his orders by 
nature just like animals. J. Annas' interpretation is that his real position is 
the immoralist one, which holds that injustice is better.26 However, we 
should consider this question from another viewpoint: that proposition A is 
based on the result of a power struggle, as the term "oug<j)epov," from the verb 
"aug4)€>w" (bring together, contribute, bear together, confer a benefit, be 
useful etc), indicates. So the proposition indicates that the term "justice" 
is a kind of resultant and contributing benefit which belongs to the stronger 
after his power struggle to justify his action and interest. To him justice is 
nothing but the Interest of the stronger if and only if he holds the reins of 
power at a particular moment. When Thrasymachus makes his meaning 
plainer, he gives examples of the laws which represent the results of each 
government(the stronger)'s interest when the ruler has power at that 
moment. Also in this case Thrasymachus does not maintain that the stronger
23 R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, p,25. 337 d 1- 2: T( o5v av, c t^i, èyw 5cC^ w éTcpav dicpoKpioiv 
irapd Ttdoas Tavras ircpi SiKaiadviis, peXriw t o v t w v ;
24 Ibid, p. 38
25 Plato I I ,  P. Friediânàer, trans. H. Meyerhoff, Pantcos Books 1964p. 61
26 Annas 1981 pp. 36 - 37
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is the just man, and that his subjects regard the stronger as the just man. 
The stronger, so far as he has power can guarantee his interest in the name 
of justice which is cloaked by a fine phrase irrespective of his subjects' 
public opinion and sacrifice. So we might agree that "Thrasymachus' 
argument is based on à daring insightful theory of the Polis as being a kind 
of exploitation machine in which both social behaviour and the standards by 
which it is evaluated are rigged by those who have the power to rule so as to 
benefit themselves".27 To Thrasymachus the term "justice" is nothing other 
than the nominal means to justify the result of the rulers' actions. 
Accordingly it is not real justice in Thrasymachus* position. This represents 
the real political situation, i.e. the interest of the stronger is in the power 
of controlling the name of justice in their own way, for the ruler can 
establish laws or the standard of justice. However, Socrates misleads him 
by making him assent that the rulers are capable of error, it is an unwitting 
mistake on Thrasymachus' part, for he is ignorant of Socrates' intention and 
not accustomed to the Socratic elenchus. Socrates' viewpoint is not that of 
the result of the power game and of the stronger, but that of the process of 
that game and of the subjects. This problem we will discuss later.
II. Cleitophon interferes in this conversation and tries to support 
Thrasymachus by saying that by the interest of the stronger Thrasymachus 
meant what the superior supposed to be in his interest. And Cleitophon 
assists Thrasymachus by saying that Thrasymachus laid down that it is 
just to obey the orders of the rulers ( t o  yàp r à  KeXetio'gcva î r o ie îv  .. .  
tîiTÔ Twv dpxovTiav SiKaiov c îva i ra \jra  iroicCv 340 b) - This is 
conventionalism (or legalism). Hourani argues that this proposition "it is 
just to obey the orders of the rulers" is Thrasymachus' real position and a 
true defin ition.28 However, we must note that this proposition is put 
forward by Cleitophon, not by Thrasymachus himself(To yàp Tà KeXcudgcva 
TToi€Îv, ê TToXcgapxe, i5ttô Twv dpxdvrwv SiKaiov elvai €0€to ©paoifgaxos 340 a). So 
textually Hourani's view does not carry conviction. And Thrasymachus 
strongly rejects Cleitophon's suggestion, for he thinks that it is irrational 
to take his view in a case where the subject must obey the mistaken laws 
that the rulers enact irrespective of the rulers' interest. Thus that "to obey 
the law" and "to do what is just" can be coextensive is entirely mistaken if 
we think once more of the case of the ruler enacting mistaken laws. And this
27 Reeve 1985, p. 254
28 Hourani 1962 pp. 110 - 115
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Interpretation does not differentiate between "is (fact)" and "ought (value)" 
which is how proposition B indicates the obligation of the subjects to the 
stronger. Facts represent the objective view, but value depends on one’s 
subjective opinion. Thrasymachus clearly maintains that "the subject must 
obey what the ruler prescribes as law when the ruler is not making a 
mistake as to his interest, and not otherwise".29 When Thrasymachus 
maintains his proposition A, his viewpoint is that of the stronger after 
securing his position in the power game. However, in the case of proposition 
B the viewpoint is entirely concentrated on how the subjects would view 
matters, and on the process of getting power in the course of a power 
struggle. The laws are the representations of the stronger's purposes to 
proclaim their actions justified in effect. So it is unconvincing to maintain 
that proposition B is Thrasymachus' real position, for the stronger's justice 
is not real justice to him.
Let us think about the case that would arise if Thrasymachus accepted 
Cleitophon’s suggestion "justice is the interest of the stronger as it appears 
to the stronger whether it really is or not"(TouTo d epodXovj Xcyeiv to SiKaiov, 
TO TOO KpeiTTovos oogcjjepov SoKoOv elvai tw KpeiTTovi, kdvre atig<|>epxi èctvT€ ; 340
c). As we mentioned above, Thrasymachus would not have this problem if he 
were more careful regarding Socrates' intention, for the stronger In essence 
cannot, in Thrasymachus' view, use the name "justice" in such a case when 
he is mistaken. If Thrasymachus had taken up Cleitophon's suggestion, he 
would have been committing himself to a position of conventionalism. If he 
held this position, justice to him would be nothing but obeying the laws. In 
this situation justice can be changed according to social structure. Also he 
would have to agree that justice is only the supposed not the real interest 
of the stronger, so it will follow that justice is not the real interest of the 
stronger. Accordingly justice is not the actual interest of the stronger. 
Kerferd maintains that "the rejection of Cleitophon's proffered assistance 
shows that Thrasymachus does not in fact hold that Justice is obedience to 
the laws".®9
ill. Thrasymachus replies, "the most precise proposition is that, the 
ruler in so far as the ruler does not err, and in not erring enacts what is 
best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, ... I say the just is
29 Kerferd 1964 p. 14
30 Ibid. p. 14
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to do what is for the advantage of the stronger" (to sè dicpi^èoTaTov èKcîvo
TUYX^vei dv, Tov dpxovTa, Ka0’ doov dpxwv èoTiv, gf) dgapTdveiv, gT) dgapTdvovTa Se to  
ai)T($ peXTioTov Ti0€o0ai, too to Ô€ t(3 apxog€V(i) ttoititcov. woTC d'nep dpxfis eXeyov 
SiKaiov xèyà), to  too KpciTTovos TT016ÎV aog4>épov 340 e). This situation reveals 
that Thrasymachus is trying with the utmost effort to escape from the 
Socratic elenchus. He must break out of the dilemma in which Socrates has 
deliberately placed him. So he has no choice but to cope with that problem 
from the viewpoint of Socrates. To this end Thrasymachus takes up another 
suggestion: his former proposition, but with the added clarification that 
this is true of the ruler in so far as the ruler does not err. We can interpret 
his suggestion as follows. If the stronger make mistakes in enacting the 
laws, then justice which is "to oug4>€pov" of the stronger, is no longer the 
property of the stronger. So he cannot be the stronger any more at that time, 
for he cannot have sufficient means to guarantee his own interest. Let us 
take an example. If an absolute monarchy enacts democratic laws by mistake 
in lieu of autocratic laws, then the result of his legislation will not 
guarantee his own interest. As a result of his mistake he cannot have any 
means to guarantee his power and interest, so he cannot any longer be the 
stronger. And he will be ousted from his post. The gist of Thrasymachus' 
contention is that we do not call someone who is mistaken about the sick a 
physician in respect of his mistake after his operation or prescription. 
Thrasymachus' meaning is that one cannot call a man a physician in the state 
of his error or mistake, because error is not art, but only in his 
demonstration of his medical art "at the moment of and in regard to a 
particular medical act."®i So the ruler does not make any mistakes when he 
is entitled to bear the name of a ruler in the most precise sense of the word.
D. J Allan says, "he (Thrasymachus) has had to take refuge in a remote 
Utopia, inhabited by Impeccable artists".®^ However, P. P. Nicholson 
maintains that
" ... the perfect ruler is a crucial and logical deliberate step in the 
unfolding of his ideas. By taking it, Thrasymachus has raised the whole 
argument to a higher level".®®
31 Reeve 1985, p. 250
32 Allan, p. 27
33 Nicholson 1974 p. 225
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What Thrasymachus maintains is that rulers in so far as they are 
rulers, do not err in the most precise meaning of the term. This contention 
is logically consistent with the fact that rulers who sometimes make 
mistakes are still in the normal way of speaking called rulers after they 
have lost their power and failed in gaining their own interest. And, if we 
think about this contention in another way, we can understand his position 
easily. When we call a certain metal thing a knife, our usage of the term 
knife is meaningful if and only if it has the ability to cut something well 
from the view-point of the result. If not it cannot be called a knife, for it 
has lost its own function, rather it might be called a useless metal thing, If 
we stick to a strictly precise definition. Likewise if we call a man wise, we 
call him wise if and only if he shows wisdom in action, and displays no 
ignorance. However, even though he is the wisest man in the world, if he 
suddenly loses his mind, then he is not strictly speaking wise anymore. 
People may say that the wise man acts deficiently.
However, Socrates argues that an art is not to seek the interest of 
anything else than that of its object - every art has an object, "but there is 
no guarantee that every art seeks the good of its object, if it does, this may 
be because it coincides with the good of the artist".®*  ^ it is not easy to 
generalise concerning his claim that an art works in the interest of its 
subject matter. This idea can be refuted if we think of the case of the art of 
fencing, martial arts or hunting. The agents of these arts perform them for 
their own benefit rather than for the benefit of their subject matter. 
According to Socrates' idea a ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, does not 
consider and enjoin his own interest but that of the one whom he rules and 
for whom he exercises his craft, and keeps his eyes fixed on that and on 
what is profitable and suitable to that in all that he says and does. And his 
argument does not distinguish between an art's aiming at its own interest 
and its aiming at the interest of its practitioner (342 e). Socrates' main 
mistake is derived from making his own generalisation concerning the arts.
IV . Thrasymachus counterattacks in a long speech (343 b -344 c) by 
arguing that, just as the shepherds and the cowherds consider the good of 
the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with nothing else in view
34 Allan, p. 28
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than the good of their master and themselves - so the rulers think of nothing 
else night and day than the sources of their own profit. So justice and the
just are in fact the other fellow 's good (4  g e v  S i ic a io 0 V v t i  K a l  t o
SiKaiov dXXoVpiov dyaôôv T($ o v t i  343 c) - the interest of the stronger and 
the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and 
serves - while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in 
every sense of the word and just , to O  K p e ir T o v d 's  T e  K a l  d p x o v T o s  o o g c jje p o v ,
o lK e ia  8e t o \> ireiGogevoo Te K ai i!nTT|peTO\JVTOS pxdpii, fj 6e d S iK ia  6c T ov ivavT io v , Kal
dpx i^ T w v  i5s d X T i0w s € 0 t ]0 ik (3 v  t c  K a l  S iK a iw v ,  ... 343 c). So against Socrates' view 
Thrasymachus maintains that acting justly is not in the agent's interests 
but in another's good. He is speaking of all human and social relations.
This passage displays Thrasymachus' rhetorical power which enables 
him to express his idea sufficiently without interruption from Socrates. As 
a rhetorician he is an expert in giving a set speech; however, he is not 
accustomed to the Socratic question and answer, as we have seen before 
this. Thrasymachus' long speech is a reaction against Socrates' own way of 
discussion in which he cannot express his view clearly and forcefully. First 
of all, we must inquire into this proposition to see if it can be a definition 
or not. This proposition conveys more explicit and precise facts than the 
descriptive statement, and comprises not only verbal meaning but also the 
existential claim for which Socrates is always asking, as the phrase 
"dXXoTpiov dyaOov" indicates. And this proposition holds the essence of the 
just for the factual world with which we can evaluate people's morality
according to the situation. Also the definiendum "the other fellow's good in
fact" can be conversible with the definiens "justice and the just" without 
either losing their intrinsic implications. So we can easily conclude that 
this proposition can be a definition of justice. The proposition "justice and 
the just are in fact the other fellows' good" is good evidence for 
understanding the coherence of Thrasymachus' position and ideas on justice. 
The evidence that this is really his position is confirmed by his emphatic 
expression "t($ o V t i"  which means "actually or really". He realises that his 
first proposition has been distorted by Socrates, so he has tried to defend 
his standpoint by way of introducing his viewpoint of "the power struggle 
process" and contrasting the just man and the unjust man in their dealings. 
He wants to clarify what his real meaning in the first proposition is and 
why he has that kind of view. From this section onwards the relation 
between the stronger as a ruler and the subject is changed into that of all
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people and all human relations. In the real world if there are business 
dealings between the just and the unjust in any joint undertaking of the two, 
the unjust man always has the advantage over the just at the dissolution of 
their partnership. So the just man is always in the state of disadvantage. 
And when each holds his office, apart from any other loss the just man must 
count on his own affairs failing into disorder through his own neglect^ while 
because of his justice he makes no gains from the government, and thereby 
he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to 
serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man who has the ability to overreach 
on a large scale, all the opposite advantages accrue. Injustice makes the 
man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who 
would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. Justice for the 
just man is the interest of the other who is unjust; for the unjust man 
justice is the interest of the just who is weaker. On this G. B. Kerferd 
declares, "for Thrasymachus injustice is moral obligation, in all senses 
which for Socrates justice is a moral obligation."®® Also J. Annas says:
"Thrasymachus admires the unjust man as being strong, self-reliant, 
and intelligent ... But the man he chiefly admires is the tyrant or 
dictator, the man who pushes his own interests at others' expense in 
such a ruthless and successful fashion that he gets into a position 
where nobody can challenge him".®®
Their Interpretations of Thrasymachus' view are misleading as to 
Thrasymachus' real intention, for he is describing the real facts of this 
world which we face every day. Such an interpretation does not necessarily 
follow on from his evaluation of the factual world, for value seems neutral 
to him who, as a kind of social scientist, is disclosing the real and actual 
operation of the world. We really cannot find any certain information as to 
whether he admires the strong tyrant. Thrasymachus knows exactly which 
people and which acts are just, for he asserts that the just man does not 
commit tax evasion, sacrilege, etc. F. E. Sparshott explains that "To act In 
another's interest is to make him stronger than oneself, so that it is natural 
for Thrasymachus to equate 'another's good' with 'the interest of the 
stronger"'.®7
35 G. B. Kerferd 1949 p, 26
36 Annas 1981 pp. 4 4 - 4 5
37 Socrates and Thrasymachus, F. E. Sparshott, Monist 50 1966 p. 430
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V. Stressing that justice is more profitable, than injustice Socrates, 
still not shifting his firm ground, argues that every art is to be 
differentiated from the art of money-making. The art of the shepherd, 
Socrates claims (345 d), is concerned with nothing else than how to provide
what is best for that over which it is set, since its own affairs, its own
best estate, are surely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails 
of being the shepherd’s art. Socrates asserts that a man who is to exercise 
the art properly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he 
gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. So 
every form of rule, in so far as it is rule, considers what is best for nothing 
else than that which is governed and cared for by it, in political and private 
rule alike. Thrasymachus might have refuted Socrates' suggestion on the 
grounds that Socrates cannot differentiate between the process of an aim 
and the result of it. To the shepherd the process of the aim of his art is to
tend his animals very well, however, the final aim of his art is to make a
profit for himself. Consequently the shepherd's ultimate aim is to profit 
from raising sheep, even if he takes care of them very well in the process of 
tending them. This is his real motivation for exercising his art. If there 
were no profit in exercising his art, nobody could have any motivation to 
learn and to exercise his own art in the real world. If Socrates’ position is 
right, the shepherd must riot make any profit by selling his sheep, for the art 
of being a shepherd is different from that of money-making. If he profits 
from selling sheep, then he is exercising the art of money-making. The art of 
money-making is quite different from that of the shepherd. Therefore at the 
time he is making a profit from his sheep, he is exercising the art of money­
making instead of his real art i.e. the art of the shepherd, so he cannot be at 
that moment a real shepherd in the strict sense according to Socrates' view. 
This reasoning is absurd in the practical and factual world. And another 
point is that Socrates deliberately misdirects their argument(Socrates vs. 
Thrasymachus) to fit to his own position: that the relationship between the 
stronger and the weaker can be identified with that between the artisans 
and the enumerated arts, e.g. the art of a physician or a pilot. Thrasymachus' 
view of the relationship between the stronger and the weaker is primarily 
based on the antagonistic relation, the opposing relationship between the 
exploiting class and the exploited class. However, in the case of the art of a 
physician the relationship between the doctor and the patient is not that of 
opposition. If Socrates insists on regarding Thrasymachus' idea as being like
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the case of a physician, Thrasymachus can be led into a dangerous trap, for 
a doctor can then be identified with the stronger who is in the exploiting 
class, rather than the helper of the sick(345 c-e).
V I. Socrates examines Thrasymachus' assertion that the life of the 
unjust man is more powerful (kpcittw) than that of the just man. He also 
elicits from Thrasymachus that justice is good nature or goodness of 
heart(Trav\i y^vvaiav €i)q0€iav), and injustice is prudence or good judgement 
(€0povXiav).3® In addition to this Thrasymachus is led to agree that the unjust 
seems to be intelligent and good (^H tcai (|)povigoi ... So k o û o iv  e lv a i ical d y a 0 o \ o i 
aSiKoi;). Also he Is forced to put injustice in the class of excellence and 
wisdom (èv dp€TTis Kal ao({)(as gèpei 348 C -e ). And it is claimed that the Greeks 
"did not make a clear distinction, as we do, between morality and prudence", 
and "|ijg<j)€pov and d y a 0 d s  are words often connected with prudence, efficiency, 
success, and the production of desired results".®® Against Thrasymachus' 
opinion, Socrates wants to prove that justice is a more powerful thing than 
injustice if justice is wisdom and excellence. Socrates' main point is that 
the just man would not claim or wish to outdo the just man but the unjust 
man would claim to overreach or outdo equally the just man and the unjust 
man. And by using the analogy of a musician and a physician Socrates 
identifies the just with the wise. And from this he derives that the wise is 
the good and the ignoramus is the bad. So he concludes that the just man is 
good and wise, and the unjust man is ignorant and bad. In this reasoning we
must note that Socrates makes use of a fallacy in the case of the analogy of
a musician and a physician. The Socratic fallacy is hidden in that no 
differences are made between the moral terms and the technical terms. He 
maintains that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would not want to
overreach or outdo another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the
strings. Socrates cannot be thinking of the competitive arts. Let us consider 
the case of a musical contest. In this case every musician will try to 
overreach and outdo other musicians for his own honour. And Socrates does 
not consider the quality of musicians' playing on a musical instrument.
38 Thucydides uses in his Peloponnesian War  iii 40 and 42-8 eilpouXla as expedient 
judgement. A. W. H. Adkins explains the values of Athenian democracy, "what is needed 
to determine what is in fact sumfevron for the state is naturally a skill, whether 
denoted by eujbouliva or by some other word, a skill which has no, of course, no 
relation to the standards of the quieter virtues. ... this is a system of values based on 
calculation, and can be no other" - Merit and Responsibility, p. 222 - 223.
39 Nicholson 1974, p. 217
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Thrasymachus' point is that the unjust man who gains his interest by 
injustice "knows how to use the just man for his own ends".4o J. P. Maguire 
holds that "the notion of justice = laoTiis and in justice = irXcovc^ia is 
prominent in Plato's thinking".4i The real unjust man, who is also an 
intelligent man, will exploit the simple just man by manipulating the just's 
good will to his interest by means of power, intelligence and prudence. 
Socrates attacks Thrasymachus' opinion on the ground that the just man 
does not outdo or overreach the just man but only the unjust, however, the 
unjust man seeks to overreach and get the better of everything from both 
the just and the unjust. So all his endeavour will be to get the most in 
everything for himself. Let us think about Socrates' view more carefully. If 
the unjust man tries to outdo or overreach both the just man and the unjust 
man, does he play the part of the just man in one respect as the just man 
does against the unjust? Or does the just man play the part of the unjust 
man In the other respect when the just man claims to get the better of or 
overreach the unjust man? If the just man tries to overreach or get the 
better of the other person, can we call such a person "just" in the strict and 
precise Socratic sense. The whole argument depends on a vague use of
nXfoveKTciv in the Greek : "It is (a) to surpass, to do an action which contains
more goodness, (b) to 'do better than' a rival in the sense of vulgar
competition; to take unfair interest of him, to gain profit at his expense".^® 
As Thrasymachus suggests, the just man always comes out at a
disadvantage in his relations with the unjust In the real world, for the
unjust man is out to get the most in everything for himself. The private 
unjust man and the unjust ruler have common attributes: "both are irXeoveKTai 
and aSiKoi ; but, whereas the private unjust man needs to act XaSpq Kai (3iq, the 
ruler runs no risk at all of being punished".^® They differ only In degree; in a 
political context, 6 KpeiTTwv is the ruler; in a private context, 6 KpeiTTwv is the 
successful unjust man, who exploits his fellow-citizens. The ruler is able to 
change what is unjust into justice by overthrowing the criteria of value
because he is strong. The world of Thrasymachus is that of the survival of
the fittest: the survival of oneself is to the detriment of others.
40 Ibid, p. 228
41 Thrasymachus ... or Plato - J. P. Maguire, Phronesis 16, 1971 pp. 152-153
42 Allan 1981, p. 32
43 Thrasymachus and Pleonexia - C. J. Boter - Mnemosyne 39 1986, p. 272
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From 350 d in this dialogue to the end the procedure of conversation is 
entirely a soliloquy by Socrates without any negative interruptions from 
Thrasymachus' denials. As Guthrie puts it, it is evident that "Socrates is 
pursuing his own train of thought irrespective of whether Thrasymachus is 
following him, and Thrasymachus is not committed to any of it".44 Even 
though Socrates has reached the view that justice is more profitable than 
injustice, Socrates repudiates it, for he says that he does not know what the 
just is (354 a - c).
As we have noted above, Thrasymachus' real position is "justice and 
the just are in fact the other fellow's good". The main reason why this 
should be regarded as his real position is that while from this proposition 
his first proposition "justice is nothing other than the interest of the 
stronger" can be derived, but the converse of this procedure is not possible. 
He knows what the real meaning of justice is. It is the other fellow's good. 
In this passage we can notice that both Socrates and Thrasymachus are of 
the same mind as to which acts and persons are just, for they do not show 
any disagreement upon the illegal or unjust acts (tax evasion, kidnapping and 
sacrilege) which are enumerated as unjust. To them justice is "a social 
phenomenon, demanding for its instantiation a context in which people act 
upon, interact with, and in various ways deal mutually with each other, and 
the same goes for injustice".^® The just man, because he is just, is always 
at a disadvantage in comparison to the unjust man who is only interested in 
his own interest even if to him justice is the just man's good, for 
Thrasymachus says that the ruler who pursues his own interest is unjust 
(344 a-c). Accordingly justice for the unjust man is not the advantage of the 
stronger (the unjust) but of the just man. And the just man who is 
interested in another's good is always exploited by the unjust man, for he is 
too just to take care of his own interest. On the other hand the unjust man 
who is prudent and powerful knows how to manipulate and control the just 
man's innocence because of the just man's good-naturedness. These relations 
have to do with the process of the power game as we mentioned above. To be 
just is to be a medium for the working out the interest of the stronger: to be 
unjust is to work for the interest of oneself. W e might think that 
Thrasymachus regards the justice of the just man as a kind of material
44 Guthrie I I I  p. 91
45 In Defense of Thrasymachus, T. Y. Henderson, American Philosophical Quarterly 7 
1970, p. 219
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property accrued from the just man’s just acts, for he thinks that justice is 
the good of another. In this view the justice of the just man will come under 
the property of the unjust i.e. the stronger. The stronger (the unjust) will 
readily seize the justice of the just man. From this respect we can easily 
understand how the unjust man comes to be the stronger according to the 
view of Thrasymachus.
And we must keep in mind that there are degrees of injustice in the 
unjust man. The absolute unjust man requires a great deal of knowledge as 
well as power, for he must know exactly what is to his advantage and how
he can get it in each case. The unjust man's superiority consists in his
intelligence and power (mental and physical). To Thrasymachus the perfect 
example of injustice is the tyrant, for he robs, plunders, and enslaves with 
impunity. He can violate all the moral rules and then justify them at that 
moment. So the life of the unjust man is stronger and more powerful than 
that of the just. A private unjust man (lower in degree) who does not have 
sufficient capability to overreach on a large scale cannot be the stronger in 
Thrasymachus' sense, for he does not have sufficient means to justify his 
interest and position in the name of justice. Only the absolute unjust man 
who has the ability to overreach on a large scale can be the stronger. After 
the process of these power struggles which includes the various struggles 
between the stronger unjust man and the weaker unjust man, between the 
weaker unjust and the just, and between the stronger unjust man and the 
just man, the strongest as a matter of course will come to have an 
advantage in comparison to the other people as a result. The just action of 
the just man can easily work to the interest of the stronger, for the 
stronger's injustice will be always trying to exploit the just action of the 
just man. So it is "a (logical) consequence of acting justly that one becomes 
vulnerable to unjust or unfair exploitation".46 So we can derive from this 
reasoning that justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger, for 
he has the sufficient power to justify his action in the name of justice after
he has got political power. Also we can realise how the just man's justice
has come under the property of the stronger in consequence. As a result we 
can find that Thrasymachus' position is coherent. We can explain this 
procedure by summing it up in the following argument:
46 Ibid. p. 220
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A. The just and justice are in fact the other fellow’s good, while the 
unjust is what profits one's own interest.
B. The just man is always at an disadvantage compared to the unjust 
man, for he does not profit for his own interest.
C. The just man's just act(justice) contributes to the interest of the 
unjust man.
D. The man who has more advantage and interest is more powerful and 
prudent that the man who has not - If he does not have prudence and 
power, he cannot acquire interest and advantage.
E. The unjust man is more powerful and prudent than the just man.
F. The absolute unjust man who is the most prudent and powerful can 
finally come out on top at the end of a power struggle among people.
G. In so far as he is stronger he can violate and control all moral rules, 
and justify his acts in the name of the just in consequence.
H. As a result the just or justice is the interest of the stronger(the 
ruler) at that moment even if it is not just in its essence.
As we mentioned above, the procedure from A to E occurs in the course of a 
power struggle. And the procedure F to H is the result of that power 
struggle. Thrasymachus is simply depicting the real world as he has 
experienced it rather than systematically outlining his own political 
philosophy. In this dialogue also "the ineffectiveness of the Socratic idea is 
displayed in dealing with the powerful claim of the moral sceptic".47 And 
we must think about the alleged fallacies in Thrasymachus' logic which 
underlie the charges against him:4s
47 Annas 1981, p. 57
4 8 Thrasymachan Justice: The Advantage of the Stronger, C. Johnson, Durham
University Journal 1985 pp. 41
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1) "Advantage of the stronger" is contradicted by "obedience to the 
laws" in the case when a ruler is In error as to which laws serve his 
advantage.
2) "Advantage of the stronger" is contradicted by "another's good", in 
two cases:
a) When "another" is not the same as the "stronger" (i.e. ruler), as, for example in the 
private deaiings of subjects among themselves.
b) When the just agent is not the subject but the ruier; for the just ruler, justice as
"another's good" can only mean " advantage of the weaker"
3) "Obedience to the laws" is inconsistent with "another's good" in 
those cases when "another's good" is achieved without obedience to any 
law, e.g., in private relations among subjects.
(1) The first problem is not serious, for as we mentioned above in II 
Thrasymachus does not mention "obedience to law" as his own proposition 
concerning the nature of justice. Indeed he strongly rejects Cleitophon's 
suggestion. Also, his position is based on the result of a power struggle not 
the process of it in this case. Thrasymachus' thinking is entirely 
irrespective of the subject's attitude and opinion. Accordingly this cannot be 
the problem with Thrasymachus' logic. (2) a) In private dealings and social 
relations among people Thrasymachus does not identify "the interest of the 
stronger(the ruler)" with "another's good," for in this stage there are only 
two kinds of people; one is just and the other is unjust. So it is not 
reasonable to identify "another" with "the ruler", b) According to
Thrasymachus' view it is not possible for the just man to be the ruler, for
the ruler's essential characteristic is to know how to use the just man to 
his own ends and exploit the simple just man by means of power and 
prudence, i.e. the most unjust man's characteristic. To the unjust man the 
just or justice is the just man's interest, however, we cannot expect 
justice from him, for he is unjust. (3) We have already mentioned that 
"obedience to the laws" is not related to Thrasymachus' thinking. In 
consequence we can resolve the alleged fallacies of Thrasymachus.
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C o n c lu s io n
Now we have come to realise that Thrasymachus' position is coherent 
in his discussion with Socrates about the nature of justice, and Socrates' 
counterattack falls short of refuting his position. To understand 
Thrasymachus' consistent idea of justice, as we have noted above, his real 
position should be seen as based on the view that "justice and the just are in 
fact the other fellow's good". The main reason why this should be regarded 
as his real position is that from this proposition his first proposition
"justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" can be derived, in 
which Thrasymachus is only concerned to make an impression of daring 
cynicism, rather than to give a definition of justice, and by which he just 
wants to show how this world operates under the name of justice. And we 
have examined that the proposition "justice is nothing other than the 
interest of the stronger" indicates that the term "justice" is a kind of 
resultant and contributing benefit which belongs to the stronger after his 
power struggle to justify his action and interest. His thinking is primarily
concerned with the consequence(result) of the just man's justice with 
respect to the relations of its enactors. So it is baseless to say of him that, 
as an immoralist, he is a hasty and confused thinker, as Annas argues, or 
that he has advanced two different criteria of justice, as Cross and Woozley 
hold. The Socratic fallacy is hidden in that no differences are made between 
the moral terms and the technical terms. Thrasymachus' purpose, as Guthrie 
says, is "to unmask the hypocrisy and show how the meaning of justice is 
being perverted".40 It is apparent that Thrasymachus, having a cynical 
outlook on human morality in general, "interprets 'the interest of the 
stronger' as something like material, worldly advantage of the selfish and 
wicked (stronger) over thé generous and kind(just)".so He intended to offer a
sturdy realistic view, which had the courage to look the facts in the face,
and would not be deceived by fine names. We may agree that his view of the 
world is deeply rooted in sorrowful pessimism; it does not deny justice but 
recognises that "the supreme human value, justice, is not practised in life 
and that he who is forced to conform to it is the victim of the u n ju s t" .S o  
he laments that the gods take no notice of human affairs, or they would not 
have left out justice, as Hermias quotes him.
49 Guthrie II I,  p. 92
50 Johnson 1985, p. 37
The Sophists, M. Untersteiner trans. by K. Freeman, Oxford 1954 p. 325
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Later on in an account of justice Glaucon explains that men reproach 
injustice only, for they are afraid of being unjust, and argues that men are 
just unwillingly because they cannot be unjust(359 b - 360 d). This idea is 
interrelated with Thrasymachus' statement in 344 c: it is not the fear of 
doing but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who 
revile injustice. Also Adeimantus agrees with Thrasymachus' idea (367 c) 
that justice is another's good, the advantage of the stronger, and injustice 
is advantageous and profitable for oneself, but disadvantageous to the
weaker ( .. .  t 6  |ièv S ixa iov dXXoTpiov dyaOdv, ou|ji<l)€pov toO KpciTTOVos, to  6e dSiKov 
aüTg  iAcv au|ji4)€pov Kai X u o itcX o û v, Tw sk i i t t o v i  dovp(|)opv). AI SO Aristotle in his 
explanation of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics (1130 a - 1133 b 32) 
accounts for the view that justice alone of the virtues is "the good of 
others," for it does what is for the interest of another, either as a ruler or 
associate ( 6id  6e to  «O to TOÛTO KoX dXXoTpiov dyaOov 6ok€i e tv a i f| SiKaioouvTi pdv% 
t(3v  dpCTWV, oT i TTpos €T€pov coTiV’ dXXt^ ydp Td oopclîepovTa TrpdTTei, dpxovTi
Koivûjvüf). So we are convinced that Thrasymacus' view of justice is 
persuasive and compelling to both Plato and Aristotle. Socrates also thinks 
that "the just" is some kind of advantage, and does not deny that justice is 
the interest of the stronger. Their (Socrates' and Thrasymachus') 
disagreement is over the interpretation of the real meaning of the phrase 
"justice is the interest of the stronger".
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C O N C L U S I O N
We have examined the ideas of six individual Sophists in detail both 
by concentrating our viewpoint on the Sophists rather than on Socrates, and 
by connecting the ideas of the historical Sophists with those of the Sophists 
as portrayed by Plato in his dialogues. Through our research we have found 
that in many respects their ideas have been distorted, misrepresented and 
exploited by Plato for his own purposes, even though they have coherent 
views, and at the same time that their ideas, once unveiled, reveal multi­
faceted philosophical interests as well as various concerns to do with 
social science. We have also realised that the Sophists' thinking is 
interrelated with pre-Socratic philosophy in developing their own ideas, 
while their anthropological ideas mark the growth of the new intellectual 
movement based on empiricism and relativism. On the other hand we have 
examined whether Plato's logical validity is consistent in developing an 
argument between Socrates and the individual Sophists; however, Plato's 
criticism of the Sophists cannot always be justified from the viewpoint of 
the actual world and logical inference, for Socrates(Plato's mouthpiece) 
employs the so-called Socratic fallacy for the purpose of refuting his 
opponents, as we can see frequently in the course of an argument between 
Socrates and the Sophists.
The Sophists, as portrayed by Plato in their arguments with Socrates, 
raise a lot of philosophical questions which have been repeatedly- 
questioned themes in the history of philosophy. Plato's reflection upon the 
philosophical questions raised by the Sophists is the starting point in his 
philosophical developm ent.^ In the course of the debate between the 
Sophists and Socrates, the Sophists raise fundamental problems in the areas 
of social science and philosophy: the relation between language, fact and
1 The Sophistic Movement, G. B. Kerferd, Cambridge University Press 1981 p. 173
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thinking; the relationship between epistemology and ontology; is it possible 
to say anything false?; nomos, a tyrant over mankind, ordains many things by 
force contrary to physis; why should I follow nomos ordained by others,for 
their own benefit?; how can one learn political excellence?; what is 
ju s tic e?
As far as our research is concerned, as a result of our investigation, 
we can find that the term "immoralist", applied to Callicles by Adkins and 
Annas, is shown to be inaccurate for one who declares the individual's 
natural right against a hypocritical society, for his idea of physis is 
basically derived from the Homeric hero's power and honour with unrivalled 
strength and prowess, closely interrelated with one's competitive 
excellence(dpeTii). As a polymath Hippias has derived his basic ideas from the 
natural philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles. Hippias' idea of physis, as 
revealed in the P ro ta g o ra s , signifies the idea of a more objective and 
lasting universal law, as suggested by Heraclitus' definition of Logos, 
underlying the phenomenal and changeable world. And our detailed analysis 
of Hippias' "the natural continuous bodies of being" has revealed that his 
idea of "being" can be interrelated with Empedocles' theory of effluence, 
based on materialism. To put it another way, "the natural continuous bodies 
of being" implies that the nature and status of material objects exist 
external to us and transmit their representation to our sense perception. 
And we can find the difference between Hippias and Callicles to lie in that 
Hippias claims that democratic equality is too limited as being only for free 
citizens of equal privileges. Protagoras has shown Socrates that his claim 
to be a teacher of the art of politics and to make men good citizens can be 
coherently justifiable through his use of myth and argument. Protagoras, in 
opposition to the other Sophists{Hippias, Antiphon and Callicles), is in the 
position of the upholder of nomos, which is interrelated with his relativism; 
moral standards are regulated according to the current respectability of a 
society. And by analysing Protagoras' way of using words we have come to 
realise that his use of terminology is consistent in his myth and argument, 
when it is used exclusively, and that the ambiguity of Protagoras' 
terminology comes from Socrates, not Protagoras. After an examination of 
the main argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the Republic I we 
have realised that to characterise him as a hasty and confused thinker or a 
mere child in argument is really absurd and baseless, a view stemming from 
a misunderstanding of his consistent view and from prejudice against him.
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We have seen how Thrasymachus' definition of justice; "justice and just are 
the other fellow's good" leads logically to another of his propositions: 
"justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger," since as a result 
of the former proposition the just man always comes out at a disadvantage 
in his relations with the unjust man in the real world. Having a cynical 
outlook on human morality, Thrasymachus has the courage to look the real 
facts in the face rather than hide behind the name of justice. In particular 
Socrates' ineffectiveness is well displayed in dealing with the powerful 
claim of the moral sceptic, for his counterattack falls short of refuting 
Thrasymachus' position in this dialogue. The validity of nomos and the right 
of the individual are expounded by Protagoras, Hippias, Thrasymachus and 
Callicles. The nom os  which creates an arbitrary bond among people is a 
tyrant for Hippias, the pan-Hellenist, whereas for Protagoras, the upholder 
of democratic nomos, the law is the symbol of civilisation which makes men 
respect the legal and moral rights of others for the maintenance of society. 
To Hippias Hellenic citizens are all related and all akin by nature, for like is 
akin by nature to like. So it is against nature to treat people with 
discrimination. Hippias' objective is to set up a more reasonable and lasting 
nomos  which is devoid of arbitrariness. However, Callicles strongly claims 
the natural right of the individual against nom os. Callicles' liberalism has 
reduced all natural criteria to the fulfilment of the individual's desire, so 
his position cannot be maintained to be liberation from artificial nomos, for 
his idea "obedience to what is prescribed by (human)nature" is in fact 
opposed to the ideas of the Sophistic Movement. But Callicles and Socrates 
have a similar view on life in that the fulfilment of the needs of the 
individual human beings is regarded as human excellence, even though their 
positions are absolutely different in respect of what constitutes one's 
fulfilment. Thrasymachus also contrasts the justice of nom os  with the 
justice of physis even though he does not use these antagonistic terms. The 
justice of physis : "the just or justice is in fact the other fellow's good" 
leads to the justice of nomos  : "justice is nothing other than the interest of 
the stronger," in the actual world. On the other hand the thinking of the two 
Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, is investigated in comparison with 
that of the Eleatics. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, basing their arguments 
on the Eleatic logic, raise the question of the identification of "meaning and 
reference", of "coming into being(becoming) and rest", of "one and many," 
arising from the identity of being and the troublesome problem of the verb 
€lvai between the existential meaning and the predicative meaning. They also
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raise a question on the possibility of falsehood. If a man says what is not 
the case, then he talks about nothing. So he is not talking about anything, for 
what is not cannot be spoken of. By an analysis of their application of 
fallacy, whose main aim is to put down their interlocutors, we have 
discovered that the logic and ontology of the Eleatics is closely interrelated 
with the Sophists’ ideas in the respect of developing their systematic 
fallacies, even if they are not natural philosophers.
According to the results of our research we can realise that Plato’s 
charges against the Sophists of immoral teaching and being the corrupters 
of young men cannot be justified. The reason for the general opprobrium and 
disapproval was the ruling class’ objections "to all kinds of people being 
able to secure, simply by paying for it, what the Sophists offer".2 Is it 
possible for us to apply the pejorative traditional sense of the term Sophist 
to Protagoras, Hippias and Thrasymachus? Certainly it is unfair and 
unreasonable to condemn the Sophistic Movement and its agents without 
reservation. On the other hand, as a matter of course, it cannot be denied 
that the method of Euthydemus or Dionysodorus and the viewpoint of 
Callicles might invite misunderstanding of the whole movement and the 
Sophists as a whole. So if we ask "who are the Sophists?," we cannot easily 
answer or define them in a word. Our mistake arises from attempting to 
come to a general characterisation of the Sophistic Movement and the 
Sophists. The only subject all the Sophists taught and studied in common 
might be suggested to be the art of language within a comprehensive 
meaning.3
When a man awakens, disillusioned by his blind belief, in a period of 
social change, and then looks into what he has believed and obeyed, he will 
at once enjoy his self-assertion and fear his endowment with reason and 
freedom, for he must assume responsibility for it. Under these conditions 
his responses may be diverse and sometimes illogical in both thinking and 
behaviour. However, he must face two alternatives according to his own 
interpretation of the world in which he lives: one is to trust human reason, 
the other is to create a more perfect ideal than the broken one by ignoring 
human rational power. We should keep this attitude in mind when we think 
about the Sophistic Movement as one which marked a turning point from the
2 Ibid 1981 p. 26
3 A History of Greek Philosophy II I,  W. K. C. Guthrie 1969, p. 44
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closed society to the open society; this is because of the extension of 
perspective it involved, which favoured a belief in progress and the 
development of humanism in the history of human beings. However, it cannot 
be denied that the process of the intellectual movement in this period had 
harmful effects. The pupils of the Sophists might identify the new 
rationalism with the realisation of their own desires, i.e. an unconstrained 
freedom "to get the better of others" and to venture to shake off what were 
regarded as moral fetters and obligations, as can be seen in the cases of 
Callicles, Alcibiades and Critias. But who were responsible for these cases? 
Blaming the Sophists as a whole "for the few black sheep"(Callicles, 
Euthydemus or Dionysodorus) is surely unreasonable and unfair.4 Where there 
are liberals, there are always conservatives. Action always brings about 
reaction, so positive intellectualism gives rise to anti-intellectualism, for 
"the new rationalism carried with it real as well as imaginary dangers for 
the social order".5 As Popper puts it, "Individualism, equalitarianism, faith 
in reason and love of wisdom were new, powerful, and, from the point of 
view of the enemies of the open society, dangerous sentiments that had to 
be fought".6 The Sophists' democratic and liberal ideas are counterattacked 
by Plato's authoritarian ideas of class distinctions based on his idealism. So 
the Sophists must have invited opprobrium and disapproval from the 
Athenian ruling class, for they claimed "to teach in what at Athens was 
thought to be for the right people" even if they were not Athenian leaders or 
teachers.7 In the course of the arguments between the Sophists and Socrates 
we can see plenty of evidence of the conflict between the liberalism of the 
Sophists, who regard history as progress, and the classicism of Socrates or 
Plato, who regards history as regress. The two sides are at odds with each 
other particularly over the identification and origin of justice and laws. The 
victor, in the process of action and reaction, inevitably manipulates his 
opponents to justify his own action, as we have seen in the main chapters. 
So the Sophists are destined to be unfairly criticised and sacrificed to 
Plato's own purposes. And we must note that traditionally scholars have 
been generous to Socrates even if he attacks and refutes his opponents by 
means of the so-called Socratic fallacy. Of course Plato should bear the 
blame for this logical fallacy.
4 Ibid p. 36
5 The Greeks and the Irrational, E. R. Dodds, University of California Press 1951 p. 191
6 The Open Society and its Enemies I, K. R. Popper, Routledge and Kegan Paul Reprinted 
1973 p. 199
7 Guthrie II I,  1969 p.40
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Plato and Aristotle emphasise that the Sophists taught for pay and 
that their teaching was immoral: Gorgias earned and took away with him a 
large sum of money (Hippias Major 282 b); Prodicus made an astonishing 
amount of money by giving demonstrations to the young(ibid c); a Sophist is 
an impostor who makes money out of an apparent but unreal 
wisdom(Sop/7/sf/c/ Elenchi 165 a21). However, against their views Isocrates 
states(XV. 155): overall none of those known as the Sophists will be found to 
have accumulated much money, but some lived in poor, other in moderate 
circumstances.® The conventional way of slandering someone's honour or 
reputation is to stigmatise them as a mere money-maker or a man of 
immorality. It is true that the Sophists educated the well-to-do who could 
afford it and who aspired to be the power élite of Athens, for supply could 
not meet demand. As Adkins argues, "it is the rich who, even in a society 
which is a democracy in name, will give advice in assembly and hold the 
most important offices".9 Across the ages and countries of the world, one's 
social success or influence usually depends on one's property and means. 
Plato's and Aristotle's testimony suggests that the Sophists came to Athens 
to teach immoral subjects for the purpose of making money. We must 
differentiate the means from the end. They came from non-Athenian cities, 
so, if they did not receive pay for their teaching, they could not survive. And 
"there was no prejudice in Greece against earning a living as such".io And it 
is ironic to discover that "Plato's Academy charged fees and high ones at 
that". 11
Aristotle calls Aristippus a Sophist, and Xenophon gives Antisthenes 
that name (Arist. Metaphysics iii 2. 996 and Xenophon Symposium iv. I.). Both 
of these were Socrates' disciples. Ironically Timon(B.C. 320-230), the friend 
of Pyrrho, classified all philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, under 
the name of Sophists(Diogenes Laertius ix 65). We might interpret this in 
two ways. From the positive viewpoint the original meaning of the word 
Sophist, i.e. a person distinguished for knowledge in a particular subject, 
could have been in continuous popular use until the time of Timon, and so 
attached to all philosophers. Or from the negative viewpoint the term
® Kerferd 1981 p. 26
9 Merit and Responsibility, A. W. H. Adkins, Oxford University Press 1960 p 197
10 Guthrie I I I ,  p. 38
11 The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics, E, A. Havelock, London 1957 p. 162
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Sophist might be used by him for the purpose of deriding or disdaining them 
with a certain odious connotation. If the latter were true, then we might 
guess that the term Sophist was a convenient and favourite weapon for 
attacking one's opponents, irrespective of their ideas or profession, as Plato 
might do. As we can understand, the strength of the effect attaching the 
term Sophist to another person depends on one's position and influence in 
the history of ideas. Because of the habitual respect for the great 
philosopher Plato, Timon's attribution of the term Sophist to Plato has not 
been made widely known. Even if people do know of it, they usually ignore 
the fact. In this respect, as Thrasymachus says, justice is nothing other 
than the interest of the stronger.
What we have examined through conjecture and incomplete evidence 
are only "the fragmentary remains and traditions of a great movement in 
human thought".i^Suffice it to say that our research will have fulfilled its 
purpose if it is accepted as an attempt to explain the supposed relationship 
between the historical Sophists and the Sophists of the Platonic dialogues, 
for we cannot have confidence in Plato's description of the Sophists because 
of his hostile attitude. However, it is encouraging that interest in the 
historical and intellectual Sophists has now much more general appeal than 
before, for the major scholars of the modern world are not Platonists who 
posit an ultimate reality for the explanation of our world, but rather base 
their thinking on the empiricism or phenomenalism which Plato disregards 
as dealing merely with a copy of the real world.
12 Kerferd 1981 p. 174
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